

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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
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HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, Editor of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* * * * **McGEORGE BUNDY**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; former Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University; joint author, with Henry L. Stimson, of "On Active Service in Peace and War" * * * **LORD FRANKS OF HEADINGTON** (the former Sir Oliver Franks), Provost of Worcester College, Oxford; British Ambassador to the United States, 1948-52; Chairman, Lloyds Bank Limited, 1954-62 * * * **PHILIP E. MOSELY**, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; former Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; Political Adviser, European Advisory Committee, 1944-45; author of "The Kremlin and World Politics" and other works * * * **GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY**, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe, and Military Governor of the U.S. Zone in Germany, 1947-49; recently President Kennedy's personal representative in West Berlin * * * **KONRAD ADENAUER**, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic since 1949; President of the Christian Democratic Party * * * **MAURICE SCHUMANN**, member of the French National Assembly since 1945; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-54; Minister Delegate of Regional Planning until his resignation in May 1962 * * * **MARGARET MEAD**, Associate Curator of Ethnology, American Museum of Natural History; frequently engaged in anthropological studies in the South Pacific since 1928; author of many works in the general field * * * **BARBARA WARD JACKSON**, formerly Assistant Editor of *The Economist*, London; author of "The West at Bay," "The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations" and other works * * * **THE EARL OF AVON**, K.G., P.C., M.C. (formerly Sir Anthony Eden), Prime Minister, 1955-57; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935-38, 1940-45 and 1951-55; author of "Full Circle" and other works * * * **WILLIAM L. LANGER**, Coolidge Professor of Modern History, Harvard University; author of "The Diplomacy of Imperialism" and other works * * * **SIR ABUBAKAR TFAWA BALEWA**, P.C., Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria * * * **SEKOU TOURE**, President of the Republic of Guinea * * * **BERTRAM D. WOLFE**, former Chief of the Ideological Advisory Staff of the Voice of America; author of "Three Who Made a Revolution," "Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost" and other works * * * **DONALD S. ZAGORIA**, staff member of the RAND Corporation; author of "The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961" * * * **ROBERT J. ALEXANDER**, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University; author of "Prophets of the Revolution" and co-author of "The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America" * * * **HUGH THOMAS**, English historian, member of the British Foreign Office, 1954-56; author of "The Spanish Civil War."

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries FOREIGN AFFAIRS can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.

The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 41

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No. 1

THEN AND NOW

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

FOREIGN policy is not a game of chess, though it is often called that. There is no fixed board and there is no book of rules to say that a certain move will be successful or that a contrary one will fail. The treatises on diplomacy are guides to techniques. Books of etiquette that tell how to hold a teacup or fold a handkerchief do not help when the ceiling falls in the parlor or a baby must be delivered in a taxicab. So with diplomacy, the human factors determine whether an emergency is handled well or badly.

The most telling factors are often the unspectacular ones—character, good sense, stamina and adaptability. Craftiness and professional finesse also count, of course; great liars, great bluffers and great gamblers have their day. But when manipulators of history forget that the pieces they plan to move about have minds of their own they can be abysmally wrong. What blunders could be more colossal than Stalin's calculation that it would be profitable to let Hitler loose against the West, or Hitler's deliberate choice to fight on two fronts, or Mussolini's decision to sell Italy cheap to the loser?

It of course is open to sober and experienced statesmen to make "right" moves or "wrong" ones in compromising the ideal and the practicable, program and decision. What turns out well may have been due partly to good luck or the rashness of the antagonist and what ends unsatisfactorily may nevertheless have been the best choice between two uninviting alternatives. In the climactic emergency, war against a remorseless enemy, the closest a nation may come to winning, even given wise and indomitable leadership, is not to lose. This is infinitely more, however, than is ad-

mitted by people who argue that wars never "settle" anything. Germany and Italy are independent going concerns again. But did Hitler reserve the same fate for defeated France, Britain and the United States? The Punic Wars settled something for Carthage; there is not even a Carthaginian history of them. Not to lose enables you to go on, probably with increased responsibilities, possibly with increased wisdom, at any rate to go on. This truism is comforting, for it tells us not to be overcome by a sense of incompleteness, of failure, when peace is not as we had pictured it and victory instead of letting us relax increases our burdens.

The 1919 peace was made by statesmen of unusual capacity, many of them of great good will. But among the parts of the settlement which survived, at least for a decisive period, were the punitive ones, while the idealistic experiment counted on to rectify mistakes and conciliate new disputes was left virtually inoperative. No one can certify how different the next 20 years would have been if our public and Senate had realized fully that, like it or not, accept it or resist it, the United States was now destined to playing a world role. This was not the premise, however, on which the debate about membership in the League of Nations proceeded. In its final and crudest terms, the argument was whether or not membership would be an entangling alliance; actually and realistically, the question was whether the United States, already "entangled," could play its role more effectively and safely inside an international organization or outside. We cannot know for certain how an opposite course would have turned out; the ifs of history are inscrutable. But whatever the causes, the peace of 1919 was only a truce.

It was almost at the start of that truce, 40 years ago, that the first issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS appeared. Its sponsors were a group of men who realized that the euphoric moment hailed as "normalcy" would not last. Their purpose was to help dispel the American people's illusion that they could ever return, as they were hankering to do, to the nineteenth-century world of irresponsibility. It was not their intention to support specific policies but to gain recognition that a new situation existed and that there must be new policies and actions to deal with it. The public would make up their own minds, on the basis of information from many sources and widely differing opinions, what those policies and actions ought to be.

It was indeed a fact, as the next 20 years would be enough to

prove, that the page of history which had been turned had been turned for all. Every part of the world was now to suffer or prosper with every other part, there was to be no escape from man's common fate behind oceans, mountains or man-made barriers, and this would be true whether the common fate proved to be progress or retrogression, tolerable or intolerable, evolved freely through conscientious trial and error or tyrannically imposed.

Science and technology have now gone on to wipe out the remaining limits to the area of common concern. Changes in classes within nations and of status among nations have brought new types of leadership to the fore, and the creation of an international forum has given them all voice. Conquests over disease and benevolent efforts to help backward nations to better living conditions have proved old population charts wrong and made the new ones dubious. But although the phenomena of our day are indeed revolutionary, in a larger perspective they are seen as successive steps in a long-maturing process that had suddenly become irreversible and universal in 1914-19. Problems were to increase in number, complexity and immediacy, but henceforth they would have the same scope, a world scope. The first war had demonstrated that the world is round and the second would state it in terms that Americans could no longer avoid. Nuclear fission, by making actions and reactions simultaneous everywhere, simply added stunning emphasis to the fact.

II

After the second war, then, the premise of American foreign policy shifted as a matter of course from the static to the active, from the conservative to the creative. Those in charge might, of course, perform well or badly, make "right" moves or "wrong" ones; but their plans and efforts must reach out along new lines, for the geography of the world was new, not just new on the maps—though there the changes made or in prospect were startling enough—but new in the social forces everywhere at work. Peoples formerly only half awake were clamoring for independence, ready or not, and expecting a better life and all sorts of assistance in achieving it; older, more settled and prosperous societies were conscious as never before of the pressure of these claims and of their duty and interest (not to say compulsion) to help satisfy them. New problems were appearing on every hand on top of the unsettled old ones. American leaders were deluged by demands

and counter-demands, cajolings and threats, from allies, allies turned antagonists and peoples struggling to become nations.

As power in the world became polarized, the concern of statesmen, not only in Washington and Moscow but in all capitals, was more and more concentrated on fluctuations in the relative standing of the two great contestants. To every rumor of the intentions of either side, true or false, to every estimate of capabilities, reasoned or rash, new means of communication gave wings. Every threat carried with it intimations of wholesale destruction. It was in this overcharged atmosphere that American policy-makers had to operate. The problems were vaster than their predecessors had faced in the period after 1919, and their antagonists more powerful and provocative. Yet among the new factors in the situation were several which proved helpful.

For one thing, relations with the ex-enemies returned to normal much sooner than had happened after the first war; and although disagreements appeared among the Allies, they were less injurious than those that had split Allied ranks after the first war and had smoothed the way as early as 1922 for Germany to make an alliance with Russia. The Western Allies decided, when their first anger had cooled, to end sanctions against the defeated states and draw them back into the world of free and equal nations. After the Nuremberg trials and the punishment of leading Nazis, American relations with the part of Germany which was not held by the Russians rapidly approached normal; and a similar evolution in relations with Japan followed the end of the occupation there. In the case of Germany, this sprang partly from a realization that if the cycle of German aggression, defeat, punishment and new aggression was ever to be broken it must be done by the victors, which meant that they must avoid creating a Versailles-like passion for revenge. But the strongest incentive to moderation was self-interest: to establish the broadest front possible against the wartime ally looming up as the next menace to peace. In consequence, American leaders did not have to reckon with resurgent imperialism and militarism in the defeated nations, nor did they get embroiled in disputes like those over war debts, reparations, the Ruhr and the Rhineland that distracted Allied statesmen for so long after 1919.

A second change in the field of American diplomatic operations was more basic. This time there existed an international organization with more power than was ever granted the League of

Nations; we belonged to it; and we could strongly influence its deliberations and decisions. This is not a reference to our right of veto, but to the fact that we have not had to exercise that right—a measure in itself of the influence which we and our Allies exert and of the degree of support received from other members.

Negotiating simultaneously among 104 nations is a test of nerves and tempers, as also of the saving sense of humor which is, after all, only the obverse of a sense of proportion. American diplomacy has nevertheless found new strength in the experience, for it has acquired the opportunity and right to discuss world problems from the moment they arise and participate in attempts to settle them before they reach a crisis stage. It is safer as well as more constructive to be involved in the attempt to settle disputes than to find ourselves involved in the consequences of their not being settled. In the process everybody learns. We learn in detail the pros and cons of each case; and the parties concerned become thoroughly aware of our position, and can take account of it before committing themselves to actions which we shall have to oppose.

This is an important change from the past.

In 1914 the United States had no part in the frantic interchanges of advice and warning that took place before the European powers, in panic and confusion, plunged into war. Given the limited requirements of American security up to that time, and the traditions of American diplomacy, it seems fantastic to suppose that we could suddenly have become a primary factor in the efforts to slow down Russian mobilization or deter the Kaiser from invading Belgium. The United States was still considered callow and by habit stood somewhat aloof (President Theodore Roosevelt's mediation between Russia and Japan and his part in calling the Second Hague Peace Conference were exceptions). Friendly suggestions or pressure from Washington would almost certainly have failed to induce the powers to accept mediation or even enter into the sober sort of discussions in which their jealousies and apprehensions might have been allayed.

Or is this taking what happened as inevitable because it happened? I cannot forget a remark made to me after the war by Raymond Poincaré. The first objective of a peace-maker, he said, is to secure delay, for with time everything becomes possible; there is always a chance of avoiding war until the first enemy soldier crosses a frontier and the first enemy shot is fired. He was

not implying that peace is always possible on acceptable terms; he would have considered Munich an exorbitant price to pay for delay and would have had no illusions that it would bring "peace in our time." He meant that negotiation for a compromise which might satisfy Austria-Hungary and save Serbian independence was possible until the Germans invaded Belgium. Sir Edward Grey was in fact making desperate efforts in July and the first days of August to slow down the pace of events and he was criticized afterward for having given an impression that Britain might stand aside, thus encouraging the Central Powers. It is just conceivable, I suppose, that if Grey had been supported energetically by the United States the joint effort might have had the opposite effect and tipped the balance in favor of negotiation.

More relevant is the fact that the United States, even after its experience in the first war, did not participate effectively in the efforts made to avoid the second. Its inability to influence events between the culmination of the appeasement policy at Munich in September 1938 and Hitler's invasion of Poland a year later raises interesting speculations. The proposed Geneva Protocol of 1924 had offered the League of Nations the last chance to become an effective organization. First it was unanimously adopted, then rejected, mainly due to the opposition of Canada on the score that the commitments involved were unnecessary, unequal and risky ("We live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials," said Mr. Raoul Dandurand, a remark that has given him a place in history). If the United States had been a member of the League and willing to accept those commitments, would Canada have refused? What would have been the political evolution of the Weimar Republic after Stresemann brought it into a League where the United States was playing a full role? Would Hitler have been permitted to seize Austria unopposed, and afterward Czechoslovakia? Without those successes, would he have proceeded with such confidence to his final gamble? It was partly in response to a suggestion from President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the Munich conference was called; but after that fiasco, the influence of his letters and telegrams was not significant. His hands, of course, were tied by the Neutrality Act of 1937. Congress had been interested only in legislation to keep America out of war and ignored warnings that the embargo on the sale of arms gave an advantage to heavily-armed aggressors over peaceful and less prepared victims. Hitler's contempt for

Britain and France was matched by what he felt for the United States—soft and escapist, an absentee from the march of history. In the circumstances, it is most unlikely that at the last moment, particularly once Hitler had received a green light from Stalin, he would have been deterred by rational argument or a belated threat from across the Atlantic. All we know is that America was in fact “absent” and that this absence did not prevent Pearl Harbor.

For a second time we entered into a great war when it was already half lost.

Here, then, we come to the chief advantage that membership in a world organization gives any nation that cannot avoid being drawn into a world conflict. It was an advantage which appealed to Senator Vandenberg at San Francisco as an offset to the Soviet intention, already evident, to make the United Nations as weak as possible. The final Soviet effort at San Francisco aimed at denying the right of any nation to bring to the Security Council or the General Assembly a complaint of wrong done or threatened. Our delegation announced that unless this right was established the United States would not sign the Charter. “If we are able to talk,” I remember Senator Vandenberg saying late one evening when the issue was hanging fire, “and if we talk as we should, we shall be heard. And if we are not heard, we will know what to do next.” The Soviet Union backed down and agreed that there would be unlimited discussion in the United Nations of any complaint brought to it by any member, free from veto. There must have been questioning in Moscow ever since as to whether it would not have been better to let the prospective world organization go on without Soviet membership than subject Soviet delegates to the public discomforts they have suffered in New York. But for us the open debate that throws dictators into a frenzy is a strength and safeguard.

III

Of course the fundamental change for American diplomacy was that this time the American people as a whole, looking at the world with eyes opened by a second terrible experience, saw that their interests and responsibilities reached to every part of it. This meant that their leaders could enter without hesitation into a policy of active international coöperation; and with the public behind them, they did so.

Where the Senate had rejected the League of Nations, it accepted membership in the United Nations almost unanimously, and public opinion would not have let it do otherwise. As soon as the war ended in the Pacific, following the atomic attack on Hiroshima, the Truman Administration offered to share control of the atom bomb and proposed measures for doing so safely; only Soviet opposition prevented a coöperative experiment that might have headed off the atomic arms race. UNRRA operations to rehabilitate territories freed from the Axis and repatriate refugees were looked on by Americans as humanitarian work that had to be done as a matter of course. The Marshall Plan followed. There was a feeling at the grass roots all over the country that since the United States had been spared the devastation and frightful losses of its allies, it in conscience owed them help in getting back onto their feet; without this feeling and support, the commercial advantages promised by the Marshall Plan would not have been enough to secure favorable action by the Senate. Aid to the underdeveloped countries was an American concept, and it appealed to the American people on both practical and humanitarian grounds. They had never so much as heard the names of many of the beneficiaries, but they did not demur at very large yearly appropriations to assist them in laying a firmer basis for independence. The total of American foreign aid to date is something over \$95 billion. The expenses of United Nations functions in the Middle East and the Congo, not provided for in the regular U.N. budget, were covered mainly by contributions from the United States. The Peace Corps has appealed to Americans of all ages, especially the young and idealistic. The Alliance for Progress is a new initiative in a troubled area that had felt slighted after the Good Neighbor Policy petered out. The activities of the International Bank are carried on mainly with American capital. Other such enterprises could be cited, besides the world-wide activities of the Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie and other private foundations, not duplicated in any other country.

This time, then, the American Government and people showed by decisive actions that they knew at last that they were and must be in every sense a world power. Other nations took a little time to adjust their ways of thinking to the new situation. Europe found a sense of both new security and new insecurity in the fact that now there were two instead of many "great powers." Asia and Africa at first felt left out of our attentions. There was joy

when at last we entered earnestly into our duties as grand almoner, even though it was flawed by uncertainty as to what this might mean in interference in their ways of life and their ambitions, good and bad.

In Europe, American wealth, resources and good will had been respected, but our use—rather, lack of use—of our potentialities less so. The notion that the American character was messianic, impractical and boringly moralistic had taken hold in the time of Woodrow Wilson. The Senate's rejection of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations and the failure to ratify the treaty of defense which we had signed with Britain and France were taken as proof of a built-in weakness in our form of government, leading inevitably to inconsistency in our foreign policy and unreliability in our foreign commitments. Europe's picture of this millionaire with a split personality, alternating between idealism and self-interest, vast generosity and noncommittal prudence, did not inspire trust. Secretary Kellogg's suggestion of a pact renouncing war, but without provision for sanctions against a transgressor, seemed typical; the idea was accepted at once, but as events unfolded it did not add to the reputation of American statesmen for being realistic.

Since 1919, the old European democracies had longed for us to be committed to partnership with them. Now that we were committed beyond all expectations, they began to wonder whether we might not try to impose our will in Europe incautiously and beyond their means to resist. Above all, how to be sure we would not make reckless use of our overwhelming atomic power? The massive-retaliation thesis caused alarmists to predict that one day Washington would suddenly turn "trigger happy" and bring on the very cataclysm that we claimed our atomic supremacy would prevent. At that time the Soviets had not yet acquired the capability of launching an atomic "first strike," so that the possibility in theory existed. Today, if any of us on this side of the Atlantic ever nourished the illusion that we would be "safer" than Europeans in an atomic war, we can do so no longer. For we are not in fact safer, or even as safe. A Soviet "first strike" must necessarily be directed against the United States, the seat of decisive retaliatory power. American strategists understand this perfectly; and the knowledge seems to be spreading in Europe also.

Neutralist leaders, too, might take this reality into account

before implying that our decision to maintain at least nuclear parity with the Soviets is in some way frivolous—"playing with the safety of the world." The forces threatening our existence as a free people are (to put it mildly) at least as real and imminent as those which they believe menace theirs. The threat we see, whether they see it or not, is to be taken as a given fact in our relations with all the rest of the world.

It being in the nature of governments to blunder occasionally, our allies naturally enough worry that sometime something we do may involve them in troubles they cannot control. To an extent this is unavoidable, not because we arrogantly desire to manage their destinies but because of the nature of the nuclear weapon which is in our hands and which is the principal shield of the whole community. But incidents outside what might be called the range of inevitable risks cause worry too—the audacious U-2 flights, for instance, and perhaps more than the incident itself the clumsy and even mendacious way we handled the discovery of it; or our bungled part in the effort of Cuban refugees to overthrow Castro. The revolution in the American attitude toward the use of power abroad—the change from thinking of it as exceptional and temporary to accepting it as inevitable and continuous—has taken place in a brief period of time. It would be astonishing if we did not slip occasionally in our exercise of that power; and we must admit we have done so. The wonder is that the two ill-fated enterprises cited have not been held against us longer and more deeply. Perhaps people felt enough sympathy with their purpose if not the execution to remember them differently than, for instance, they remember the Soviet tanks rolling down the Budapest streets, gun turrets swinging.

In our search for a *modus vivendi* with the Soviets we sometimes have been ahead of our European associates in firmness, sometimes in conciliation. Thus criticism on one score has tended to offset criticism on the other. Some say that our position on Berlin is too adamant; others disapprove of our willingness even to negotiate on the subject. Two opinions exist about our role in the arms and nuclear test discussions—we are "dragging our feet," we are "being led down the garden path," we are dangerously hard, we are dangerously soft. There is disagreement as to how well we have been exercising our lonely responsibility in Asia. The British have differed with us over our attitude toward the two Chinese régimes and the French over our en-

deavor to save independence for the remnants of the former French domain in Indochina.

The extent to which we should share our knowledge of nuclear development and how to control nuclear weapons jointly are still unsolved problems of the alliance; scientific discovery and technological advance have dizzyingly outpaced the evolution of political institutions, and here as elsewhere we are only at the beginning of the effort to suit national and group relationships to the requirements of an age in which man-made devices disregard boundaries and can alter the force of alliances and of enmities. In these circumstances one or another of our allies easily comes to believe that at certain points we are exceeding our prerogatives. And we feel in turn, for reasons that need not be spelled out here, that an ally may become so preoccupied with special interests that he injures the larger interest of us all. In our position, however, we cannot expect to be more than relatively comfortable. Problems arising with one member are sure to affect the rest, and when all the interests in play cannot be reconciled we shall be lucky to get a not-too-sulky acceptance of a compromise.

The members of the Atlantic Alliance are free with their criticisms, but there have not been recriminations. If the Anglo-French-American partnership which is the core of the alliance could stand the test of Suez, there must be an overriding sense of common destiny between the three nations, survivors together of the two greatest wars of history. Will it continue to prevail? Out of enlightened self-interest, it must. The dangers we have been living through these past 15 years or more have not decreased, are not decreasing and at any moment may increase. We shall surmount them in the future only as we have done in the past, together.

Together, too, our peoples will be able not only to keep on living but to live lives of expanding opportunity. Today Western society has within reach the means to accomplish all that it should desire or deserve, material and immaterial, more richly than ever before. The European Common Market points the way. We have refused to view it as a potentially dangerous competitor, as might easily have happened before the war, and from the start have strongly encouraged it instead of trying to obstruct or disrupt it. President Kennedy, casting a hopeful look beyond, intimates that if federation succeeds in Europe it might open the way for writing a new chapter of history on an even

wider theme. The West stands only at the threshold of such achievements. Whether we shall bring them to pass will depend on our ability to keep the peace.

The knowns and unknowns of the space age are intruding more and more into the old relationships. The tides of time, not predictable like the rise and fall of the oceans, have suddenly carried us well along toward shores which 40 years ago were not thought to be within measurable reach. But while astronauts circle the earth today, plan to reach the moon tomorrow and have designs on the virginity of Venus a few days later, we are so engrossed in the competitive aspects of these exploits that we have not taken the time to form clear opinions—let alone rational policies based on them—about what they mean for the majority of human beings who seem likely to continue dwelling on earth and having political relations with their neighbors. Daring research and personal courage have combined pure science and pure power into a team that pushes moral and philosophical considerations into the corner and makes traditional diplomatic methods and even objectives archaic. More and more, obviously, the universal is going to determine the terrestrial. It is time we caught our breath and began intensive inquiries into the problems that will arise along the astral ways, so that the knowledge of nature now being unfolded may be made useful to humanity in the highest sense, and not disastrous. (Is it too much to hope that whoever lands first on the moon's sterile crust will not unfold a national flag but set a stone dedicating the lunar territories to the human race?)

No one can say at a given moment, even approximately, what degree of confidence and respect American foreign policy commands around the world. Sometimes, as we have seen, we are thought to use our power unwisely. But there no longer is any doubt, as there was four decades ago, that we shall use it. Nor does there seem to be any questioning that it will be used with a purpose and energy which in the environment of those days was inconceivable. If this is indeed the case, the change can be put down not only to the integrity of American leadership in the years since the war but most of all to the matter-of-fact way in which the American people moved into their new position and accepted the widening responsibilities that came with it. This has meant everything to the proper conduct of our foreign relations. Without steady backing, a Truman, Eisenhower or Ken-

nedy could not have pursued a strong foreign policy, and if he had tried would have ended like Wilson in frustration. Knowledge that they had the support of a politically conscious and informed public opinion has brought our Presidents and Secretaries of State inner strength and assurance; and it has convinced the foreign leaders with whom they have had to deal that the United States would "stay the course." It is a performance—and a verdict—that our enemies have noted with astonishment and bitter disappointment.

IV

In an article in the first issue of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* Elihu Root wrote these sentences, since then often quoted:

When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war is in mistaken beliefs. The world will be the gainer for the change, for, while there is no way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary education, with correct information about their relations to other peoples, about the limitations upon their own rights, about their duties to respect the rights of others, about what has happened and is happening in international affairs, and about the effects upon the national life of the things that are done or refused as between nations; so that the people themselves will have the means to test misinformation and appeals to prejudice and passion based on error.

Autocracies and oligarchies have not vanished; they still encumber the road. Nor will anyone claim that there is the free exchange of information and opinion which can prevent the spread of mistaken beliefs, or that the danger of wars has receded as a result of the attainment on any general scale of these or the other objectives described by Mr. Root as desirable and necessary. But if as a people we have become more mature in our view of world affairs, have increased our ability to test misinformation and appeals to prejudice based on error, and are more determined and better prepared to throw our weight with that of like-minded nations against those of sinister purpose, then the world is indeed a gainer by the change. For as history unfolds it is in company with those who knowingly commit themselves to the side of freedom, security and peace that mankind will prefer to risk its destiny. If over the past 40 years *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* has contributed in any degree to this result its first sponsors would be satisfied.

FRIENDS AND ALLIES

By McGeorge Bundy

FOREIGN AFFAIRS is forty years old—and the modern foreign affairs of the United States are less than ten years older. The problems we have today—of technology, conflict, alliance and hope—have little relation to the times of the Founders, the ordeal of Lincoln, or even the turning days of Cleveland, McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. It is August 1914, with its alerting record of the stakes of diplomacy and of the enormous damage that ordinary well-trained men can do, which reminds us that Woodrow Wilson at his typewriter, and all of his successors, have had to live with world-wide danger, world-wide power, and so world-wide responsibility.

Many forces are a part of this revolution, but one which holds special fascination for the student of our history is our sudden and multifarious involvement with a host of friends. In traditional terms the most remarkable change in our foreign relations is that we now have formal alliances with 42 nations. Moreover, in most cases these are not merely formal ties of contingent commitment, but major operating day-to-day connections. Beyond these alliances we have major working relations too, especially in Africa and Asia, with dozens of nations which are friends, though not allies.

II

The central problem in all these relations is how to establish reciprocity. We are unique, in the non-Communist world, in our strength and wealth. We are also unique in our record of assistance to almost everybody. This has happened by choice; our help to others has been designed to serve our own wide interests, and with exceptions it has done so. But what we had to do for so many after 1945 we ought not now to do for many countries alone—or for some countries at all. At the same time we must give new and urgent attention to the needs of other nations—in and out of the Western Hemisphere—which were not on our priority list in the first decade after the second war.

We are thus required to move toward new relations of mutual respect and interlocking performance with those to whom we are traditionally connected. Some of our oldest friends, in new

strength, are fortunately raising a louder voice in world affairs—and where their efforts match their claims it is not only necessary but satisfying to meet their desires. Others, proud and brave as they are, have come to accept and depend upon not only our strength but our wealth in ways which cannot lead to good, if unmatched by efforts of self-help. Yet not one of our allies is unimportant to us—not one but has claims on our support in proper and productive ways. The task is to find courses of behavior which will meet our obligations, sustain our connections, assist in self-reliance, and rest on reciprocity. It is not easy.

The half-dozen alliances in which these forty-odd partners are gathered have a family resemblance, in their formal clauses, which obscures the great variety of the real relationships involved. The passion for such treaties which marked the mid-fifties derived from a rather simple reflex to the Korean War. We have learned that while the danger of such direct aggression persists, there are other dangers against which a pact gives no automatic assurance. Time has made plain what forms obscured, and we now recognize that SEATO is not the same as NATO; all its members do not have common interests or purposes that compare in weight and character to those which bind the Atlantic Alliance together. As the central power of this alliance, we have real and important relations with all its members—but the meaning of our key relation to a country like Thailand in this area is different from the meaning of our relation to some other members with less at stake; when the same treaty is used to cover everyone, we must look past the paper to the facts.

Even in NATO there is a persistent tension between the formal identity of mutual guarantees and the real relations of the members with each other. The alliance is not defined merely by its operating paragraphs, any more than it is defined merely by its formally assigned forces. It is not even defined entirely by the full relation of all its members to one another. The security of Sweden or Austria is intimately related to what NATO is and does. The safety of all Europe and of North America requires NATO. It is dangerous to believe that all of the importance of this great alliance rests in any one element of its existence, and it is here that one can sympathize with General de Gaulle when he asserts that the organization and the alliance are not the same thing. His own vision of right relationships may not be ours, but he is right to remind us that nothing so important can be wholly defined in terms of specific present practices.

In all our alliances, though the forms are multilateral, the lines that pass in and out of Washington, bilaterally, have a special importance. Even in NATO, where there are other powers of major importance and where the general hope is that a new Europe may engage with us in a new level of partnership, there is great significance in the lines from London or Bonn to Washington. If France and the United States can find a way around their honest differences—a search to which the present Washington Administration remains fully committed—it will be clearer to others that Paris-Washington is also a crucial line of force. Indeed, the importance of this line is evident even when it is—as at present—temporarily and partially out of order. The two countries remain bound by common interests, that dwarf their differences, and certainly on the side of the United States the existence of disagreement is no bar to high regard for France and her President. Indeed, the honest recognition of such differences can be a step toward improved understanding; clearly it is better than any facile assumption that harmony can always be found in a simple acceptance of the unspoken desires or demands of others.

The troubled state of our relations with France leads naturally to the question of nuclear relations among allies. What is urgently important here is not the question of what role Europeans may come to play. That is a major question and a most difficult one, but it needs sober thought and discussion, probably continuing for a long time ahead. In such discussion the United States will aim to play a fully responsive part. But what really matters at present is what has been repeatedly and emphatically stated by the President. It is that now, and for as far ahead as we can see, our nuclear strength is committed to the support of the alliance. We have not made our pledge to the defense of Europe in any lighthearted or limited way; for the fulfillment of commitments most solemnly and advisedly undertaken, our whole strength serves the whole North Atlantic area. This is at once a fundamental principle, a fact of deployment and an imperative of nuclear strategy. Beside this reality much recent dialectical discussion of details of nuclear tactics is pompous nonsense. Where and how the nuclear defenses of NATO should be deployed and engaged are of course important questions, but they are questions wholly subordinate to the reality that the whole strength of the United States, including its whole nuclear strength, is engaged for Europe's freedom—which is only another way of saying what is ob-

vious, namely, that it is engaged for our own freedom. And this is not the commitment of a single moment or of a single Administration. It is the commitment of a people, made clear by them after mature contemplation of a half-century of history made painful by uncertainty on this precise point.

There is another reason for clarity on this point: it is that the world cannot risk misunderstanding on the other side of the Wall. The twin dangers of the nuclear age are irresolution and overboldness. We have aimed, in three Administrations, to avoid both dangers. By the clarity of its commitment to evident vital interests, and the completeness of its rejection of any policy of nuclear adventure, the United States aims to set an example which, if followed elsewhere, will protect us all from nuclear war. It cannot help in that process to have doubts expressed, for special purposes, by those whose security under our nuclear umbrella is most evidently guaranteed.

III

Many of our friends are allies—others remain apart from that form of connection. Yet it would be an erring logic which would set our unaligned friends always behind our allies. We have chosen neutrality for enough of our history to recognize and respect the similar choice of others—and none of our allies is attached to us by other than free choice. We have a deep interest in the effort toward stable and progressive freedom now so gallantly in course in small states and in great sub-continents; that interest is not removed by the absence of formal alliance—any more than the justified fact of alliance is a reason for perverse suspicion by those who do not choose to join.

But the requirement of reciprocity is as important for friends who are unaligned as for friends who are engaged. Among some of the former there is a tendency to take our good will for granted, and to assume that their special interests and prejudices may, in the nature of things, be pressed against us to the limit. When the discount is made with all insight and generosity for the special problems and concerns of the ardent new nations, this still remains a global community where the interests of all—even the richer states commanding greater military power—deserve respect. It is disappointing that a few men, themselves extraordinarily thin-skinned, appear to rejoice in attributing the lowest of motives to us; one may hope that American journalists

will cease to apologize for asking fair questions of such sensitive politicians.

Fortunately most of our neutral friends are friends indeed. We will continue in our respect for their neutrality, in our concern for their advancement, in our belief that their independent progress is deeply in the common interest of humanity. Because we ourselves are a new people, a recent historical addition to the written record of mankind, we can and do feel with a shock of recognition the pride and purpose of the new countries.

Neither they nor we have yet solved the new problem of setting the reasonable terms of coöperation for their development and for the common peace. Out of even a short experience we may conclude that easy formulas are likely to be wrong, and that in this new relation neither politics nor economics, as normally defined, has a good claim to single sovereignty. We cannot apologize if we find a special importance in such notable states as India and Pakistan, and in the aspirations and problems of our neighbors in Latin America. In quite another aspect we must and do recognize that what happens to certain great commodities that make breakfast for the world is more significant for many a young economy than all the long-term loans that Washington can laboriously assemble.

Indeed the travail of these new relations can easily lead to disappointment and even cynicism. We must remember how unusual it is that separate nations should seek genuine economic coöperation with one another, and how little historical experience we have to guide us, on either side. We should remember, on both sides, the cost of failure. And we should understand that in a society which keeps its energies alive and its conscience active, new means of action will constantly be thrown forward. The Peace Corps, against more skepticism than many would wish to remember, has shown plainly that a good idea, with good men and women at work for it, still counts.

A curious and special problem, in our relations with the many new nations, lies in our somewhat different views of the United Nations. For us the U.N. is both a major hope and an indispensable reality; it is also a force in which our steady support has been, from the beginning, essential. We do not from this fact conclude that the U.N. must do only what we want; our record in New York challenges comparison in its responsiveness to the interests of others. Our steady insistence on the importance of

the U.N. as both forum and framework of action has set us apart, on occasion, from important allies.

But this long record of political and economic support for the U.N. has taught us that, like other merely human institutions, it functions best when it functions in the real world. We cannot see it merely as a voting machine for the expression of simple feelings. The legitimate aspirations of all men are not the same as the present capacities of every dependent—or newly independent—area. And the natural feelings of those who see colonialism as the one great enemy are not always a perfect guide to action or to voting. The U.N. can do many things, but the price of irresponsible votes can be high; our own effort will be still to do all we can to assist in reasonable progress, and to avoid damage to the U.N. through misuse of its forum. Yet we shall continue to seek a place in the first ranks of those who make the peaceable influence of the U.N. an end as well as an instrument of policy.

IV

In one way or another all of our military alliances take their present meaning mainly from the threat of Communist expansionism. They are all defensive, and Communist power is plainly what they must now defend themselves against. Except in the case of our hemispheric connections, it is the Communist danger that has created the requirement for these alliances. Yet because we are numerous and varied, and because we live at different distances from the various centers of Communist aggressive initiative, we do not all see the Communist threat alike. For the United States it has a special and unique meaning, if only because without us the Communists would be irresistible everywhere. It is therefore fortunate that among the 40 allied opinions ours is near the center.

We have not yielded, except in the temporary and discreditable fears connected with the name of Joseph McCarthy, to the notion that the only guide to policy is passionate anti-Communism; as a people indeed we have never ceased in our hope and preference for a reliable improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union. Those among us who would make empty hatred into a policy have never been more than a minority in either party; the victory we seek is not one of angry words—and still less one of heedless holocaust.

At the same time we have not since the second war allowed

ourselves the gentle luxury of belief that the Bear will turn into a Golden Retriever if only we are kind to him. We have found no natural good will in the record which still remorselessly includes the drawing of the Iron Curtain, the death of free Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, the attack in Korea, the blood bath of Budapest, and the inhumanity of the Wall. It is probably inevitable that among our friends there should be some who read reform in every new Soviet riddle, but it is also good that we are skeptical.

Among the allies, then, we are moderates. We see the Soviet power as a great reality, uncertainly but intimately entangled with the Chinese Communist enormity. Together with our allies we must deny this power the temptation to expand by open aggression; we must oppose its persistent effort to expand by conspiracy and deception; we cannot and do not seek its conquest in war. We shall not be second in readiness for defense against attack—but we must still be first in the search for more honest exchanges, more even communication and a clearer recognition that peace is in the common interest.

Yet it is well to remember always that this policy can be put at hazard by miscalculation or provocation on the Communist side. Recurrent and uncalled-for slanders, in a warfare of words which belies the pleasant tones of improved diplomatic courtesy, are dangerous to peace; still more dangerous are pressures tinged with threat upon clear and well recognized rights. Our strength and our determination are equal to such challenges, but the patience of even the most careful democracy is never infinite. We shall persist in our refusal to reply in kind, but we shall also persist in remarking that such one-sided adventurousness is as unbecoming to a genuine great power as it is inevitably hazardous.

In this determined but moderate posture we find many of our allies content, a few concerned to restrain us, and a few who are troubled by existing restraint. We stand between these separated allies—and yet we also stand together with them all. For in the end there is reality in all of our alliances, and in our concern for all of our allies.

And that is why, in a discussion of our many friends, the last remarks must go to allies. Danger does exist; the threat is real. Those who recognize the threat, and act in prudent but declared response, have made a choice not to stand apart, and not to pretend that because there are only two great powers they must (on

some mistaken logic) be alike. This choice we honor, and for it we have met, and we will meet, reciprocal obligations.

v

Finally, we come to what we ourselves may ask of all our friends. This question is too often omitted, in a conscientious but incomplete concern for what others think and want. Of both neutrals and allies we may properly ask the same thing they expect of us: an understanding that we have a role and interests of our own. Our power and responsibility are now so evident—so fully taken for granted—that their meaning for *us* is easily forgotten. Thus close allies, serenely confident of our ability to sustain the nuclear shield, can easily disregard the cost and care of this assignment. A balance of judgment, as on nuclear tests and test bans, which we must weigh with full accountability, others can treat with casual optimism, because they count on us. Disarmament is easy for the irresponsible.

Nearer to the bone, and harder for all concerned to understand, is the fact that we too are in front-line danger now. Ancient and deeply rooted habits of geographical thought do not easily yield to the facts of our time, on either side of the Atlantic, but perhaps we have grasped the new reality more clearly than some friends in Europe. The general nuclear war the world fears would be a disaster to the whole race, but it is the stronger members of the two great opposed alliances who would be most certainly caught in its horror. The present danger does not spare either shore of the Atlantic—or set Hamburg apart from San Francisco. We can understand the desire of some to stand apart from the Promethean force of nuclear weapons and the desire of others to have their protection without their hazards. And while our experience of the cost and burdens of genuine membership in the nuclear club makes us believe that countries which do not apply are wise, we fully recognize that this sovereign decision is not ours to make for others. But we may reasonably ask for understanding of the fact that our own place at the center of the nuclear confrontation is inescapable.

Out of this confrontation come both responsibility and concern. Thus it is the seriousness of our commitment to NATO that makes us wonder at the frivolity with which that commitment is questioned for small purposes. Similarly, it is the knowledge of nuclear hazard that makes us press in two directions

which have given honest but mistaken concern to some allies. First, we are insisting upon the best and most effective arrangement, both of technical mastery and of military discipline, to ensure that nuclear weapons are used when—but only when—the central order is given. Second, we remain indefatigable in our pursuit of some workable and reliable international agreement to limit the general hazard of nuclear weapons and enlarge the world's safety. We know better than any other nation how little the Soviet Union has yet said or done in serious response—but we will not stop the reasonable, necessary, human search for sensible agreement. Moreover, we will always measure the hazards of agreement against the hazards of unlimited competition, and we do not expect to be distracted from this course by men, on either side of the argument, who emphasize one danger and ignore the other.

Outside the nuclear field, in which mutual understanding must include the present fact of our special responsibility, our claims upon our friends can be entrusted to the formula of reciprocity. What we ask, in respect for our convictions and concern for our peculiarities, we must also be ready to grant. In one other respect, perhaps, we have a special claim to sympathy; as we are the most powerful, we have the largest number of associations—and so we face the largest number of conflicts of interest. Both interest and sympathy can pull us two ways, or more; those who find such choices easy are usually wrong, and our policy will often put us in positions which both sides would like to disapprove. It is becoming that we should accept that responsibility coolly—as we have tried to do, in these last years, in different ways, in the Congo, in West New Guinea, in the Dominican Republic and in the Middle East. It is as reasonable to ask a general understanding of this posture as it would be foolish to expect the praise of the interested parties in each specific case.

And finally, there are the things on which we are hard set as a people; nations, like men, have convictions that are at given periods beyond argument. Ours are limited but real. They may not be universally approved, but it is prudent that they should be understood. What we believe, for example, of Red China and Red Cuba rests, to us, upon evidence, principle and interest. We do not require that others who disagree should change their minds or lose our friendship. But they should recognize that it does not advance international understanding to assert with comfortable

self-satisfaction that “nobody could think like that.” We do. It will serve their interest to study our reasons and respect our convictions.

Yet a proper insistence on our own national interests and attitudes should not blind us—or even our friends—to a wider claim. The emerging society of free nations, as we see it, can and should so shape itself that the ultimate interests of all are served in concert. We try not to seek for ourselves what we would deny to others. Even in the grim business of nuclear deterrence we can share whenever there is equality in sharing. And at the happier end of the spectrum of affairs, we seek nothing more than that all peoples shall find a way toward decency and hope, in simple human terms. With all our national failings, we do not fear comparison in the depth and the integrity of our commitment to this reasonable dream.

COÖPERATION IS NOT ENOUGH

By Lord Franks

ANY attempt to look at some of the economic problems confronting the Atlantic group of nations over the next ten or fifteen years must take into account the general change in the economic climate which has occurred in the last five years. The long postwar boom ended in the summer of 1957. Before that climacteric the Atlantic group had enjoyed a period of almost continuous prosperity. Demand was high; markets were good; prices were satisfactory; and production was at capacity. Businessmen projected the lines of their graphs upwards and on without a kink. Growth and progress seemed here to stay. Since 1957 it has been a different story. spurts of prosperity have been succeeded by the languors of recession and stagnation, except among the Six; and even among them the rate of growth has been slowing down and they have begun to be plagued with many of the problems already affecting the rest of the group. It has been a time of growing uncertainties: about maintaining the volume of production, about the erosion of profits, about the status of the two great currencies which, with gold, constitute the media of international settlement. This accumulation of doubts about the future has found expression in the last few months in a major decline in prices in the stock exchanges of the Atlantic group. There is a widespread feeling that a new set of problems has come up which will be with us for a long time and with which we do not know how to deal.

These uncertainties and problems spring from one basic dilemma which affects the political and economic life of this group of nations. In itself it is not new; it existed between the wars but was submerged by the tides of war and then by the continuous prosperity of the postwar boom. During the last five years it has steadily reëmerged and now asserts itself with new force and urgency. The classical description occurs in lectures given in 1931 at the Academy of International Law at The Hague by Professor Maurice Bourquin:

A hundred years ago, there were neither railways nor steamship lines, nor electrical telegraphs, nor telephones, nor submarine cables, nor aircraft, nor wireless communications; there were stage-coaches, wooden sailing-ships, interminable journeys, full of difficulties and, sometimes, dangers. . . . Industry

was still in its infancy; the machine had been introduced only recently; there were small workshops serving a local or regional public whose needs, limited and well-known, determined production; industry demanded little capital investment, occupying in general only a secondary place in the economy of the country, of which agriculture still was the main basis. . . . Political organization corresponded to economic needs; . . . international life was still rudimentary and, for the most part, of secondary importance. By and large, every state could provide for its essential needs; if absolutely necessary, it could live on its own resources without straining its existence to the breaking point. Hence, in order to solve the main problems besetting it, no more was necessary as a rule than taking counsel with itself, guided only by a consideration of its own interests. The state machine had enough power and differentiation to cope with the requirements of the life of the community, and the notion of sovereignty found considerable support in the independence which each national entity enjoyed.

Now in the economic and social field there is no question of any importance which can be settled outside the international sphere. It is here that a *civitas maxima* has come about which is an undeniable fact, . . . a tangible, living, inescapable reality. But is it a reality all along the line? Certainly not; for the political organization of the world continues, on the whole, to be based on the particularism of states; and it is that which results in the unbalance we suffer from, the maladjustment modern society has come to feel more and more acutely. An economic pattern on an international scale; a political pattern mainly of a national texture.¹

It is because of their international scale that the major economic problems in the relationships of the Atlantic group² have become so difficult to deal with. And this statement in no way reflects on the reputation and success of the great international institutions set up at the end of the war—the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These all presuppose the political pattern of nation states, and their performance has been determined by the framework within which they work. Of recent years the International Monetary Fund, for example, has done magnificent work in keeping the international monetary mechanism running; it has intervened in crises with support and, when it appeared prudent, with advice; it has alleviated the crises and given time for national economies to adjust themselves to the facts of the current situation. It has saved things from going badly wrong on a number of occasions; it mitigates but cannot cure the difficulties which spring from Bourquin's dilemma.

¹ "Recueil des Cours," v. 35. Paris, 1931.

² I have deliberately avoided offering a definition of the Atlantic group, for I do not wish to include or exclude. But I shall concentrate primarily on those powerful, highly industrialized nations which form its center.

This last year has seen a great deal of attention given to one of the dilemma's effects. The economic editor of the British Sunday newspaper, *The Observer*, wrote recently that we were gradually moving into a new era where prices are determined on an international competitive market, while wages and other costs are still determined on a national level. This, he said, was at the root of current industrial heart-searchings all the way from U.S. Steel to Ford at Dagenham, Britain. By a coincidence this view was confirmed on the same day in the same newspaper during an interview given by a shop steward of Ford at Dagenham who maintained that he stood for independence from the Yanks and for the British working class to control their own country. This situation, in which the international market sets the price for increasing quantities of manufactured goods, especially engineering products where wages are a high proportion of the cost, while wages themselves are determined in traditional social and political patterns in each state, has progressively troubled governments in several nations of the Atlantic group. This whole problem of costs and prices lay at the root of President Kennedy's intervention with U.S. Steel; it brought about Britain's "pay pause" with its difficult history; it has occasioned the running debate between Professor Erhardt and Herr Heinz Nordhoff of Volkswagen. Businessmen fear the erosion of profits, so-called "profitless prosperity," and governments fear for the competitive position of their nation's industries in the world market. The effect of the dilemma was fairly illustrated by a question asked by President Kennedy in the course of an address at Yale University: "With the necessity of maintaining our competitive position in the world, what should be the price and wage policies of our basic industries? Is there a public interest in such price and wage decisions, and, if so, how is it to be defined and organized and expressed?"

II

The five years since 1957 have thrown up at least four international economic problems of vital importance to the Atlantic group of nations. They are long-term problems affecting the future even more than the present and their solution or the lack of it will determine the structure of the economic relationships of the group. I believe that none of them is capable of solution either piecemeal by the unrelated efforts of the several members of

the group, or by their coöperative action if this means conferences where the unanimity rule prevails or the traditional processes of negotiation and bargaining between the nations. The four problems are those of aid to developing countries, trade with developing countries, the means of international settlement and the surpluses of temperate-zone agricultural products.

Of course it is a false abstraction to describe these simply as economic problems; they are political too, and, unless their political importance is grasped and understood, the will to deal with them will lack strength. The fundamental political judgment that faces us is what kind of a world we want ourselves and our children to live in, and whether we want it enough to will the means necessary to attain it. Assuming that for the period under consideration severe and uneasy East-West tension will continue without exploding into thermonuclear war, the chief positive policy of the Atlantic group of nations must be to encourage and support the largest possible free world, so that in Latin America, Africa and Asia most nations will wish to live and grow and prosper outside the Communist system, maintaining friendly relations with the Atlantic group so that there increasingly comes into being a great company of peoples not separated by man-made barriers but freely exchanging ideas and goods. The aim is not that all the developing peoples should be made over into the image of the nations of our group, imitating the systems of democratic government familiar and usual among us and adapting their economies to our pattern. The point is that they should develop politically in their own ways, building societies according to their own situations, temperaments and aptitudes, not living in fear of solutions imposed from outside but confident of the friendship and support of the Atlantic group. Were this not high policy, then in all likelihood a great part of the world would develop away from us. We might find ourselves cut off and alone in a world indifferent and probably hostile to us. In the long run this is not a tenable position. That is why it is the interest and policy of the Atlantic group that there should be a large free world in which the group with others can move, converse and trade and have their being. The existence of an effective will to attain and maintain the goals of this policy is a criterion of the durability of Western civilization.

In this context, aid to developing peoples is a necessary means to the political end. During the last five years the problem has

become of much greater importance and urgency and has led to large-scale action. But it is long term, not short term. Quite apart from moral considerations of what is due from rich nations living in the same world with many poor nations which have hundreds of millions of their citizens existing at subsistence level, it has been seen that the developing peoples face a vicious circle. Too poor to save, they cannot produce capital to increase the standard of living. Yet they cannot remain as they are, for the idea that men are not bound by an iron rule of nature to mere subsistence has spread around the world and the governments of the developing nations can retain power only if they can produce results. In this situation there is a choice. The governments must either resort to tyranny and by force and starvation extract the savings for capital investment or they must receive capital resources from outside. The choice rests with the Atlantic group. This is what aid is about, for the choice is at the same time whether there is to be a large free world.

In past years the main burden has been carried by the United States with Britain and France coming next. But recently the United States has felt the burden too heavy and has tried to persuade other members of the Atlantic group to bear a larger share, so far with little result. There has ensued a great deal of time-consuming argument in which the members of the group have tried to persuade each other that the real duty of providing more men and money for aid programs is somebody else's. Even in the leading case of India, where there has been a real coöperative effort, the coördinating committee has not been able to raise enough resources to meet the need. Generally speaking there is no agreement on the amount or duration of aid, on priorities or on methods. To a considerable extent the members of the Atlantic group do not know what the others are doing, at times with unfortunate results in the receiving country. There is a clear need for common policy and common action, not only in the provision of material resources but in finding the men and women needed for technical assistance and educational programs and in formulating policy on the stabilization of prices for the limited number of important commodities exported by the developing nations.

After aid comes trade, in many ways a more difficult problem. It is already possible to see its nature and formidable awkwardness. In the case of many, if not most, of the developing countries

aid must provide a substantial program of industrialization as well as measures for improving agricultural skills and resources. Industrialization is what the developing nations and their governments want and insist on. One of the gifts to the world of the Atlantic group has been the idea that the definition of a modern nation includes industrialization. It has become a status symbol as well as being the only way to employ the surplus labor of the countryside. But sooner or later, and often sooner, the developing nation wishes to export some of its manufactured goods. It is driven to this partly because of the relatively small and inelastic supply of foreign currency which can be earned by exporting its traditional primary products, when increased amounts of foreign currency are required to sustain the momentum of development, and partly because it desires to progress beyond dependence on aid to the stage when it can stand on its own feet and earn its living in the world. This is not only inevitable and laudable but exactly fits the Atlantic group's aim of a free world in which and with which to trade. And, further, the Atlantic group increasingly needs foreign markets now that it seems easier to create new industrial capacity than to sell the products. If the developing nations earn more from their exports, they will be able to buy more.

But what an awkward process this is politically to the Atlantic group, how disruptive internally it threatens to be as the volume of manufactured imports from developing nations increases! Britain is already familiar with the problem of textile imports from India, Pakistan and Hong Kong. But India is also making some lighter engineering products in quantity and exporting them—for instance, bicycles and sewing machines. Very often the simpler manufactured goods which are within the competence of the developing country, when exported, hit at old, established industries which are already having a hard time. The immediate interest of politically influential employers and trade unions is to keep them out. Yet the long-term political interest of all the Atlantic nations is to formulate a policy for admitting them. No such policy exists. The problem of trade, of manufactured imports from the developing countries, is kicked around in the hope that in the meantime someone else will do something. Here again the requirement is a common policy and common action.

Adequate and enduring programs of aid, the digestion of adequate quantities of manufactures from developing countries can

be successfully undertaken only if the economies of the Atlantic group prosper and grow. But prosperity and economic growth presuppose confidence, and one of the prime constituents of confidence in the trend of the future is lacking today: confidence in the international monetary system which is the creation of the Atlantic group. International debts must ultimately be settled in gold or in one of the two great reserve currencies, sterling and the dollar. There is not nearly enough gold to serve as the sole means of settlement, nor would there be if the price of gold in terms of currencies were doubled. But off and on since the war sterling has been suspect and now in degree the dollar has joined sterling. No doubt this situation has arisen for virtuous reasons: Britain trying to sustain political responsibilities assumed a long while ago, the United States in a similar position because of assistance given to the free world since the war. The six nations of the European Economic Community have become the largest holders of free reserves, while Britain and the United States hesitate to adopt policies of growth because of anxieties about the balance of payments.

Here is the third great economic problem on the international scale. When confidence in the two great reserve currencies comes and goes, confidence in the future of the whole trading system of the Atlantic group and, with it, of the free world generally, also comes and goes. At present there is a real possibility of a monetary crisis some time in the future. If it ever occurred, it would divide the nations of the Atlantic group and forfeit the trust of the free world. The problem calls for a common solution and common action. No nation alone can deal with it, nor can adequate arrangements made on a national basis between central banks, helpful though they are in tiding over immediate difficulties. The international monetary problem of the Atlantic group is different and calls for different treatment.

In the fourth place there is the problem of the surpluses of the agricultural products of the temperate zone—for example, wheat and dairy products. An acute manifestation of the problem has appeared in the current negotiations between Britain and the Six. Of the countries which need to import wheat and can pay for it, Britain provides the largest single market. Historically it has been supplied by Canada, Australia and Argentina. Now France has reached the point of breakthrough and her rich acres are beginning to yield to modern agricultural skills far more wheat than France can consume. Western Germany takes some but France

looks for a major outlet in Britain if Britain joins the Economic Community. The difficulties of Britain, France and the Commonwealth would not be so great if effective demand for wheat in the world was in balance with supply. But it is not: there is heavy surplus and therefore an economic problem on the international scale. It has been mitigated in recent years by exports of wheat from the United States under P.L.480 and by the Canadian deal with Communist China. But the problem remains, for Western Europe used to be the great market for the surpluses of the main primary producers; now Western Europe produces much more of its own wheat, thanks to the same advances in science which have permitted the primary producing countries to grow far more on fewer acres. I quote Pierre Uri, who played so important a part in the drafting of the Rome Treaty:

It seems to me that if all of our developed countries just forge ahead—with our present agricultural policies, talking about surpluses and trying to protect ourselves against each other's surpluses, at the same time trying to overcome those obstacles which each raises against the other, then there could be a tragic failure for the policy of the West at large. For we cannot forget that we are living in a world of hunger. We cannot forget that about three-fifths of the world is underfed. The sooner we begin to realize that, the sooner we begin to see that in such a situation there are no real surpluses. The only question is to find a tie between the need for large aid to developing countries and a better use of our capacity to produce food, in which case the sooner we shall be able to solve the problems of our own agricultural policy.

Once more a common problem on the international scale requires a common solution.

III

It is said that General Marshall, when Secretary of State, remarked on discovering some of the officers of the Department endlessly arguing the points of a problem: "Don't fight the problem, gentlemen: solve it!" To tackle the problems under review piecemeal by national efforts is only to fight them; it is to relapse into the Bourquin dilemma. What is needed is to find an approach to them which will discover common solutions that can be accepted by the Atlantic group of nations.

At this point it is worth looking at the procedures adopted by that part of the Atlantic group which over the last five years has displayed creative political thought and economic vigor of remarkable quality—the European Economic Community. The Six have had for their own purposes to overcome the dilemma. Their

ultimate purpose, as laid down in the Treaty of Rome, was political: to create an ever closer unity. They set out to accomplish this by a series of economic arrangements each of which from the point of view of the members of the Community was on the international scale. If they were to achieve the political purpose of the Community step by step through the successive economic arrangements that came into force, they had to devise a procedure which would ensure that the proposals for each arrangement were designed to promote the common good of the whole Community while at the same time being acceptable to the several member states. The result has been an interesting political experiment, the more significant because it has worked. It is in important respects a new way of finding common solutions to common problems.

The new procedure involves the interplay of three institutions of the Community: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The Commission has the sole power of initiative to make proposals; it also executes policy, when it has been approved. Its major purpose is to represent the whole against the parts. The Council of Ministers alone decides whether or not a policy is to be adopted; it more nearly represents the interests of the member states. The Parliament is in close touch with both Commission and Council and can exert pressure on both; it has control only over the Commission.

The way in which the procedure functions was well illustrated by the prolonged and difficult negotiation over agriculture at the beginning of the year. It can be seen in the argument over one main point. The Commission put forward proposals to provide a general framework for the common farm policy and further proposed, if this general framework was approved, that most of the consequent executive decisions should be left to the Commission. The Council of Ministers hesitated to accept the latter proposal. Both the French and the German Ministers for different reasons wished execution to be undertaken by bodies which would give more weight to considerations of national policy. But the Parliament intervened and threatened to censure the Commission if it gave way on its proposals. The intervention was effective and the Council decided in favor of the Commission's original plan.

The novelty of this political procedure is evident. When the Commission, exercising its power of initiative, makes a proposal, it is thinking for the Community as a whole—as a unit. The Community, therefore, through its institutions gives itself the oppor-

tunity of working out a common solution to a common problem, something that cannot be attained by the normal processes of international bargaining between states which so often produces only a least common denominator of agreed action. But if the Commission proposes, the Council disposes. Broadly speaking, nothing can be decided except by the Council which ensures that policy, when finally formulated, is acceptable to the member states of the Community.

It would be false and misleading to suggest that bargaining between states has been eliminated from the total procedure, that there can be no haggling over a compromise between national interests. That happens in the Council of Ministers but it happens in the presence of a third party to the argument, the Commission's proposed solution to the common problem. The Ministers find themselves bargaining against a common solution of independent origin at least as much as against each other. And this has produced results of a different kind from those which could have been reached by traditional methods of negotiation. The argument on agriculture demonstrates by itself that we are observing a new form of political life.

If the Atlantic group of nations seriously wills the attainment of its broad political ends in the world and searches for common solutions to its economic problems on the international scale, it must escape from the Bourquin dilemma. It is difficult to see how this can be done except by adopting political procedures akin in some respects to those operating in the Six. This is not at all the same thing as advocating that Britain should join the Economic Community, let alone the United States or Canada. These are separate considerations. But it does involve saying that the partnership of the Atlantic group of nations cannot get where it wants simply by the established processes of coöperation and negotiation: conferences with the unanimity rule and the compromising out of agreement between national interests. The scale and the urgency of the problems no longer permit it. A new way has to be found: a new organization, institution or commission, which will have sufficient standing, independence and initiative to formulate common solutions and put them forward to the governments of the several nations of the group, so that they will have to face in argument not merely each other but also and at the same time the solution proposed for the partnership as a whole as best realizing its common good.

Of course there will be objections to this suggestion. The first is obvious. It will be asserted that such a procedure is incompatible with national sovereignty and therefore with the proper responsibilities, which cannot be compromised, of the Executive, of Congress or Parliament, to their citizens. This is the old-fashioned view of the sovereignty of the nation state which by definition is not subject to any other, and autonomously regulates its own affairs. By force of tradition it tends to be the major premise of argument, unconsciously adopted, for all of us so long as we do not think about it—and this holds good particularly of governments and government departments. But it is not true. All national sovereignties are in commission to others in some degree. Whether the United States shall have peace or war does not simply depend on the decision of the United States. Total thermonuclear war could occur through the action of Britain, an ally, or Russia, an opponent. And it is within the decision of still other nations to overthrow the peace of the world. The same is true of the economic pattern. The decisions of the governments of the United States, Britain and Western Germany to try to make the public interest count in the complex of wages, costs and prices were not wholly free decisions. They came from the pressures of prices set in the international market, combined with the fears of governments about inflationary additions to costs and a consequent inability to export, which would lead to difficulty in the balance of payments. For all the brave words so often spoken in public places, the objection that national sovereignty would be compromised by the suggestion is a piece of sentimental romanticism which has no place in the world today.

There is one other objection. Any suggestion to set up an institution or commission with some status and independence and with the initiative to formulate and put forward proposals on international economic problems will be attacked because it sets up a body to plan—and planning, especially by governmental bodies, is anathema to the free-enterprise system. This objection is as frequent as it is silly. All men, all business corporations, all governments plan. They have to, because they have to think, decide and act. All thinking leading to action is planning and it at once reflects and expresses the characteristic and fundamental human conviction that by taking thought men can modify and change their environment to suit their desires. Objections to planning by the government are really objections to some but not all such

planning. A man may dislike Communist or, it may be, Socialist planning and boldly proclaim he is against planning. It does not follow that, if he is an American, he is against the Sherman Act or that, if British, he will be against the Restrictive Practices Court. Yet both Act and Court are the products of government planning. Or a man may object to planning by governments—to all such planning, he will say—because he is content with things as they are, entirely oblivious that things as they are are what they are because of the existing accepted phase of planning. What he is against is the disruption of the status quo: he dislikes the discomfort of change.

But the real enemy of the suggestion is not like these, an intellectual attitude. It is lethargy, the dream of the lotus-eaters: Why bother? "Let us alone. Time driveth onward fast." It is precisely because time drives onward fast, and these economic problems which confront the Atlantic group of nations are growing more acute, that the time for change has come and the suggestion for a new procedure has been put forward. If what is done results from the separate decisions of the nations or from the established methods of haggling, it is likely to produce increasing division among the members of the group. Unity and a common purpose depend on finding and accepting common solutions to these economic problems on the international scale, so that the strengths of all the member nations will be multiplied in joint action as the problems themselves over time receive their answer. On this procedure and policy the direction of our economic relationships would be set toward expansion; governments would no longer hesitate to adopt policies of growth and it would be possible to make steady progress with the lessening of tariffs and the increase of freedom of trade. We could make progress toward the kind of world that we desire.

THE MEANINGS OF COEXISTENCE

By Philip E. Mosely

IN the deeply divided world of today, one main obstacle to achieving a genuine state of peaceful coexistence is the gap in the meanings attached to these two words in different societies and political systems. The gap is, of course, just one additional example of the estrangement of vocabularies that besets every effort at direct and sincere exchanges of ideas across or through the ideological and psychological barriers. Words like "democracy," "freedom," "progress" are, as we know only too well, employed in very different and even opposite senses in the two worlds.

Another obstacle lies in the confrontation of absolutes, the insistence on the total good of one ideal and the total evil of the way of life that it seeks to displace and destroy. This sense of serving as a mere instrument of History justifies, in the minds of its champions and supporters, a vast arrogance of self-righteousness. To them, the adversary is not only doomed but is morally wrong in his every act and thought.

Finally, the ideological armor that encases the Communist leaders is wrought of that contradiction in terms, "scientific revelation." Its theoretical bases, which were laid down over one hundred years ago at the beginning of the industrial era, must be proven to be uniquely correct and infallible today; and therefore those who dare re-examine or question any part of its fundamentalist dogmas must be silenced or destroyed.

The most recent and most authoritative statement of Communist dogma is, of course, the new Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, unanimously adopted by the Twenty-second Party Congress on October 31, 1961. Despite its repetitious length and its many internal contradictions, it was carefully designed to serve as the main guide to Soviet thought, policy and action over "the next historic epoch." In the ten weeks between the publication of the draft program and the convening of the Congress, it was "discussed" in tens of thousands of meetings; since the Congress, it has been distributed in millions of copies printed in scores of languages. Hence, its statements on the nature and purpose of coexistence must be studied seriously. First:

Peaceful coexistence of the socialist and capitalist countries is an objective necessity for the development of human society. War cannot and must not serve as a means of settling international disputes.¹

Excellent! All reasonable people can welcome this position as a basis for a lively and earnest give-and-take discussion on how best to guarantee mankind against the danger of a new and terrible war and especially on how, in practical terms, we can concert our actions so as to diminish, contain or eliminate some or all of the conflicts that threaten to escape our control and balloon into a total struggle.

Here, however, the Program brings its non-Communist partners-in-dialogue up sharp against a flinty dogma of Communist fundamentalism:

Imperialism is the only source of the war danger. The imperialist camp is making preparations for the most terrible crime against mankind—a world thermonuclear war that can bring unprecedented destruction to entire countries and wipe out entire nations.

Here dogma, as so often, takes precedence over reality. After all, the Soviet Union has also been hard at work constructing horrendous weapons systems. Its leaders have, indeed, addressed blackmail notes to more than 30 governments, in which it has threatened their peoples specifically with nuclear destruction unless they abandon certain policies and postures of which Moscow disapproves. Semantically, the Kremlin, like its opponents, argues that it is not preparing for “aggression” but “to deter aggression.” The distinction rests in the degree of faith or confidence in the government that makes the threat. Today any nuclear threat raises the level of international tension. This is all the more its effect when the Kremlin stretches the concept of “self-defense” to include the demand for Communist control over West Berlin and for the breaking up of alliances that Moscow views as obstacles to the extension of its own power.

The completely one-sided nature of the Communist interpretation of world politics appears in one small but interesting correction that was inserted in the final version of the Party Program. The draft of August 5 referred with approval to “. . . a growing number of countries that adhere to a policy of neutrality and strive to safeguard themselves against the hazards of participa-

¹ This and subsequent translations of excerpts are official ones, reproduced in “Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules,” edited by Jan F. Triska (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962). Orthography and punctuation have been adapted slightly.

tion in military blocs." This wording apparently gave too strong praise to non-alignment. At bottom, Communists are bound by dogma to view non-alignment as a way-station to joining their own power bloc. The words of the draft program might even imply an endorsement of Tito's posture, were it not for his heresy of claiming to be both Communist and uncommitted. And some Communists might have wondered why Khrushchev had used his tanks and artillery, in October 1956, to put down the attempt of the Imre Nagy government to declare Hungary neutral.

The drafters of the final version caught this awkward ideological ambiguity and changed "participation in military blocs" to "participation in aggressive military blocs." Since "aggressive" is an adjective that is applied only to "imperialists" and never to "the countries of socialism," the revised wording modifies the Kremlin's praise of non-alignment and leaves the gate open for presently uncommitted countries to commit themselves later to the "good" military bloc of "socialism."

The pursuit of "peaceful coexistence," in Moscow's view, must not lead to any slackening in the effort to reshape the rest of the world to the Communist pattern. On the contrary, the struggle for the triumph of Communism must be pressed even more vigorously and with the wider and more varied arsenal of instruments that is now available:

Peaceful coexistence serves as a basis for the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and constitutes a specific form of class struggle between them. As they consistently pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence, the socialist countries are steadily strengthening the positions of the world socialist system in its competition with capitalism. Peaceful coexistence affords more favorable opportunities for the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and facilitates the struggle of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation.

The Program specifically warns Communists everywhere against pinning to a new world war their hopes for their worldwide triumph. Indeed, the expectation of victory through cataclysm might lead them to relax their efforts and to slacken their discipline. However, in accord with a long Leninist tradition, the Soviet leadership is not against all types of wars:

The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet people as a whole will continue to oppose all wars of conquest, including wars between capitalist countries, and local wars aimed at strangling people's emancipation movements, and consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just anti-imperialist wars of liberation.

This reservation leaves a wide range of military actions open to Soviet arms, for the Kremlin reserves to itself the right to decide what peoples are "oppressed" and which wars are "wars of liberation." Despite the great risks that may accompany its participation, direct or indirect, in a variety of wars, the Program affirms the self-confident belief of the Soviet leadership that it can achieve complete victory without becoming involved in a nuclear war:

The growing superiority of the socialist forces over the forces of imperialism, of the forces of peace over those of war, will make it actually possible to banish world war from the life of society even before the complete victory of socialism on earth, with capitalism surviving in a part of the world. The victory of socialism throughout the world will do away completely with the social and national causes of all wars. To abolish war and establish everlasting peace on earth is the historic mission of Communism.²

In the Soviet view, "peaceful coexistence" is the correct policy in "an epoch," more or less prolonged, during which "capitalism" (the label the Kremlin attaches to those who resist its embrace) is to be compelled to retreat from one position to another until it finally gives up the ghost. The means for enforcing each such retreat are to be varied according to the local and international balance of power.

In some countries the transition to socialism (*i.e.* to rule by the Communist Party) may take place by peaceful, in others by "non-peaceful," means. Of course, even if "the working class" (those who obey and support the Communist Party) manages to "... win a solid majority in parliament. . . ," it must also "... launch a broad mass struggle outside parliament, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces, and provide the necessary conditions for a peaceful socialist revolution." Since the Communists would then hold the monopoly of force, they would also be able to define "the reactionary forces" to suit their own interests. In any case they would have no further interest in providing conditions of "peaceful coexistence" with any groups or individuals that they considered hostile or recalcitrant to that monopoly of power.

The Program emphasizes that the struggle must be waged untiringly and relentlessly, with a rapid succession of tactics, in order to keep the various opposing forces off balance and disunited:

² I read the Russian original to mean "the historic mission," rather than "a historic mission."

The success of the struggle which the working class wages for the victory of the revolution will depend on how well the working class and its party master the use of all forms of struggle—peaceful and non-peaceful, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary—and how well they are prepared to replace one form of struggle by another as quickly and unexpectedly as possible.

In the end, of course, all roads lead to Rome, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, *i.e.* of the Communist Party:

... whatever the form in which the transition from capitalism to socialism is effected, that transition can come about only through revolution. However varied the forms of a new people's state power in the period of socialist construction, their essence will be the same—dictatorship of the proletariat, which represents genuine democracy, democracy for the working people.

It is essential, of course, for the main center of the Communist movement to assure the unquestioning unity of "the working class," in order to lead a well-orchestrated offensive against "capitalism." In recent years this has not proved easy or simple even within those countries and Parties that acknowledge Moscow's hegemony. In fact,

Revisionism, Right opportunism, which is a reflection of bourgeois influence, is the chief danger within the Communist movement today. The revisionists, who mask their renunciation of Marxism with talk about the necessity of taking account of the latest developments in society and the class struggle, in effect play the role of pedlars of bourgeois-reformist ideology within the Communist movement.

However, "dogmatism and sectarianism, unless steadfastly combated, can also become the chief danger at particular stages in the development of individual parties."

Finally, who is to define "revisionism" and "dogmatism?" Obviously Khrushchev is determined to keep this "lever of power" in his own hands. He demonstrated this most dramatically at the Twenty-second Party Congress where he made his famous attack on the Albanian Party leaders, only to be rebuffed by Chou En-lai, who protested the bringing into the open of this bitter inter-party quarrel, and then departed for Peking. The Chinese leadership could, had it been so minded, have cited the very words of the Soviet Party Program on this crucial point:

The Communist Parties are independent and they shape their policies with due regard to the specific conditions prevailing in their own countries. . . . The Communist Party of the Soviet Union . . . regards it as its internationalist duty to abide by the appraisals and conclusions which the fraternal parties have reached jointly concerning their common tasks in the struggle against imperialism, for peace, democracy and socialism. . . .

Apparently the Soviet leadership has been unusually sensitive

to the accusation that it dictates its policies unilaterally to other Parties, for it inserted a significant rewording in the final version of the Program. The draft of August 5 stated:

The C.P.S.U. will continue to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the ranks of the great army of Communists of all countries.

This could be read to mean that the C.P.S.U. will, by its direct action within or upon those Parties, strengthen their "unity and cohesion" and assure their obedience to Moscow. In the final draft this slip of the drafters was softened:

The C.P.S.U. will continue to direct its efforts to the unity and cohesion of the ranks of the great army of Communists of all countries.

Indeed, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Khrushchev to exercise over a wide diversity of régimes and Parties Stalin's "internationalist discipline." As the Program states in another context: "... not only the big states, but also the small ones. . . . are in a position, irrespective of their strength, to pursue an independent foreign policy." The forces of division seem to be working within "the camp of socialism" as well as beyond its bounds. The impact of fissiparous trends may be all the more serious for Khrushchev's policy just because these tendencies run directly counter to Communist dogma as well as to Soviet ambition.

II

It is important to know the new Party Program. It is not mere rhetoric or a pious affirmation of hopes or aspirations. Lenin and his successors have prided themselves on "the unity of theory and practice," and since the new Program, despite Peking's carpings, is genuinely Leninist, it lays down not a theory but a set of comprehensive and coherent guidelines for action.

Modern practices of scientific analysis also affirm "the unity of theory and practice," but this means something quite different to the West. Under conditions of free inquiry it means that theories are formed on the basis of carefully examined facts for the purpose of giving order to larger and more complex bodies of facts. Then, when new or previously unexamined facts can no longer be explained or contained within existing theories, these comprehensive concepts must be revised, sometimes radically. Thus, the generalizing role of theory in a system of free inquiry means that all theories have a utility value rather than a moral value, that many theories are competing to establish their valid-

ity as scientific tools, and that they are basically tentative rather than absolute in character.

Despite the recent and modest enlargements of the sphere of inquiry in Soviet scientific thought, the fundamental duty of the political leadership to define the limits of inquiry and to state in advance the conclusions it must reach has been strongly reaffirmed in the 1961 Program:

The investigation of the problems of world history and contemporary world development must disclose the law-governed process of mankind's advance toward communism, the change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism, the aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, the break-up of the colonial system of imperialism and its consequences, and the upsurge of the national-liberation movement of peoples.

In Soviet theory and practice, what is desired is stated as already proved "scientifically." The only purpose of inquiry is to prove again what has already been affirmed by political authority to be "true." The Soviet insistence that new data, or facts that cannot be fitted to the only valid theory, are "non-facts" is a continuing obstacle to any genuine freedom of discourse. The habit of raising each disagreement to a quarrel between "sin" and "virtue" also remains strong. This means that the examination of new or unwelcome facts is regarded, not as an interesting exercise in scientific skill, but as another form of political combat.

The rigidities of Communist thought make it very difficult (outside the natural sciences and technology) for the shapers of policy to have available the findings of objective research. Nevertheless, the range of useful investigation is definitely wider today in domestic policy than it is in the analysis of world affairs. The Soviet leaders have made numerous adjustments in their domestic economic policy: breaking up the machine-tractor stations, cutting back long-range investment in hydroelectric power plants in favor of more numerous and less costly thermal plants, and so forth.

The quality of rational inquiry has been improved substantially in those fields where its validity is of direct advantage to the decision-makers. Unfortunately, even in this area of policy many of the major decisions seem still to be based primarily on deeply rooted prejudice. What will the Soviet people do with all the steel that has been promised by 1980? What can it do with a vast flow of petroleum if the output of private cars remains as low as is planned? Can agriculture possibly meet the growing and

more varied needs of the Soviet people without a far larger investment of resources?

In the study of foreign countries and world politics, on the other hand, there has been almost no relaxation of political rigidities. Everything is painted in black and white. On one side, angels; on the other, devils. If dialectical materialism can provide a scientific basis for analysis, it should make it possible for Soviet experts to examine more objectively than they now do the causes of the high rate of growth in several of the free-world economies. It should actually encourage them to state calmly and without indignation why other systems operate differently from the Soviet one. A strong and powerful country needs objective information and conscientious analysis, and its rulers should not be afraid to permit the full use of scholarly inquiry if they want to be well served.

Because "science" had become a magic word in his time, Karl Marx baptized his theory of economic history with the name of "scientific socialism," and the same honorific adjective has been claimed by Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev for their political programs. In practice, however, many of the judgments made by Soviet leaders have chiefly reflected ingrained ideological prejudices and strong political ambitions. As often as not, Soviet appraisals have fallen wide of the mark.

By the late 1920s the Comintern, along with some "bourgeois" economists, was predicting the onset of an economic crisis in Western Europe and North America. On the other hand, the first Five Year Plan was drawn up on the assumption that world prices of foodstuffs and raw materials, Russia's main exports, would remain stable. Moscow's oracles insisted, in the face of obvious facts, that the depression of 1929 was driving the United States down the path of fascism. In 1941 Stalin assumed that, if Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, Britain would make a compromise peace with him because of common "class interests." Fortunately for the people of the Soviet Union, Churchill and Roosevelt had already concerted a policy of alliance with Russia against the common enemy. In 1948 Stalin thought he could take West Berlin by a cruel blockade, and since 1958 Khrushchev has made several misjudgments of the Berlin question. Until recent months Soviet spokesmen have had little or nothing to say about the rapid steps that Western Europe has been taking toward economic unification; the "law" of capitalist competition made this

historic process, in Moscow's eyes, an absurdity. The record of Soviet predictions suggests that it is more faith or habit than practical performance that supports the Kremlin's claim to possess the sole "scientific" and "infallible" instrument for predicting the future course of events.

III

Since 1953 many things have changed for the better in Soviet life. The improvements in food, housing, clothing and household conveniences have been widespread and substantial. In literature new themes of individual love and suffering, together with a cautious criticism of recent Stalinist "excesses," have become almost fashionable. More than at any time since the early 1930s the Party and the press seem to be trying to remedy some of the most callous features of Soviet administration and to improve the workings of Soviet justice.

All this is extremely welcome. The people of the Soviet Union, as they approach the forty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, have earned over and over the right to a modest return for their vast sacrifices and patience. Through this long travail they have preserved many fine qualities of friendliness, hospitality and patriotism. The modest comforts many of them have now attained, the pride in the scientific and material achievements of their country, and a burning memory of the Second World War combine to make them deeply and genuinely eager for peace and coexistence. They are now confident of the good intentions of their new rulers toward themselves, and therefore they accept more readily the Kremlin's protestations that only Soviet policy is "peace-loving" and that the sole risks of war now arise from the "imperialists" and their conspiracies.

"Making a peace treaty" with East Germany, "putting an end to the occupation régime in West Berlin"—all this sounds very reasonable to Soviet people. They are not aware that the people of West Berlin regard the token garrison as their protector and that they resent profoundly Ulbricht's insistence on "liberating" them from their hard-won freedom and prosperity. If people in the Soviet Union did know this, with whom could they discuss it? All they can do is hope that Khrushchev, who seems to them a human sort of man, knows what he is about and will, as he promises, safeguard peace.

The same old attempt to maintain a low level of strain at home

and a high level of tension abroad has again been standard Soviet tactics in recent years. For many months Soviet readers heard all about the 400 or so American military advisers in Laos and the supply of American military matériel and economic support. It was many months before one relatively obscure Soviet newspaper gave one solitary hint that Soviet supplies and planes were engaged on the Communist side. Even now Soviet readers have no inkling that in Laos a major part of the fighting has been conducted by North Vietnamese units. Similarly, after the Soviet Government had announced on August 31, 1961, the forthcoming renewal of hydrogen bomb tests, it gave no further information to Soviet readers for some six weeks. Even so, the news apparently spread rather widely, at least in the major cities, and gave rise to a good deal of muted anxiety.

A fierce patriotism, a defensive resentment of any condescension on the part of foreigners, a strong pride in Soviet strength and achievements—these emotions are widely shared. They make it easy for many Soviet people to accept a messianic ideology of Russia's unique mission, without thinking very much about the historic foundations of this notion or about its intellectual inconsistencies. The extreme self-righteousness of the Kremlin's boasts and demands is more troubling to many thoughtful Soviet people. Sometimes they wonder whether there is not a contradiction between Russia's being "the strongest power" in the world, as Khrushchev often claims, and the strenuous effort to protect its people against all but carefully screened and denatured information about the "imperialist" world.

Coexisting on the same globe with a one-eyed and angry giant is dangerous rather than exhilarating. In one breath he demands "friendship" and describes the many achievements, mainly material, that he admires in American life. In the next, he explains with "scientific" certainty why Communism will inevitably "bury" this much envied America. Even without benefit of Freud, it is not hard to see the power lust bursting out from behind the appeals for "peace and friendship."

We must, nevertheless, deal with the world as it is, and two of the facts of the world are the Soviet messianic fantasy and the power the Soviet leaders wield. It is, of course, a sign of good judgment that the Soviet leadership recognizes the mutually suicidal character of a nuclear war, and we must welcome its stated intention to contain the conflict within a rather elastic

definition of "peaceful coexistence." As the Soviet spokesmen have made clear at Geneva, however, the Kremlin is not actively interested in bringing nuclear arms under control, and it believes it can gain more political advantages by continuing the arms race at a high pitch.

Moscow regards the present period of "peaceful coexistence" as a prolonged contest in which it must exert its full strength and will in order to make decisive gains by all means short of nuclear war. By the leverage of its strategic, political and economic power it hopes, within a few years, to bring about a great shift of political power in its favor. In contrast to Stalin's cautious peripheral probings, Khrushchev's declared ambitions, and the current Soviet programs of action, now extend to all continents except, perhaps temporarily, Australia. Since Soviet military and economic strength will be growing rapidly in coming years, it is not going to be enough for the countries that cherish freedom to repeat old and tried formulas that have served them well in previous crises. They must seek actively for new ways to bring their great political, economic and strategic resources to bear in the balance if they are going to survive in freedom the multiple challenge that is posed by Khrushchev's program of "peaceful coexistence."

BERLIN

By General Lucius D. Clay

TIME and time again during the past fifteen years our people have had to confront a new Berlin crisis. Thus they are well aware that we have a continuing Berlin problem. However, it is not always recognized that the critical Berlin situation which has prevailed since the end of World War II is in reality a challenge to the survival of Europe. Many of us have forgotten why and when the Berlin problem came about. For a proper understanding of it and of its relationship to our foreign policy, we must look back occasionally to find how it did develop.

In the fall of 1943 when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met in Quebec, the Soviet armies had stopped the German offensive and were advancing doggedly toward Central Europe. The British representatives at Quebec were already concerned as to where and when the Western Allied armies would meet the Soviet armies. They urged that an early conference be arranged with the Soviet Government to fix the lines of demarcation between these armies and to draw an agreement for the occupation of a defeated Germany. As a result, this question was placed on the agenda for the meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943. There it was agreed that a European Advisory Commission would immediately be established in London to negotiate agreements for the future zones of occupation and for the postwar treatment of occupied Germany. This Commission was composed of the United States and Soviet ambassadors to Great Britain and a representative of the British Foreign Office, Sir William Strang.

Shortly after the Commission met in London in January 1944, the British representative submitted a proposed plan of demarcation with provision for a Berlin enclave to be carved out of the Eastern or Soviet zone, and this proposal was immediately accepted by the Soviet representative. Our government demurred somewhat as the War Department had suggested a counter-proposal which would have made Berlin the center of a pie to be carved in three slices. Since it was obvious that this proposal would have disrupted natural administrative and communication lines, it was not pushed vigorously. In point of fact, our government was more concerned about whether we would occupy the

northwestern or southwestern zone than it was about the location of the line between the Western Allies and the Soviet forces. Thus, in April 1944, President Roosevelt approved the British proposal. It is important to know that the boundaries which exist today between East and West Germany as well as within the Berlin enclave are exactly the lines proposed in January 1944 and approved in April 1944, some weeks before the Western Allies had landed in northern France. Certainly, the existence of this agreement had some bearing on the political importance given to the possible capture of Berlin by the Western Allies. Since the future zonal boundaries had been laid down many months in advance, it did not appear to matter which armies were the first to enter Berlin.

In any case, at the time of the German surrender, the Western Allies had passed well to the east of the proposed boundary line and were in physical possession of much of Thuringia and Saxony. Under the occupation agreement, our forces were to retire behind the line of demarcation as soon as joint military government was established, and concurrently we would enter Berlin and occupy the assigned sectors there. In June of 1945, the Allied commanders met in Berlin to issue the declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the rules of conduct of military occupation. The agreements, which had been negotiated by the three governments through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission, had already received formal approval at Yalta. Under these agreements an Allied Control Council composed of the three commanders-in-chief, with headquarters in Berlin, was to be responsible for the government of Germany. However, each commander-in-chief was to exercise final authority in his zone, thus making the Allied Control Council able to function only by unanimous consent. Berlin, however, was not included in any of the zones, but was to be governed by an Allied Kommandatura which reported directly to the Allied Control Council. At Yalta, France was added as an occupying power, although its government was not represented either at Yalta or at Potsdam. The Soviet Government offered no objection to the inclusion of France as an occupying power other than to insist that its zone in Germany be carved out of the American and British zones of occupation.

It is important also to remember that at Yalta the Western Allies agreed in principle to the transfer of lands in eastern Poland

to the Soviet Republic with compensation to be provided to Poland from land in Eastern Germany. However, the eastern boundary of Germany was not fixed either at Yalta or at Potsdam and we insisted that this boundary could be fixed only with the signing of a peace treaty with a new and representative German government. We did accept at Potsdam the removal of the area in dispute from the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Council, and its being placed under Polish occupation and control until the final boundary was established. Very little else was accomplished at Potsdam other than to confirm the Yalta decisions, except that it was agreed that Germany was to be treated as a political and economic unit and that the German people were to be given the opportunity to establish a government of their own choice for all of Germany through democratic elections.

Much has been written about the failure of the Western Allies to obtain written guarantees of free access to Berlin, particularly as no such provision had been made in the agreement for the joint occupation of Germany. Philip Mosely, who was intimately connected with all of the negotiations of the European Advisory Commission, states that this was not included in the agreement as it was a matter to be negotiated directly by the military commanders.¹ Interestingly, despite my responsibilities as General Eisenhower's deputy in charge of our entry into Berlin, I had not been informed of this intention. However, the question arose immediately. At our first meetings Marshal Zhukov requested that our initial access to Berlin be effected over a specified highway route and a specific railway route, as all others were needed for the demobilization of the Soviet army. While this arrangement could have been obtained in writing, I refused to regard it as other than a temporary measure, since it seemed obvious to me that the joint occupation of Berlin clearly conveyed with it the right of access by any and all routes. More importantly, we were then concerned only with Allied access, as the right of access for Germans was not even discussed; in all the negotiations up to then it was taken for granted that Germany was to be treated as a political and economic unit. No one then foresaw the ultimate division of Germany and the blockade of Berlin which was aimed principally at throttling its German population. Since we had free access in the air, no blockade on the ground represented at any

¹ Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950.

time a serious threat to our supply. For safety reasons we did establish specific flight corridors for the Allied aircraft flying to and from Berlin. This established, under written agreement among the four powers, three airlines for use by the Western Allies, and these airlines have been in daily use by the West ever since 1945.

The United States tried in every way to make the Allied Control Council a real government for all of Germany, only to find that the Soviet Government merely kept the Council alive while exploiting East Germany as a bolster to the Russian economy and simultaneously converting it into a police state. For a few months while we still had powerful military forces in Europe there seemed to be a chance for Allied government to function. Much to our surprise, shortly after our entry into Berlin, Soviet representatives had agreed to hold free elections in the city. It seems likely that they did this in the belief that their consolidation of the K.D.P. (Communists) and S.D.P. (Socialists) into the new S.E.D. (Socialist Unity) party would win the election. Fortunately there were strong and wise leaders in the S.D.P. who rejected this shotgun marriage and when the election was over the S.E.D. party had failed completely in its quest for power. From then on our difficulties in Berlin began, starting with the Soviet refusal to recognize the properly elected mayor, Ernst Reuter.

However, the final breaking point came with the currency reform that was put into effect in the American, British and French zones in June 1948. This reform, which had been prevented by Soviet veto for two years, was essential if Germany was to become self-supporting. Soviet representatives refused to accept any currency reform unless they were provided with a separate set of plates to print the new bank notes. Their prior flagrant abuse of plates for printing the occupation currency of course made it unthinkable that we provide them with this ready means of wrecking the new currency at any time. The decision of the Western Allies to proceed was violently denounced by the Soviet representatives who walked out of the Allied Control Council, thus putting an end to this last symbol of allied coöperation.

In recognition of the special Berlin situation, the currency reform introduced in Western Germany was not made effective immediately in West Berlin. However, the Soviet military government quickly introduced a new currency into their zone and into

East Berlin, and this led necessarily to the inclusion of West Berlin in the currency reform already placed in effect in West Germany. At this time the city government still had its headquarters in East Berlin. After the blockade by Soviet forces in June 1948, it came under increasing pressure from the Communists so that it could not hold its deliberations except in disorder and under threat of physical violence; in September 1948 it moved from East to West Berlin.

The blockade of Berlin by the Soviets was not caused by their desire to take over the city, which was not then the asset it is today. It came primarily from their desire to weaken our position in Europe. With the end of the war we had rapidly demobilized our great military strength as evidence of our faith in the United Nations. We had worked diligently with our Allies and the Soviet Government to establish peace treaties with the countries which had fallen under Hitler's domination, and we had accepted coalition governments to rule these countries until free elections could be held. These free elections never took place, as the powerful Soviet armies were kept intact and the threat which they represented led one by one to Communist domination of the countries of Eastern Europe. This threat was stopped only in mid-Germany by a thin line of American, French and British soldiers.

Fortunately, it had become evident to us in 1947 that even though this line defended Western Europe against the threat of Soviet force, it could not forever stop Communist political penetration into the countries of Western Europe where the economic chaos which followed war had created a despair favorable to such penetration. Our leaders had the political wisdom and our people had the political maturity to recognize the full extent and danger of this threat and they extended financial and economic aid to the countries of Western Europe that wanted to regain their economic independence and their political stability. We did not make this offer as a challenge to Communism; it was made to all of the countries of Europe which needed and wanted our aid. When it was refused by the Communist countries, we still made it clear that our assistance was not to be used to strengthen the military defenses of Western Europe.

Thus, the Soviet Government was still not sure whether we intended to stay in Europe or not. It was fully aware of our traditional policy of remaining free of foreign entanglements and it determined to test our intent by a blockade of Berlin, which was

obviously the most vulnerable and difficult spot for us to defend. I am sure the Soviet Government expected the Western Allies to withdraw from Berlin. The consequence would have been to destroy the confidence of a defenseless Western Europe in the determination of the United States to support and defend it until it could recover. We recognized immediately that the loss of Berlin might well mean the loss of Europe, and with the support of our British and French Allies we determined to maintain our position. Although we alone had atomic power at the time, we did not want to be the first to use force. An airlift supplying a city of over two million people enabled us to break the blockade without the use of force. Since that was a success, it renewed the confidence of Western Europe in the United States and in the will of its own peoples to remain free and independent. The immediate Communist threat to Western Europe had been halted, and when it became apparent that the unsuccessful blockade was no longer worth the risk, the Soviet Union lifted it in May 1949. Berlin had become a symbol of American determination to remain in Europe and of the will of the peoples of Western Europe to remain free.

II

The chain of events which had started with our economic aid program in 1947 and which was accelerated by the blockade did not end with the lifting of the blockade. In Berlin, the city government which had been forced by Communist pressures to move to West Berlin was confronted with the creation of a separate Communist-dominated puppet government in East Berlin. The free elections which were to take place under the city constitution in December 1948 were prohibited in East Berlin and the unhappy division of the city became a fact.

Meanwhile, in Western Europe the Allies had agreed to establish the Federal Republic of Germany and to convey to it a large degree of sovereignty. They then moved to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, dedicated to collective security against aggression, and in a few years the Federal Republic of Germany, with its sovereignty fully restored, was added as a member. Moreover, we began rebuilding our own military strength and encouraged the countries of Western Europe to rebuild theirs. The economic recovery sparked by our foreign-aid program moved more quickly than anyone had expected and

brought to the countries of Western Europe a political stability which made new Communist gains most unlikely. As these countries regained full economic strength and political stability, the movement toward unity accelerated. The Soviet Government, already disturbed at the success of the Common Market, recognized that, once this unity had become a fact, it would end forever any prospect of Communist domination of Western Europe. Thus, once again it embarked in November 1958 on a new challenge to Europe and its growing unity. Once again the spot chosen for this challenge was Berlin.

For several years the Soviet Government, with the support of the Warsaw Pact countries, had been threatening to sign a peace treaty with East Germany under which, so it claimed, the rights exercised by the Allied powers under their agreements with the Soviet Government would be cancelled completely and the Western powers would have to negotiate with the East German régime some new arrangement for access to West Berlin. And then, of course, the Ulbricht government might simply deny that right of access! During this period of heightened tension the flow of refugees from East Germany through Berlin continued to increase until it threatened to undermine the already shaky East German economy. To survive, Ulbricht had to close this avenue of escape. So on August 13, 1961, the East German government, certainly with Soviet backing, erected a wall through the heart of Berlin to stop further escapes. The fact that this wall separated thousands of families and cut off thousands of workers in East Berlin from their jobs in West Berlin meant nothing to a ruthless régime which could survive only as a police state and which could not successfully establish its full police control as long as an avenue of escape remained open.

Thus the Berlin Wall was built to serve two purposes: to stop the escape of refugees, and to create fear and confusion in Europe. The Communist leaders believed that a walled-in West Berlin could not endure and that its people would flee to safety in West Germany, leaving the Allies holding a hollow shell. Western Europe would lose not only its faith in the determination of the United States, but also its confidence in its own future, and the Soviet Government would be able to negotiate separate agreements with each individual Western European country. To add to the fears of West Berlin, continuing harassing actions were taken against Allied personnel; if these had been accepted with-

out resistance, they would have demonstrated a lack of Allied determination to defend the city.

These harassments, it is important to note, were limited to actions against the Allies and were not directed against the movement of German goods and persons to and from the city. The first reason for this was that the movement of German goods and persons to and from West Berlin is not regulated by any of the existing agreements between the Allies and the Soviet Government; it is based on a trade agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the East German régime, whose economy is in very poor shape. The loss of this trade would be serious, even though a major effort is being made to reorient the East German economy to those of the Warsaw Pact countries. Secondly, the Soviet Government wanted to persuade the Federal Republic of Germany that the Allied powers would not defend Berlin and that West Germany and West Berlin would fare better by making a separate treaty with Russia than by continuing their close association with the West.

Fortunately, these were serious miscalculations. The United States and its Allies met the threats of the Soviet Government with sufficient show of force to convince it that harassing actions could be effective only if carried to lengths that might indeed cause war. The Federal Republic of Germany did not lose faith in the United States or its NATO Allies and refused to heed the Soviet overtures. The people of West Berlin, to whom the division of their city had been a great shock, realized that West Berlin must continue to grow and to prosper as a symbol of hope to their countrymen in East Germany and indeed to all enslaved peoples. The initial exodus of people and capital from the city stopped, and there was a renewal of the determination to keep West Berlin as the most important industrial center between Paris and Moscow and to add to its standing as the major cultural and educational center in Germany. Western Europe continued to prosper economically and the Common Market countries took the Soviet pressure as a warning to accelerate their progress toward full economic unity and the beginnings of political unity.

These are the conditions that led Foreign Minister Gromyko to indicate early this year that the Soviet Government would like to resume talks with our representatives to see if there was a basis for negotiations that offered any hope of success. These talks have now continued for some months without result, and

now once again Mr. Khrushchev has renewed his threats to proceed with a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

Even though these talks have produced no practical results, it would seem wise to continue them as long as they can be held in an atmosphere reasonably free from duress. If, on the other hand, Soviet harassing tactics should be resumed in Berlin, then the advisability of continuing the talks becomes most questionable. Obviously, there is little left to negotiate on Berlin in view of the firm commitments which we have made and the threats which Mr. Khrushchev has uttered again and again. Still, it has never seemed likely that the Soviet Government would want to assume the risk involved in the unilateral transfer of its own responsibilities, which it assumed in the wartime and postwar agreements with its Allies, to an irresponsible East German régime which could bring about a war without Soviet approval.

During the progress of these talks, a major effort has been made to obtain full Allied agreement on basic principles which will not be subject to negotiation. While the three Allied powers, the Federal Republic of Germany, and indeed all the countries in NATO, are pledged to the defense of Berlin, there is still a lack of Allied unity as to the exact meaning of this pledge. We have been much more specific in our commitments than have our Allies. With them, of course, we hold firm to the commitment made to the Federal Republic of Germany when it was admitted into NATO that no other government would be recognized as having the right to speak for any of the German people until collectively they had selected a government of their own choice. We remain committed to the position taken at Potsdam that the final eastern boundary of Germany cannot be fixed except in a peace treaty to be negotiated with a united Germany. To the people of Berlin we have pledged ourselves to defend their freedom. Specifically, we are committed to maintain free access for Allied personnel and goods on the ground and for all who travel by air, and to protect the viability of West Berlin; and this viability obviously includes the safe movement of West German persons and goods in and out of West Berlin. We are committed to maintaining our garrison as long as the people of West Berlin want it there. We have also taken the position that there should be no lessening of the ties which now exist between West Berlin and West Germany. We have encouraged the investment of additional capital in West Berlin and the construction of new cultural

and educational facilities. We hope and believe that full Allied agreement can be obtained, for we realize that a negotiated solution that is unacceptable to any ally cannot be accepted by the other allies. Otherwise, the Soviet Government might well accomplish its purpose of driving a wedge between the Allies which could threaten the continued existence of NATO and disrupt the progress toward political unity in Western Europe. Perhaps the most difficult question still to be resolved is what would constitute recognition of the illegal East German régime as a sovereign power. Here the views of the Federal Republic of Germany and the people of West Berlin must be taken into consideration in light of the commitments made when the Federal Republic became a part of NATO.

Certainly, the weakening of the Alliance remains the main objective of the Soviet Government. The countries of Western Europe which have indicated their desire for political union, and which together have populations greater than our own, resources greater than those of the Soviet Union, and talents and abilities second to none, would—united and in defensive alliance with the United States—bring about a balance of world power which would ensure peace for many years, guarantee the protection of the free countries and provide inspiration for the newly developing countries to choose freedom as their way of life. The countries of Western Europe which now seek political unity have prosperous and growing economies, they enjoy political stability, and their people live in freedom and hope. They have, it is true, not yet enjoyed their newly found prosperity long enough to see the necessity for them to contribute their proportionate share to the common defense and to the aid of the less developed countries of the world. However, these are nations that have always accepted broad responsibilities in maintaining a free society and we have every right to expect that they will assume their proper share in the defense of freedom.

Since the erection of the Berlin Wall, we have done more to increase our military strength than any other of the free countries. We must insist that the other countries which belong to NATO meet their military commitments and we must urge that they join with us in helping to support freedom in other parts of the world where it is under threat.

It is difficult to know what will happen next in Berlin. Any interference with the movement of German persons and goods to

and from Berlin that was serious enough to destroy or even threaten its economic life would lead at once to the cessation of all trade between East and West Germany and, if continued, would undoubtedly bring about other types of massive economic retaliation. Most of the actions directed against the Western Allies since August 13, 1961, have had as their purpose to bring about the West's recognition of East German authority in some form, and future Soviet actions can be expected to pursue the same purpose. It is not easy for us to understand the nature of these harassments, many of which seem too petty to warrant countermeasures; yet they have resulted in substantial deterioration of the Allied position in Berlin. Many people have wondered why it is important for us to refuse to show to East German police the credentials which we are prepared to show to Soviet soldiers. To accept this illogical demand would mean granting to Ulbricht's police the right to supervise, and hence to grant or deny, our right of access to West Berlin.

I believe that if further harassing tactics are undertaken by the Soviets to bring about panic in West Berlin they will have to include the use of force. This does not seem likely. However, we must be on our guard in Berlin to maintain the rights which we now possess and to prevent any encroachment by the puppet East German régime. There, as elsewhere, we must be prepared to interpose our troops step by step as threats materialize so that these threats can be carried out only by the use of force. Thus we shall place the responsibility for the use of force squarely on the shoulders of the Communist leaders. If this involves the risk of war it is a risk we must take. If we are less willing to risk war to save freedom than the Communists are to further their plan for world domination, we may be sure they will continue to gain.

There is little we can concede in Berlin although there is perhaps some room for trading concessions provided we get at least as much in exchange as we give. To make a compromise in which something of equal or superior value is gained in exchange for a concession is not in itself unworthy and may be wise. We must, however, establish clearly on the ground those principles which we will not compromise and for which we are prepared to fight, and we must be ready to use all of our strength and resources to protect these principles. Only in this way can an eventual solution be found which will enable the people of West Berlin to live in freedom and in economic independence.

We are in Berlin both by right of victory and by right of agreements under which we turned over to Soviet occupation a large part of what is now Eastern Germany. It is unthinkable that we should let anyone take this right away from us. Moreover, if we remain true to our lifelong support of self-determination, we cannot allow the people of West Berlin to fall into the hands of a régime which they have rejected again and again in free elections. We must remain firm in Berlin, not just because of this obligation, not just because of our deep concern for its courageous people, but also because the Berlin crisis is really a European crisis and any threat to Western Europe is a direct threat to our own freedom and independence.

If we fail or falter in Berlin the present confidence under which Western Europe thrives and grows closer in political unity could well disappear in the minds and hearts of those people who seem today most apprehensive. No one in the West can afford to forget that the abandonment of Berlin might well lead to the permanent eclipse of democracy in Europe.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM, A WORLD PROBLEM

By Konrad Adenauer

I WRITE this article not long after my visit to France, where I spent seven eventful days of great political importance. One essential purpose of my visit was to demonstrate to the German and French peoples and, indeed, to the whole world that the reconciliation between the two neighboring peoples on both sides of the Rhine has now become a reality.

President de Gaulle called it a "miracle." And indeed, ten years ago very few people would have dared to hope that the two nations, which fought one another for centuries, would extend the hand of friendship so soon after a terrible war in order jointly to tackle the tasks before them. The solidarity now existing between France and Germany is the result of long and courageous efforts on both sides. On the French side the work was begun by Robert Schuman; with great prudence and energy President de Gaulle has brought it to its conclusion and, I may say, to its crowning glory. The extraordinary characteristic of this development, however, lies in the fact that broad sections of both peoples seized upon the idea and supported the efforts of their governments. The ever-increasing friendliness and open-mindedness with which the French everywhere welcomed the German Federal Chancellor from Paris via Rouen and Bordeaux up to Reims have shown the broad basis on which Franco-German solidarity now rests.

Germany and France have become aware of what they have in common—their histories, their interests and their responsibilities. From now on they will be still closer together. The feeling of solidarity will be embedded still deeper in the conscience of the nations and will one day be natural to all. President de Gaulle is visiting the Federal Republic this autumn, and by the time my words are printed, the German people will have shown him how dearly they cherish the friendship with France. This friendship is directed against no one in the free world; it will be to the advantage of all. Europe can only benefit if the two neighboring countries in the heart of Europe are closely united. France and Germany will form a firm political dam against the advance of Soviet Communism which threatens the freedom of us all.

II

Franco-German solidarity is also the foundation for the edifice of European unification. The policy of European union is in an important stage of development.

The success of the policy of European unification through the work of the Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and Euratom constitutes one of the great achievements by which during the last few years the West has proved its vitality. The Common Market of the Six has been realized to a great extent. The internal customs tariffs have already been reduced by 50 percent and will disappear completely within the next few years. Joint action is undertaken in important fields such as agricultural, social and transport policy. In recent years the rate of growth of the Gross National Product was higher in the European Economic Community than in the Soviet Union.

That our policy is right is confirmed by the fact that states which had stood aside now seem to be prepared to assume the responsibilities of the Treaties of Paris and Rome in order to share the advantages of economic integration. Britain, Denmark, Norway and Ireland have already applied for membership. Other states will follow, while still others are considering association with the Community. The most important negotiations—those with Great Britain—are well under way and we hope they will succeed. Their outcome will greatly influence the envisaged negotiations with other countries.

The European Economic Community intends to pursue a liberal external trade policy. It does not aim at secluding Europe but rather at creating the basis for an extension of world trade to the benefit of all trading nations by strengthening Europe economically. In particular we also desire close coöperation with the United States in the field of trade policy. In this connection I welcome the Trade Expansion Act, introduced by President Kennedy and already passed by the House of Representatives, which authorizes the President to reduce customs tariffs.

Finally, the economic integration of Europe will encourage assistance for the developing countries. We desire to improve the effectiveness of this assistance, which is intended to enable the emergent countries to make their own development efforts.

The economic integration of Europe, in spite of its great value, is not by itself sufficient. It is necessary for Europe to create a

strongly coördinated policy with regard to vital problems, and especially in foreign policy. That is the basic idea of the plan to establish a Union of European States which will intensify the existing coöperation in the political field. All six countries agree that the "European policy" must be vigorously continued and that if possible the negotiations regarding the European political union must be brought to a conclusion this year. Any delay in the efforts toward European unification would tend to paralyze the dynamic power of our political development and would stimulate the Soviet Union's hope to divide the free world. The Union of European States as envisaged will at first be a relatively loose structure. However, we are aware even now that the form of political coöperation must continuously become closer during the next few years.

It has always been a great encouragement to us to know that the Administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, with the strong support of each of their Secretaries of State and of the American people, have sincerely wished to foster the policy of European unification. The United States recognized very early after the war that the free world could not exist unless Europe was unified and strong. The same recognition will also guide us in our future action.

III

Europe could not and cannot achieve unification all by itself; it requires the support of the Atlantic Alliance, another great success of our common policy. Since NATO came into existence, Communism has not been able to make further progress in Europe. The defensive power of the free world organized under NATO safeguards peace and preserves the traditions of our peoples. The security of America and Europe is today indivisible.

The Atlantic Alliance has achieved a high degree of coöperation in the field of defense. The objective of this Alliance is that the partners in it, all of whom are subject to the same dangers, shall contribute to the collective strength according to their capacity. Since NATO was established, the United States, by its efficiency and the sacrifices of its soldiers and taxpayers, has provided the decisive contribution to common security. This is gratefully recognized by the German people.

From the time it joined NATO, the Federal Republic of Germany has consistently raised its defense contributions in accord-

ance with the defined objectives. It will continue to do everything in its power to provide its prescribed share for common defense.

NATO, a proven instrument, must remain effective and flexible in order to meet all requirements. The decisions of the NATO Ministerial Conference in Athens have shown that the Alliance is also able to meet newly emerging problems. I am convinced that on the difficult problem of control of the common deterrent a settlement can be found that is satisfactory both to America and the European states.

NATO was born out of the need to defend the common ideals of the free world against the Soviet threat. Its military organization, therefore, is not an end in itself. It is based on a close unity of the states on both sides of the Atlantic who share the same basic views on the meaning of life and the mission of man throughout the world. This strong link must be intensified in all fields.

IV

The free world united in the Atlantic Alliance is threatened by the ruthless efforts of Soviet Communism to expand its power and its system. The Soviet Union is trying by every means to weaken the West and to drive it back. It changes the form, the intensity and the theatre of its efforts, but never allows the free world to settle in peace.

The Soviets sustain their policy of threats and extortion by a great military potential, both conventional and nuclear. That they could not score any major success recently is due to the fact that the West has developed a credible deterrent policy. The strength of the West today is so great that the Soviet leaders obviously do not contemplate the possibility of an all-out war in order to achieve their objectives. They express this through the doctrine of a so-called "coexistence." Although this doctrine manages to find room for "wars of liberation," it does imply that all-out war between the two power blocs is avoidable.

We must be fully aware, nevertheless, that these Soviet tactics are only a result of Western strength and that the Soviets would revert to a more aggressive policy if ever the readiness and alertness of the free world were relaxed. It is our chief obligation, therefore, to maintain Western unity and strength. If we can do this convincingly the Soviet leaders will one day realize, I hope, that to maintain tension is not conducive to success, nor does it serve their interests in the long run. Today the Soviet Union pays

out huge sums for armaments and for anti-Western activities. We hope that the leaders of the Soviet Union will not permanently be able to withhold from the Russian people the fruits of their work as a result of a pointless policy of tension. If we maintain our unity and strength, and remain patient, we will lay the foundation for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union based on respect for the vital interests and the freedom of peoples. This is a policy of reason, the only one that can preserve freedom and peace.

At the present time East-West tension is concentrated in and around Berlin. This is particularly distressing for us Germans. By repeated threats and intimidations the Soviet Union is endeavoring to remove the Western powers from the position they have held for 17 years in the free part of Berlin. The Berlin crisis has now lasted for almost four years. Its course has shown that the Soviets want to avoid a military conflict. They obviously believe, however, that they can undermine the morale of the Berliners and the firm attitude of the Western powers by constant disturbances. Hence, Berlin has become a test case for the determination and patience of the free world.

There are people in the West who, having become weary of the constant burden of the Berlin problem, recommend that concessions be made to the Soviet Union. Such views do not take into consideration the decisive aspect of the whole problem. In the first place, it is a question of the destiny of millions of people. West Berlin must be held not only because 2,500,000 people live there but also because the confidence and the hope of 17,000,000 Germans in the Soviet-occupied zone depend on the West to stand by their principles in Berlin. The German Federal Government, which also speaks for the Germans under Soviet domination, must point out that the free world also bears responsibility for them. Our awareness of this obligation is kept permanently alive by the Berlin Wall, that abominable monument of terror. The wall, which transformed the Soviet-occupied zone into a huge prison, is an expression of inhumanity signifying suffering and hardship for millions of people. But it also concerns the reputation of the United States throughout the free world. The United States has given its word. The whole world knows that it will keep it.

The Berlin problem, just like the German problem, is in the last analysis a human one. This is why a starting point for a solution could be found in that sphere. If our countrymen in the Soviet-

occupied zone are granted decent living conditions and at least a certain amount of freedom and self-determination, we shall be open to discussion on a good many points.

V

The disarmament problem is a central problem of world politics. The tensions sharpened by Soviet actions have necessarily given rise to an ever-faster armaments race. Both the Soviet Union and the United States possess great stocks of weapons capable of wreaking mass extermination and unimaginable devastation. It is in our urgent interest to remove this terrible possibility by general and controlled disarmament.

In the disarmament conference which has been under way in Geneva since March 14 of this year, the United States has submitted extremely far-reaching and well-considered disarmament plans which we emphatically support. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, again and again aim at shifting the military equilibrium in favor of the Eastern bloc. This applies in particular to the plans for regional disarmament and so-called atom-free zones in Central Europe, by which it is intended to weaken European defense, as well as to the Soviet refusal to agree to any kind of control, for fear that inspection would remove the secrecy of the closed Soviet system in contrast to the open system of the free world. It seems that the Soviets again wish to use the present disarmament conference only as a vehicle for propaganda.

Despite all disappointments, the efforts of the Western powers to find ways and means leading to disarmament must be energetically continued. Our hope must be that consistency on the part of the West in the disarmament field will convince the Soviets of the necessity to enter into serious negotiations which take into account the interests of both sides.

VI

I do not wish to conclude without saying a few words about American-German relations and the role of the United States.

When, after the last terrible war, Germany lay conquered and beaten on the ground, it was the Western occupation powers, led by the United States, that lent us a helping hand. The economic assistance provided by the American Government and many hundreds of thousands of private American citizens was important; it contributed to our survival and the reconstruction of our

country. But still more valuable was the human spirit underlying this attitude. It is rare in history that the victor helps the defeated enemy to his feet and is prepared to accept him as an equal if he proves his worth—as an ally and friend. This attitude of the American people will go down in history as a great and exemplary act. For this I have already expressed my thanks to the United States on many occasions. I shall continue to do so; we shall never forget what America has done for us.

And now one last word. We are living in a restless age full of tension. The atheistic forces of Communism, while pretending to create a paradise on earth, are set on robbing people of their dignity and freedom and degrading them into will-less elements of a termite-state.

The free world resists this attempt. The dispute will continue for a long time to come, and will be endured by the free peoples only if they are wise, determined and, above all, united. In this regard the United States has a special role to play. It is the strongest of the Western powers. It is the leading power, but according to the concept of freedom, leading does not mean commanding; leading is more difficult, but also more successful. Leading means to understand the worries of the Allies, to listen to their proposals, to make suggestions of one's own, to arouse the community to action, to ensure a fair distribution of burdens, to exhort to unity, to set an example for the others to follow.

In this respect, the Soviet Union, the leading power of the East, is apparently faced with easier problems. The concept there is to lead by command. But we are confident that the American Government and people will master the more difficult task that confronts them.

On July 4 of this year, in Philadelphia, President Kennedy spoke of the principles of a genuine partnership between the United States and Europe. In this great speech he outlined the picture of an Atlantic partnership in which the members stand in a relationship of mutual interdependence, bearing jointly the responsibility for freedom and peace in the world, as well as the same rights and duties. I am pleased to say that I fully agree with this aim as it was proclaimed by President Kennedy, the leader of the free world. We are prepared to take this step. We shall do everything in our power to make the partnership healthy and strong, not only for the benefit of the peoples directly concerned but also for the prosperity of the whole human race.

FRANCE AND GERMANY IN THE NEW EUROPE

By Maurice Schumann

ON August 2, 1914, a young officer burst into the office of General Lyautey in Rabat to inform him that hostilities had just broken out between France and Germany. Lyautey, who had spent the greater part of his career in Asia and in Africa and had acquired the habit of looking at problems not on the scale of a general staff map but on the scale of a world map, stopped to think, then lifted his eyes and said slowly: "They are crazy; it is a civil war." The young officer closed the door behind him without understanding. For him, as for most men of his time, the history of the twentieth century, like that of the nineteenth, could only be written by the European peoples; their strife, however tragic the consequences, was thus in the nature of things.

Only one well-known Frenchman looked upon this great tragedy in the same light as Lyautey—the pacifist writer Romain Rolland, an admirer of Tolstoy. After taking refuge in Switzerland in order to avoid having to choose sides, he published as early as September 1914 a pamphlet entitled "Au-dessus de la mêlée," in which this passage appears: "Thus the three great peoples of the West, the guardians of civilization, are rushing headlong toward their ruin and are calling to their rescue Cossacks, Turks, Japanese, Singhalese, Sudanese, Senegalese, Moroccans, Egyptians, Sikhs and sepoys, barbaric peoples from the pole and from the equator, peoples and races of all colors! It looks like the Roman Empire at the time of the tetrarchy appealing to the hordes of the whole universe in order that they might devour one another. Is our civilization so firmly rooted then that you do not fear to weaken its pillars? Do you not see that, if one single column is destroyed, everything will come crashing down about you?" Lyautey and Romain Rolland were two men with ideas and beliefs as different as could possibly be. But they had one thing in common: they had both taken the trouble to observe the masses of Asia and Africa. They needed to do no more in order to be 40 years ahead of their time.

For the great majority of Frenchmen today feel that another French-German war would be "a civil war" and many of them would freely admit that, as far back as 1914, Lyautey had seen

the truth. It was above all in order to test the survivors of Verdun and of the Resistance that General de Gaulle, a veteran of Verdun and bearer of the title of "First Resistance Fighter of France," in July of this year invited Chancellor Adenauer, not to meet him personally (as he had done previously) but to come into contact directly with the French people. The towns that were visited had not been chosen haphazardly. Bordeaux, the capital of southwestern France, and Reims, the capital of Champagne, are associated with two of the most humiliating incidents, one for the French, the other for the Germans. It was from Bordeaux that, on June 17, 1940, came the demand for an armistice against which de Gaulle, a member of the last government of the Third Republic before the fight was abandoned, instantly rose up in protest. It was at Reims that, four years and eleven months later, Field Marshal von Keitel signed the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich, after having greeted the arrival of General de Lattre de Tassigny with this exclamation: "What! The French too . . ." The scene took place a few hundred yards away from one of the world's most famous cathedrals, which—after having served as a target for the German artillery in 1916—was restored during the period between the two wars, in large part through American generosity. If I had not resigned from the government on May 15 of this year, I would no doubt have been present, as one of General de Gaulle's ministers, less than 18 years later, at the first French-German military parade in history, which, as it happens, took place some 12 miles from Reims. I would, of course, have felt that I was witnessing an event of capital importance. But I would not have been any more surprised than most of my countrymen, including those who—like myself—answered General de Gaulle's call as early as June 1940. For Chancellor Adenauer was welcomed wherever he went, not with enthusiasm, but with understanding; not with joyful cries, which would have been considered out of place by everyone, and first of all by our guest, but with deference and dignity.

Everyone who witnessed the event had three similar observations to make. First of all, the only manifestations of hostility were those that had been organized by the Communist Party. Thus it was that, when the Chancellor arrived at the Hôtel de Ville in Paris, the Communist municipal councillors staged a spectacular walkout accompanied by shouts. Their Socialist colleagues were the first to publish a communiqué protesting this

attitude. Second of all, the Communist militants themselves, while they executed the orders that had been given to them, did not seem to be carried away by enthusiasm; they were much more numerous and violent some ten years ago, when their target was someone like General Ridgway. Lastly, the average Frenchman—in Paris and in Bordeaux, in Reims and in Rouen—had the impression that he was witnessing not the beginning of a new era, but the crowning of a policy undertaken and accepted long ago.

In 1871 the King of Prussia, Wilhelm I, was crowned Emperor of Germany in the Galerie des Glaces of the Versailles Palace, after having taken away Alsace and a part of Lorraine from France. On June 28, 1919, the treaty ending the First World War was signed at Versailles by France, her allies and Germany. The first event occurred barely four years before the birth of Konrad Adenauer, the second when the mayor of Cologne was nearly 45 years old. When the 87-year-old Chancellor was the official guest of the town of Louis XIV, he recalled these two historic facts without any constraint. Somebody then remarked, "You would think he is talking of a civil war." It was an English journalist who said it. After 48 years, ten of which were filled with slaughter, he was, without knowing it, using the same expression as Lyautey.

II

Does this mean that the French-German reconciliation is today considered to be irrevocable by all Frenchmen except the Communists? If we were to give a purely affirmative answer, we would run the risk of overlooking something essential. Behind the French-German reconciliation, as behind all the seemingly theoretical debates arising out of the problem of supranationality, there is, in reality, a fundamental fear—that of a new German-Soviet pact.

The aversion of a large section of the French Right to the transformation of "the hereditary enemy" into a partner and an ally has not disappeared overnight. To be sure, the champions of traditional nationalism who joined with the Communists (their worst enemies) to combat the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, or the Common Market in 1957, and to bring about the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, were not all guided by distrust toward Germany. Many of them—probably most of them—were responding rather to the desire not to get involved in a system of which England was not a member;

to the fear of upheavals that might bring about the disappearance of old economic structures; or to the almost instinctive will to preserve national sovereignty. The proof of this lies in the fact that the same National Assembly which in August 1954 had rejected the idea of a European army several months later approved the Paris accords, which authorized the rebuilding of a German national army.

The fact remains, however, that until 1955 the Communists were not the only ones to speak of the "German peril;" the E.D.C. was turned down on the joint motion of the old Radical leader Edouard Herriot (who had been, during the Weimar Republic, the great advocate of French-German rapprochement and was scarred forever by the collapse of his efforts) and General Aumeran, deputy from Algiers, who sat on the extreme Right. The latter even went so far as to warn his colleagues against "the eternal Germany." If this kind of language has almost disappeared during the last seven years, it is because the French spirit has become accustomed to reasoning in terms of the following alternative: Either Germany will be linked to the West, or else it will be tempted sooner or later either to play a seesaw game between the East and the West or even to come to a direct agreement with the Soviet Union, which holds the key to German unity. All Frenchmen over 40 years of age recall the German-Soviet pact signed in the Kremlin on August 23, 1939, by Stalin and Ribbentrop. None of them forgets that this sudden reversal was the direct cause of the war. In this regard, the violent campaign conducted by the Communist Party against Chancellor Adenauer and the Federal Republic has greatly helped the reconciliation venture.

No one understood this better than the Chancellor himself. Summing up his French trip for the German press, he made this key statement: "The goal of German and French policy should now be to bring the two peoples together in such a way that neither of the two governments could think of concluding a treaty with Moscow at the expense of the other." Are there many Germans who fear that a French government might decide to conclude a treaty with Moscow at the expense of the Federal Republic? At any rate, such a fear never entered the mind of the old Chancellor. He knows that a bilateral agreement is sought by the Soviet Union in so far as it can help disrupt the Atlantic Alliance, and thereby alienate the United States from Europe; he also

knows that no European government can take such a risk without at least having the illusion of gaining thereby a major advantage. Now the only major advantage that this could hold for France would be to ward off a new German menace. General de Gaulle thus settled the question for the moment when he declared publicly that Germany "did not at present represent any kind of danger for France."

On the other hand, there are many Frenchmen who fear that a German government may some day decide to conclude a treaty with Moscow at the expense not only of France but of the whole West. In such a case, there might indeed appear to be a major advantage if the Soviet Union offered to barter the reunification of Germany for its neutralization. Of course, the great majority of West Germans think that such a bargain would result not in the liberation of 17,000,000 Germans who are behind the Iron Curtain, but in the transformation of West Germany itself into a satellite. But would a Germany that had recovered its attributes of power without being solidly tied to the West go on thinking this way indefinitely? When Mr. Khrushchev proposed, in an official note to Chancellor Adenauer last December, a new type of German-Soviet pact, he must have been aware of the fact that his scheme was doomed to failure in the immediate future. But the very choice of the arguments invoked demonstrates that he was addressing himself, over the heads of the government and its very old leader, to two categories of Germans. On one hand, by stressing that "the German and Russian economies are complementary," he was baiting the industrialists, flattering their atavistic tendency toward continuous expansion and suggesting by implication a new "Drang nach Osten" in the form of a sharing of markets. On the other hand, by asserting that NATO's goals were inconsistent with the fundamental interests of the German nation, he was inviting the young people to question the means by which it was proposed to reestablish the country's unity and was reminding them that unification does not depend on the good will of the West, but on his—Khrushchev's—good will.

Was this a casual manoeuvre? On the contrary, the same approach is tried periodically. The French Communists, who were indignant because Chancellor Adenauer was greeted in Paris to the strains of "Deutschland über alles," forgot that the same anthem was played in Moscow on September 8, 1955, when the

German head of government was received there with unaccustomed splendor. In February 1957, Marshal Bulganin, who had not as yet fallen from grace, addressed a memorandum to Chancellor Adenauer in which he outlined all the topics that were later taken up in Khrushchev's memorandum of December 27, 1961. On November 9 of last year, a "five-point plan," which did not have the same scope but stemmed from the same design, emerged out of a meeting between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kroll, the Federal Republic's ambassador to Moscow. In January 1962, the Soviet radio celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the first agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union by enumerating the advantages that the West Germans would derive from a "creative application of the spirit of Rapallo."

If the implications of these events do not catch the public's attention, we may be sure that General de Gaulle has carefully noted them. His turn of mind always leads him to light the paths of the future by the lantern of the past. He is, as has been said, "a man of the day before yesterday and day after tomorrow." If he had not been more than 30 years old at the time of Rapallo and almost 50 at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, his attitude with regard to the Berlin problem would no doubt be different. When he was visited by Mr. K. in March 1961, he said to him: "You say you would like an easing of tension? We would like it too. But there can be no easing of tension without equilibrium. There can be no possible equilibrium if the Federal Republic does not belong to the West. The Federal Republic will no longer belong to the West from the moment that West Berlin is, directly or indirectly, abandoned. For this will be proof that the Atlantic guarantee is weak, precarious and revocable. What will happen then? The whole of Germany will tumble into neutrality and the safety of our Rhine frontier—which we have secured at the cost of two terrible wars—will be placed in question again. It is in order to avoid this fatal chain of events that France is urging the greatest firmness in the defense of Western rights in West Berlin."

Many Americans believe (it is true that many Frenchmen encourage them in this belief) that a certain bent for proud solitude was the one thing that prevented General de Gaulle from approving the famous Soviet-American "contacts," which would have turned into negotiations on the Berlin problem had they shown any possibility of an agreement. The basic reason is quite different. "There are two possibilities," the President of the French

Republic would say; "as long as the U.S.S.R.—which has artificially created the Berlin problem—does not modify its basic positions, negotiations can only lead to failure or to gradual capitulation. In the first case, we would be aggravating international tension by trying to work toward a *détente*. In the second case, we would be clearing the way for a German-Soviet rapprochement. If some chance of avoiding a break between Germany and the West is to be preserved, it is essential that France, at least, shall have taken no part in the abandonment." This reasoning reflects perhaps an exaggerated idea of France's means or of her powers of attraction. But it is indicative of the obsession (the word is not too strong) that is driving General de Gaulle to want to make the French-German reconciliation spectacular and indestructible.

What do the "Europeans" make of this? Everything should lead them (it would seem at first glance) to be satisfied. But it is precisely at this point that their misgivings begin. With some of them, these misgivings arise perhaps out of an ingrained and, consequently, unwarranted suspicion. In the case of others, the misgivings are justified by two motives that are worth thinking about. On the one hand, they feel that General de Gaulle is not following his thinking through to the end; since he considers, with good reason, that if ever France's alliances were upset, the nation would be in mortal danger, he should deduce from this that the only way of shielding her from this threat is by withdrawing himself from the mechanism of traditional alliances between sovereign states. All the agreements of this kind with which history is punctuated have been precarious and destined sooner or later to be called into question; the only way of "creating the irreversible" (to use the expression employed by M. René Pleven, former President of the Council) is to bind Germany, and therefore France, to supranational institutions, which presuppose the relinquishment of sovereignty. If the 13 British colonies of North America had become sovereign states united by a treaty, instead of forming a federation, the heirs of George Washington would today be quarreling over a divided territory instead of governing the leading power of the world. On the other hand, although it is true that the end of French-German antagonism is the necessary and vital condition for European unity, the end of this antagonism cannot take the place of European unity. The part of the Continent that has remained free is not so large that it can

afford to be divided against itself. At a time when Britain is asking to join the Common Market, it would be absurd and dangerous to give Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands the impression that we want, if not to do without them, at least to submit the Europe of the Six to a sort of French-German directorate, with which Germany itself, moreover, does not seem at all likely to be satisfied.

Such are the objections. In order to appraise their significance, we must examine the thoughts and motives that govern General de Gaulle's foreign policy.

III

First, can we consider that it was only when General de Gaulle returned to power in June 1958, twelve years and five months after having left office, that he discovered the necessity for a French-German entente and a European regrouping? The speeches he had made back in 1945, as President of the Provisional Government, prove the contrary. "All of us here come from the same race," he declared in Mainz in October 1945, less than five months after the end of the war. "And here we are today, between Europeans and Westerners. What good reasons for us to stay close together from now on!" Several days later, he exclaimed in Strasbourg: "The Rhine can resume the role laid out for it by nature and history. It can become a Western bond once again." Admittedly French policy was at that time wedded to three propositions: the end of the centralized Reich, autonomy for the left bank of the Rhine, internationalization of the Ruhr. But, when General de Gaulle presented these proposals to President Truman at the end of 1945, he was careful to point out: "It is not our intention to drive the German people to despair. On the contrary, we mean for them to live, to prosper and even to draw closer to us. But we must have guarantees. If it turns out later that our neighbors have changed their proclivities, we can reconsider these initial precautions." He also added that his basic purpose was to prevent the Soviet Union from using the fear of Germany to strengthen its subjugation of the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans. "If these states," he said, "find that a German threat no longer exists, their national interests will not fail to rise up within the Soviet camp."

Yet even then this outline of the French-German rapprochement aroused suspicion. Was General de Gaulle not thinking

more of France than of the West? Was he not trying to reestablish a concert of Western Europe around his country and his person, and thus to transform the Old Continent into a "third force," capable of intervening and maintaining a balance between the Communist world and the Anglo-Saxon world while remaining at an equal distance from both? It would be futile to deny that these questions remain unanswered. We shall get the answers not from systematic argumentation nor from criticism of alleged intentions, but from the joint conclusions reached by the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic after the last and most important of their meetings.

The first of these conclusions is that the need for a politically united Europe is directly linked with the continuance of the Soviet danger. There can be no misunderstanding on this fundamental issue. Chancellor Adenauer and General de Gaulle feel that it is urgent—at a time when all the Western powers are faced with serious problems, and the Soviet Union is exerting pressure on them wherever it can—to give organic political structure to the coöperation of the Six. To achieve this, doctrinal quarrels must be forgotten and a "realistic and concrete" line of action must be defined. The two adjectives have a very special meaning. They mean that the two partners meet each other halfway. On the one hand, General de Gaulle agrees to let the existing communities remain, with the more or less supranational powers that they possess. On the other, Chancellor Adenauer admits that the political institutions in course of creation should, at least in the initial stage, preserve national sovereignty—in other words, be governed by the principle of unanimity. But it is made clear that, from now on, their goal will be to draw together, coördinate and unify the policy of the member states in three domains—diplomacy, culture and defense.

The second conclusion reached by the President and the Chancellor is that equal care must be taken on two points: Great Britain must not be excluded from the joint enterprise; nor must the signing of a treaty establishing a political confederation of continental Europe be made to depend on the outcome of the negotiations undertaken in Brussels for the purpose of bringing her into the Common Market.

The two sides of this coin are equally important. First, British membership in the European communities is considered desirable, provided it does not destroy a delicate balance (in other

words, on the sole condition that the preferential system enjoyed by the Commonwealth is to disappear by 1970—that is, at the end of the transitional period). Second, in order that Europe shall be able to make its voice heard and defend its interests in every domain, it must not sacrifice its cohesion merely for the sake of enlarging its scope. The economic Europe that Britain now wishes to join would never have come into existence if its creators had decided not to do anything without the participation of the British Cabinet. In the same way, we would now be condemning ourselves never to create a political Europe, or to create it too late, if we waited for Britain to lead instead of showing her the way.

A third conclusion reached is that it is neither legitimate nor possible for the United States—or rather, the two Anglo-Saxon powers together—to retain a monopoly of atomic weapons indefinitely; the corollary of which is that for Europe, and first of all France, to achieve nuclear power ought to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and not weaken it. The problems involved here are both complex and controversial. Perhaps I can help the American reader to understand how Chancellor Adenauer and General de Gaulle could reach accord on them by explaining my own stand.

Although I had resigned as a minister in the present government on May 15, 1962, because of my disagreement with General de Gaulle on basic issues in the European problem, I did not vote, on July 18, against the government's request for funds to complete the construction of a French isotopic separation plant. My reasons were three:

1. The decision to provide France with atomic weapons was first taken by governments that firmly believed in the Atlantic Alliance and favored European integration. I remember clearly the arguments that carried weight at that time, notably in the ministerial councils of which I was a member in 1951, 1952 and 1953. First of all (we thought) the surest way in the long run of ruining the credit of the "Grand Alliance" in the minds of the French people would be to let them believe that from now on there were to be two categories of allies: those who were the sole possessors of deterrent weapons, and those who were entitled to possess only conventional weapons. Any French government would be particularly unlikely to accept this discrimination because it would not apply to Great Britain. In this connection

Americans should recall remarks by two friendly Frenchmen. By Raymond Aron: "We shall never accept the fact of atomic secrets crossing the Atlantic but not the Channel." And by René Pleven, former President of the Council: "It would be the biggest error to believe that French atomic policy will change when General de Gaulle is no longer there."

2. Just as NATO's conventional forces are supposed to constitute a single army, so it would be desirable that all the atomic and nuclear resources of the "Grand Alliance" should also be integrated. This would mean specifically that the decision to employ them, if necessary, should be taken by majority vote, either by all the members of NATO, or by five of them—the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy—to whom the others would have delegated authority. However, if I were American I would find it inconceivable that the use or non-use of my own nuclear weapons could depend on others—in other words, that the order "to push the button" could be given to the President of the United States by three votes against two (the United States itself figuring in the minority).

3. If, then, an "Atlantic" nuclear force is impossible, can we not substitute for a French force a "European" force? This solution is by far the best, since it would open the way to make good the relative weakness of France's technical and financial resources. How might it be achieved?

There can be no "European" atomic and nuclear force without the participation of Great Britain and the German Federal Republic. But the United Kingdom is only just beginning to take the big step into Europe; months, perhaps years, will inevitably elapse between the time when it might join the Common Market and the time when it will agree to contribute its atomic and nuclear power to a European pool. In this matter, moreover, the British cabinet is not completely free to act, for it would have to receive Washington's permission to pass on to its continental allies the secrets which at present it alone shares. As for the German Federal Republic, when it regained its sovereignty and entered NATO in 1954, it committed itself not to build atomic weapons on its territory. It would be within the letter of this commitment if it participated in the construction of an isotopic separation plant on French territory. But clearly any move that associated the German Federal Republic with the creation of atomic power for Western Europe would produce international

complications and tension, and the consequences must be taken fully into account. I am not thinking only of the possible reactions of the Soviet Union but also of those from America. Washington's main argument against the nuclear arming of France is the fear that this "spread" of nuclear weapons may extend to Germany. We may believe that this wariness will be untenable in the long run; nevertheless, we must take it into account and refrain from imposing additional burdens and difficulties on the United States—even with the excellent intention of substituting an atomic E.D.C. for our own "striking force."

For these reasons I believe the right course of action is the one which General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer have formulated together—namely, to lose no time in developing political institutions for the Europe of the Six; to plan them in such a way that Britain could join as soon as possible; and to give a politically united Europe competence in defense matters. If unification is completed before France acquires an atomic force, or even if the two tasks are pursued simultaneously, we shall have reached the goal we were aiming at ten years ago; we shall have strengthened the over-all power of NATO while reestablishing, within the "Grand Alliance," the balance between the Old World and the New.

French-German reconciliation was the chief condition of success in this great undertaking. But it was only a condition. At the end of the dinner at the Elysée Palace in Chancellor Adenauer's honor, General de Gaulle made a few bold and unexpected statements. "In reality," he said, "Germany and France, while each was seeking to impose its rule on the other in order to extend it subsequently over its neighbors, were pursuing the old dream of unity that for some twenty centuries has possessed people on the Continent. In the ambitions of Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, Bismarck, Wilhelm II, Clemenceau—and even, yes, even during the Second World War in the passions which an oppressive and criminal régime aroused for the purpose of seducing the German people—how much could be traced to the grandiose memories of the Caesars, of Christianity and of Charlemagne?" This historical myth is beautiful, if debatable. At all events, it has the merit of providing a clear connection between the entente which has now been firmly cemented and the "old dream of unity"—unity not only of a continent, but of a heritage and a civilization.

THE UNDERDEVELOPED AND THE OVERDEVELOPED

By Margaret Mead

THIS pair of phrases sums up the new, conflicting and contradictory assumptions that underlie the highly unsatisfactory climate of opinion in today's world. The use of the word "underdeveloped" in connection with a country implies that the most significant dimension of measurement in the world today is standard of living and that standard of living should be measured in terms of those indices that are inextricably linked with industrialization. Countries that are unindustrialized and depend primarily on agriculture and other primary industries are poor. Countries that are industrialized are rich. Richness and poverty are unequivocal terms. They relate to a single scale and provide one set of measurements in accordance with which all countries can be placed.

Economists grant that the problem of weighting is a difficult one. It is perfectly clear that, in a country in which 90 percent of the population can raise little more food than they need for their own consumption, very little will be left over to satisfy other and more complicated needs. If, for example, there is just enough extra food to take to a nearby market to sell for the few things that must be bought there—salt, candles, tea or coffee, tobacco, woven cloth—and the sellers always walk to market, then when bicycles are introduced, there will be no funds to buy them unless a change takes place. But in a relatively rich underdeveloped country like old Bali, where food was plentiful and there was a large surplus which could be spent on cremations, it was possible to cut down on cremations and to buy bicycles instead. When this happens, the standard of living is said to be higher. The culture has been impoverished and the country is not yet developed, but a first step in development has been taken—at cultural expense only. But where, as in most underdeveloped countries, the population lives at the subsistence level without a surplus of any kind, where the only source of animal protein is the ox or the pig consumed at a feast, the desire to own a bicycle can be realized only at the expense of something that is absolutely essential to subsistence as well as to a full and rewarding life. So, once the people of any country have learned to want manufactured objects that they

cannot buy out of an existing surplus, because there is no such surplus, they are immediately defined by themselves and others as underdeveloped and therefore poor.

The term "underdeveloped" is used technically to place a country in terms of industrialization, real and potential, on a scale which implies that industrial development can, should and will take place. The term "poor," however, is not used to place a country on a continuum of technical change. It is used rather to describe its relative consumption position—or the relative consumption position of the majority of its citizens—in comparison with other countries. Poor can mean not knowing where the next meal is coming from, as it does for many of the urban poor, or it can mean not being able to buy a bicycle, a jeep or a truck. It has no absolute connotation, in this context.

A group of primitive Eskimo, caught between winter and summer, their snow house melting above their heads but the time not yet come when summer hunting and fishing have brought in new supplies of food, or, at the opposite season, caught by the terrible autumnal storms that for days on end make hunting impossible, sitting together starving and the lamps gone out for lack of oil, until in desperation some hunter braves the storm and the punishing supernaturals—these people can be described as in danger of death but not as poor. They had the same equipment as the other Eskimo for meeting the harsh realities of their environment. They knew how to build snow houses, they had dogs, sleds, harpoons, soapstone lamps, bone needles, clothes of skin and fur. In those desperate situations when, in order to stay alive, they had to eat their dogs and then had to go on living without the means to make a living, they might be considered unfortunate. Or a man who, for some reason, had no wife to cook for him and dress his skins might be considered temporarily unfortunate. But these losses were potentially retrievable. His misfortune was a temporary lack of equipment or the lack of a working partner as compared with his fellow Eskimo. For an isolated individual or family group the lack might well be fatal; in other circumstances recoupment was possible. In the early days of contact, Europeans in the Arctic had to adopt Eskimo equipment in order to survive; the Eskimo were not then, by comparison, poor. But later, when modern equipment suitable for the Arctic was developed, the Eskimo did become poor in comparison with Europeans.

Poverty appears only when some people are organized into

groups from which they themselves have no means of escape or of self-betterment, because of ignorance, or government regulation, or lack of a culturally derived belief that escape is possible. So they are immobilized and do without necessities that others have, or they do without some of the luxuries that others have. Moreover, the more egalitarian the society, the more important is the concept of poverty. Where only the chief or the feudal lord lives in a large house and all other men in houses which are small and mean, the distinction is not between richness and poverty but between privilege and absence of privilege in a system based on rank or caste or class. But when it is possible for a majority of the population to have some given thing—a tin roof, a well, a pump, inside plumbing, a donkey, a team of horses, two teams of horses, a bicycle, a tractor, a truck, a station wagon—then the smaller number who cannot acquire it do not regard themselves, and are not regarded by others, as members of a different or a lesser breed. Instead they come to feel, and others come to feel, that they are simply poor.

While the term underdeveloped implies occupation of a place on a continuum that is defined in terms of technological per capita capacity to produce, the term poor implies placement at the bottom of the scale of consumption, having less than others—less, usually, than most others. When the two ideas are combined, and emphasis is laid on the relative presence or absence of technical productive capacity, all this is changed.

In older discussions of the condition of the poor, the poor at home or abroad, it was emphasized that it would do little good to divide up the riches of the wealthy few in an attempt to alleviate the poverty of the myriads of poor. Then it was possible for the rich to sit at overweighted tables while the poor pressed their noses against the windows in envious contemplation. If the rich were generous in a time of famine or flood, if they built hospitals or endowed schools so that a few more individuals could escape from misery, they could go their way without too bad a conscience. However wealth was rationalized—as the reward of individual effort or parental effort, as the necessary support of high birth—it was necessarily only for the few; the fortunate should be individually generous and should improve their position in heaven. If they did so, they had no special reason to feel guilty; they could enjoy their wealth.

But acceptance of the assumption that technological develop-

ment is possible for all and, therefore, that improvement of consumption is possible for all meant that it was no longer morally acceptable to let the majority of the peoples of the world live in poverty. From an economy of scarcity—in which, if one person got more, someone else got less and no redistribution of the rubies and emeralds of the rich could, in the long run, help more than a handful of beggars—we have moved, by definition, to an economy of plenty. Riches are no longer somebody's disproportionate, though legitimate, share of a scarce supply; poverty is no longer the consequence of someone else having a large proportion of the existing supply. Stated simply, as between the peoples of the world, poverty is the consequence of being underdeveloped. According to this doctrine, wealth is not given but is produced and every country is capable of an ever-rising rate of production; therefore poverty, defined as the present state of low consumption of most of the peoples of the world, is remediable. A people need not be poor; development will cure their poverty.

Systematic change from the older to the newer position has its difficulties, but there is a further complication. For, in the present position, poverty is defined in two different ways—relative and absolute. In the relative sense, poverty is defined as having less than others. In the absolute sense, there is a minimum standard below which no human beings should fall; when this minimum standard is attained by all the peoples of the world, when the now developed nations have helped the underdeveloped countries to develop, then everyone will be well off. This complication, arising from the discrepant definitions of poverty as relative and as absolute, is as seldom worked out in discussions about countries as it is in relief situations in the United States, where the relief agency attempts to meet standards of nutrition, medical care, shelter and so on, on an absolute scale of health and decency, while the recipients of relief experience profound and humiliating poverty on a relative standard.

A further consequence of the confusion between these two definitions of poverty is the effect it has on the planning and expectations of countries that are, by definition, rich. By implication, "closing the gap" between underdeveloped and developed countries means that the developed countries are, in fact, developed (or, as Myrdal puts it, are "now developed"¹) and, essentially,

¹ Gunnar Myrdal, "Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications." New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.

should develop no further; that is, the standard of living should rise no further. Instead, such countries should use the surplus that could go into further development to "close the gap" by supplying the undeveloped countries with capital already accumulated in the rich countries through the sweat and toil of the poor of other generations.

If, on the contrary, the rich countries continue to develop their already enormous productive capacities for their own use, and existing discrepancies in birth rates are maintained, then the underdeveloped countries will become poorer, relative to the rich countries, but poverty in the other sense—the absolute sense—will also result, *i.e.* deprivation of basic subsistence goods.

Thus advocacy of "closing the gap" includes, implicitly, a demand that developed countries should either arrest consumption or arrest the motivating force in their productive development—the desire for a rising consumption standard.

(A second very widely accepted assumption is that our capacity—based on our tremendous command of technology—to feed, clothe, shelter, educate and medicate the peoples of the world should be shared among the peoples of the world seen not as individual human beings with human needs, but as citizens of nation states. The vision that no one need be hungry or cold, illiterate and ignorant, or suffer from an illness for which there is a cure coincided with the contemporary implementation of ideals of self-determination, especially for colonial peoples. Both are aspects of anti-colonialism, as an ethic and as a political tool which has been exploited in the cold war and by ambitious local leaders, hungry for power.

So, on the one hand, our new conception of technical development is geared to a twentieth-century understanding of the relationship between technology, productivity and the determination and satisfaction of minimal human needs. But on the other hand, our conception of how these needs are to be met is geared to an obsolescent conception of what nation states, of whatever size, shape, resources, population and so on, can accomplish as full, complete and sufficient units for the implementation of new forms of satisfaction of human needs. The focus is not on hungry *people*, wherever they may be, but on underdeveloped *countries*, which should be able to feed, clothe and educate their citizens. The combination of these two ethics—the right of human beings to the satisfaction of their basic needs and the right to national auton-

omy of any group of people who have come to regard themselves as a group because of the institution of colonialism or the accidents of political treaties—has resulted in an extraordinary degree of obfuscation.

For centuries the lack of equal resources, natural or man-made, has been compensated for by migration of some kind. The poor peasant went to the city or another country, or worked as a coolie overseas. Younger sons of the landed gentry or the wealthy went abroad to make their fortune. Inlanders went to sea. Opportunity was conceived of as localized and people as movable within a region, within a country, between nations or areas of the world. But today, possibly in reaction to the stress of millions of refugees—people who left their homes unwillingly—we have created a new right, the right to stay at home under one's own apple tree and have light industry brought to one's own backyard. This implication of bringing development to underdeveloped countries has gone almost unnoticed. Americans have been subjected to so much compulsory moving since the beginning of World War II, and have developed such a phobia about shifting their children from one school to another, that it seems to them a quite reasonable demand that everyone should be allowed to stay in his own country and have the comforts of civilization brought within his reach. Moreover, various fortuitous circumstances attendant on the wars and revolutions of the twentieth century have effectively obscured some of the serious consequences of taking the position that it is the right of every *nation*, new or old, rich or poor, large or small, no matter where located or how technically competent, to be developed and to become, if not rich, at least as well off as every other nation, with as high a standard of living for its people and as large and as conspicuous marks of national prestige in the way of embassies, airlines, armies and so on.

Today the idea of the nation state as the unit of development is the more easily supported because a very important part of the planning for underdeveloped nations has been done by those who come from small developed nation states, in which state intervention and planning for a welfare state are already far advanced. If extensive intervention by government has made it possible for such countries as Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, West Germany and the United Kingdom to maintain an optimum standard of living, then government appears to be the appropriate instrument for benevolent economic change;

the welfare of peoples is thought of as inextricably related to activities of government, and the focus is on the nation state—which has a government—as the appropriate unit in developing the means of improving the well-being of a people.

Thus, just at the moment in history when most of the paraphernalia of the nation state, postulated on the political protection of citizens whose economic lot it was powerless to ameliorate, is becoming obsolete (for it can no longer protect its citizens, and their economic lot can be more efficiently ameliorated in larger or smaller units), the nation state has been transformed into a highly valued and highly inefficient instrument for the equalization of opportunity and the optimization of the good life. At a time when there is a crying need for transnational organizations, whether it be for the sharing of scarce or unevenly distributed natural resources, the eradication of disease, or the use of scarce intellectual resources, most of the efforts of the world have gone into the construction of mechanisms that are not transnational but intergovernmental.

In a new nation the poverty of its people and the prestige of its day- or month- or year-old national identity become intertwined. The poverty of the people represents a moral claim on the conscience of the world, which can be enforced in political terms, manipulated for political purposes, sometimes promoting but more often defeating the satisfaction of the very needs in the name of which the manipulation is done. While Germaine Tillion pled for the maintenance of the tie between France and Algeria for the sake of the hungry people of Algeria,² political considerations made this impossible. In China, millions are on the verge of starvation and there is urgent need for materials and tools essential for mere subsistence. Yet to supply them, under present circumstances, would mean crossing a national boundary and, in addition, crossing an ideological line defined by the cold war and breaching Mainland China's new inviolability. Coupled with our enormously enhanced ability to feed the peoples of the world, technically, is a definite crippling of our ability to do so organizationally. While valid in themselves, the arguments in favor of national pride, self-determination, autonomy and dignity essentially fail to recognize—even as they have been used to decry bilateral aid and to promote internationally organized aid—the

² Germaine Tillion, "Algeria: The Realities," translated by Ronald Matthews. New York: Knopf, 1958.

ways in which nation states, all nation states, have become economically and technically irrelevant. There are two continuous reminders of the irrelevancy of the old borders, as lines drawn on the ground. One is our technical ability to feed the peoples of the world, disregarding boundaries; the other is the presence of the satellites of the United States and the Soviet Union, circling overhead.

II

In the context of the foregoing discussion, the term "overdeveloped" is anomalous. If technical development is good because it produces a higher standard of living, how can there be an overdeveloped country? It should be recognized that the phrase has been used most frequently to undo the damage done by placing all countries on a single scale. The term was brought into use collaboratively by members of underdeveloped and more developed countries, acting out of patriotism, ambition or humanitarianism. Only by playing up the underdeveloped state of the underdeveloped countries, by calling them poor, did it seem possible to create the climate of opinion that was being sought. But when this resulted in a single scale, on which all countries could be set up in a hierarchy, it became clear that a low position—on a scale of development—was necessarily invidious and odious. The underdeveloped countries wanted to gain every benefit from having their position so defined; especially they wanted high priority in every form of economic aid. At the same time the inappropriate association between economic need and national prestige meant that it was insulting to be called underdeveloped. With a display of the kind of good manners by which a hostess, to put at ease the guest who has dropped a plate, proceeds to break a platter, internationalists, guilty over colonialism and preventable human suffering on the one hand, and their own conspicuous, wasteful consumption on the other, responded to the touchiness of members of less industrialized countries by calling the old, rich, industrialized countries "overdeveloped." Seen simply in these terms, it is a piece of good manners in rather poor taste.

But the term overdeveloped also permits several questions to be raised about what is the position of industrialized countries in a world which has been reorganized in accordance with pre-industrial ideas of nationalism. Are they, for example, overdeveloped in terms of over-consumption? This judgment is expressed in the

accusation that enough paper is wasted every day in the United States to provide the newsprint necessary to save freedom in some new country. Or it is said that the power wasted in the average electrified home would be enough to bring food and water to a village of several hundred people, or that by eliminating the duplication of radios and television sets in American homes a great many villages could be supplied with modern communications. In these terms, can a country like the United States be said to have passed the point of optimum development? This question, in turn, can lead to the advocacy either of arrest or of curtailment of standards of consumption in the developed nations—or at least to a growing fear that other nation states will not long tolerate their have-not position vis-à-vis the have nations.

But those who use the term overdeveloped may go even further. They may point to indices of social disorganization in those industrial countries in which political democracy and welfare-state organization have gone further than elsewhere—the indices of crime, delinquency, suicide, divorce, alcoholism and homicide. These are the current costs of overdevelopment—of becoming rich without abolishing poverty, however high the level of that poverty is in comparison with the poverty of the average Indian or Mestizo resident of a Latin American city or an average resident of Calcutta.

Futhermore, use of the term raises the question of whether the continuum of technical development, which is assumed to be a good thing, may not in fact be something which should not be pursued indefinitely or something which should not be pursued at all, or at least so singlemindedly. It emphasizes the price paid by human beings in industrial countries—both the price paid by those who suffer in their own person through neglect that leads to crime, alcoholism, family disorganization and so on, and the price paid by the apparent beneficiaries of industrialization through lack of space, leisure and privacy and through the exchange of peace of mind for a greater number of material possessions. It stresses the values of a pre-industrial (or just possibly a post-industrial) form of society, in which standard of living may be seen as having optimum but not maximum value. It refocuses attention on the values of other countries of the world, poor only by a recent definition of what is the right of a nation state, and stresses values which are intangible. Coupled with an emphasis on the intangibles of faith and a delight in life, there may be, as

in Theobald's work,³ a sophisticated recognition of how difficult it is to transform the motivations of people who have worked all their lives for what they regard as enough into a restless quest for more, because this is part of their newly acquired sense of national identity.

In fact, the world has been manœuvred into a situation which is not technically, economically or politically feasible. The association of national identity with industrial development is no less ridiculous on a world scale than it would be on a national scale if some group of developers (in the United States, for example) were to say: Every town in the United States, of whatever size, location or composition, needs a modern factory that can give steady employment to five hundred people and will adjust constructively to changes in world demand. We will lend you the money to build it, supply you with the name of a distributor who will provide you with the equipment, lend you more money if you get in trouble, and control the world market so that your product will always be salable. It is up to you to decide whether the unit of control is to be an unincorporated borough or a section of a metropolitan area, etc. It is also up to you to decide whether the board of managers is to be composed of the D.A.R., the Chamber of Commerce, ten elementary schoolteachers, the Fire Department, a local of an international union, the top 10 percent of the senior class in high school, a representative sample of families who have lived in the area for a hundred years, Catholics, Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, a random selection of engineers educated at M.I.T., former employees of the F.B.I., at least 10 percent American Indians, and so on. We want you to have a high standard of living. We are sure that a manufacturing plant will make it possible for you to improve your health and your educational facilities and to share in the general benefits of an affluent society. But, the developers would have to add, be certain that all this, however you organize it, will result in support of our political position and will not help our rivals. All other considerations—technical, economic and social—are to be subordinated to this end. It is true we and our political rivals agree that you must have a series of benefits in the way of food, housing, medical care, education and security; there is no argument about this. And of course you are free to choose the size and shape of the unit within which you

³ Robert Theobald, "The Rich and the Poor: A Study of the Economics of Rising Expectations." New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1960.

want to work. What really is at stake is that in doing this you stay on our side. But our aim is for you as a community—regardless of whether you are a village, a city or a suburban housing development—to catch up with the highest standard of living that can be shown to exist anywhere.

In effect, the idea of world-wide economic development on a single scale is a case where our ethic for human welfare and human dignity has outrun our ethic for group relevance, where political rivalry, in terms of the 1960s, still permits an efflorescence of economically irrelevant units within which economic development is expected to occur.

What we need urgently today is a set of new propositions which are congruent, one with the other:

1. The technical skills and resources exist; no one in the world need be hungry or cold, unclothed, uneducated or unmedicated. Standards can be set below which no people anywhere should be allowed to fall. What help is needed to bring their living standard up to the minimum can be introduced in ways that are appropriate, whether by the export of natural resources, by migration, immigration or resettlement, regional planning or world-wide organization.

2. The nation state, which historically was concerned primarily with warding off attack and with attacking others, is an imperfect unit for the administration of human welfare and is an even more imperfect one for the administration of economic development. There is a need for a new kind of nationhood within which every people may find dignity and take responsibility in certain ways for their fellow citizens and in other ways for all other peoples.

3. Any single scale of development is invidious and leads inevitably to conflict, humiliation and hurt pride. Our present roster of nations has in common only nationhood; in other respects the widest discrepancies exist—in size, age, wealth, tradition, degree of internal homogeneity, natural resources, rate of growth, racial composition, legal practice, level of skill. So it is important to phrase nationhood in terms of what a nation can accomplish in the way of assigning dignity, responsibility and recognized world-wide status to all peoples of this planet. Citizenship, so phrased, is independent of age, sex, size, intelligence, experience, wealth, beauty, past glory or future expectations. Any attempt to alter this position, in regard to individual citizenship, would—and should—be opposed with vigor. Yet we are allowing the world

to drift toward a position in which all nations will fail to find the dignity they seek if, as is now the case, nationhood is joined to planning for economic development in inappropriate ways. Single-scale development, under these circumstances, will inevitably result in a hierarchy of citizenship as well as of nations.

We need to develop a new framework within which to meet people's basic needs and all world-relevant needs, *i.e.* for transportation, communications, currency, the allocation of medical supplies, and so on. All these should be dealt with in other than national or simple intergovernmental frameworks. Simultaneously, those countries which are now called underdeveloped could be encouraged to develop their own distinctive identities within the modern world—to cherish their local languages while all children also learned a world language, to develop their own architecture, their own poetry, their own style of life.

With the development of new contexts, it would immediately become apparent that there is nowhere an "overdeveloped" country. The price paid, in delinquency, crime, suicide and disorganization, by those who live in politically democratic, industrialized countries is high because they themselves have failed to realize their own economic potential. This in turn hinders the development of a world-wide viable economy.

Nations are, and should be, different from one another. Units of economic development should meet technical, not national, criteria. What we need to work out is a series of overlapping structures which are so acephalous that it will be as difficult for any member to destroy them as it will be unprofitable for any member to withdraw.

FOREIGN AID: STRATEGY OR STOPGAP?

By Barbara Ward Jackson

WHAT are programs of economic assistance *for*? After a dozen years of them, the question still has to be asked. Otherwise how can their effectiveness be judged? Clearly, there is no consensus. For some they are tools to stop Communism, for others to propagate Western ideas, for still others to defend Western interests. All these factors certainly enter in but they do not explain why or how such programs can have these effects. In fact, as critics are quick to point out, some assistance programs do not. Countries can swallow aid like blotting paper and at the end of the process are no more pro-Western, anti-Communist or secure and stable than they were at the start.

Here, however, may be the beginnings of an answer. The most fundamental of all Western—and, indeed, of all human—interests is the preservation of peace. Communism is a danger primarily because it is aggressive and expansive. When it is not—as in Yugoslavia or Poland—it can be lived with. But profound internal instability in the modern world *is* a danger to peace. States in the grip of ferment and disorder tend to become—as Cuba has done—a point of polarization in the cold war between East and West. They recreate the risk of conflict which was inherent in Balkan instability before 1914, the risk that rival power systems will seek to flow into any vacuum brought about by local collapse and, in the process, will collide with each other in fatal conflict.

In this large context of peace and war, the fundamental aim of economic assistance is, therefore, to build up stability in unstable states. This cannot be done by piecemeal patching up, by casual subsidies and handouts. The most successful of all programs of economic aid so far—the Marshall Plan—clearly illustrates the need for change in depth. If the nations of Western Europe had simply been restored to where they were before the Second World War, they would inevitably have repeated yet again their melancholy inter-war cycle of economic isolationism and national rivalry. It was America's insistence upon a joint solution of their problems that opened the era of technical modernization, supranationalism and interdependence. What has saved Europe has been not the reconstruction of the old order but the bold projection of a new.

The same vision and daring are needed in the infinitely more complex pursuit of stability among the extra-European peoples. We live in an age of maximum instability. Its general driving force is the modification of all techniques and institutions by reason, science and technology. But the particular context of our day has been formed by two hundred years of history during which the nations around the North Atlantic Ocean made the first transition to the wealth and power locked up in modern technology, and used their dominance to establish colonial control or economic dependence among the pre-technical societies elsewhere. This era is ending as the last of the colonies receives political independence. But its economic and social inheritance is still intact; it is also essentially unstable. Most of the new states emerging from the old tutelage lack inner coherence. And the general economic relationships between them and the developed states do not work well and threaten to grow worse.

Action, therefore, is needed at two levels—to complete the modernization of the local economies and to devise a world system that fosters the necessary change. The starting point is, obviously, the post-colonial inheritance as it stands today. One should be wary of generalizations. Nations as various as India and Mexico on the threshold of full modernization, or Chad and Niger barely emerging from nomadic life, tend to be lumped together as “underdeveloped” and “developing.” Development policies, to be effective, have to be based not on generalities but on detailed analysis of the community which is to be aided. The West’s increasing acceptance of the need for “country plans” is a fruitful recognition of how specific the problems of development are likely to be.

Yet one can discern a broad pattern of “semi-modernization.” In the last 150 years, the modernized states of the North Atlantic have broken up the static stability of traditional society—in Asia, in Africa, in feudal South America. They came in to search for raw materials—minerals, rubber, coffee, tea—and established small modernized export sectors. To these they attached their “infrastructure” of roads, railways and great coastal cities through which the materials flowed out to the West—and Western manufactures flowed back.

This Western incursion did not stimulate or provide much local saving. Mines and plantations were often foreign-owned. Even when peasant farmers or local magnates produced the materials, most peasants quickly spent their earnings on Western consumer

goods, while many magnates banked their profits abroad. As a result, little capital flowed back into the local economy—and without capital there is no growth, save in the single category of population. Food production remained unimproved. Industry did not develop. Such enclaves of industrial activity as Bombay state or Minas Geraes led to no larger developments. Revenue did not rise. Governments therefore could not afford expensive yet crucial services such as wider education. Only a small élite received some modern instruction—through the missionaries or the private enterprise of wealthy parents. Yet even so small a breach in the old stability undermined it. With the new goods came new ideas—sovereignty, nationalism, above all, equality between nations, equality within the state.

Nor was this ferment simply a factor of internal change. As the twentieth century advanced, profound political and economic changes in the world increased the tension. Anti-colonial agitation spread; Communist propaganda fanned it. The West endured a shattering slump. Export prices of primary products remained profoundly depressed and investment fell. Worse than that, the Atlantic world showed signs of shifting, by way of synthetics and substitutes, to a state of providing a permanently smaller stimulus to the less developed economies.

Such, then, is the anatomy of semi-modernization. Developed export sectors, the infrastructure they require, the beginnings of modern education—all these set in motion a passionate ferment through the vision they give of a wider and more commodious life. But the stark daily realities are of poverty, illiteracy, stagnant agriculture, marginal industry and a world economic system which offers no way out of the impasse. There is enough change to excite the desire for more, not enough to create it. And if anyone underestimates the instability bred in such communities, it is salutary to remember that Communism made its European and Asian breakthroughs in two countries—Russia and China—where, in spite of a profound and secular culture, there had appeared many of the characteristics of semi-modernization—export sectors greatly dependent on foreign capital, only the beginnings of industry, a stagnant countryside, education mainly for the élite, an intelligentsia torn between the desire for modernity and despair at the obstacles in its way. Nor, for all its urbanization and sophistication, was Batista's Cuba lacking in these characteristics of partial and discordant modernity.

Communism can be seen in this context to be not the culmination of the modern revolution based on capital and technology but rather a phenomenon of an early stage in the process. The Atlantic world has passed far beyond its blocks and frustrations. But the emerging continents today are nearer to Russia in 1914 than to the United States or the Common Market in 1962.

II

The essential task of economic assistance is, therefore, to correct and complete the old lopsided structure. Within the developing countries, it is a question of extending the colonial infrastructure, expanding education beyond a small élite, raising savings and channeling them into dynamic farming and growing industry where more savings can be secured by higher productivity. Thus the cycle of sustained growth can be set in motion. At the international level, the task is above all to restore a worldwide economy which stimulates and does not depress the possibilities of local development.

These are statements of high generality. Fortunately, in the last ten years, governments have begun to learn to fill in some of the details. The starting point is a progressive attempt to increase the flow of domestic capital. By general agreement it must rise to at least 15 percent of national income if sustained growth is to be secured. Such an increase does not happen easily or naturally in post-colonial economies. A strategy of saving must be worked out. Hence the new importance placed on the formulation of country plans. Ten years ago, most plans were no more than the shopping lists of government departments. Today, their aim is at the very least to give a full picture of the economy, to lay down the forms of investment most likely to accelerate growth and to devise a financial strategy for raising the necessary capital and channeling it into the right enterprises. The sophistication of these plans varies, naturally, with the scale of information and the reliability of statistical sources. Some countries—the Ivory Coast, for instance—have to be content at this stage to extrapolate plans from small sample surveys of typical regions. At the other end of the scale, such plans as India's Third Plan are based upon all the data of a modern state.

At the core of the plan is the government's strategy for saving. The aim, in every country, is to keep resources rising in balance with a more ambitious scale of spending. It is a tricky balance.

Slam on taxes and forced savings too violently and there are, as in Ghana and British Guiana, strikes and riots and immense discouragement to private and foreign investors. Proceed too cautiously and inflation takes over, as in Brazil. There are no general rules for either the techniques or the scale of saving. But one generalization seems permissible. Governments can hardly be said to be seriously bent on development unless they are willing to raise the level of taxation to some 20 percent of national income. The figure is not impossibly high. Typical Asian landlord-usurers took 50 percent and more of the peasant's crop and charged him several hundred percent on his loans. It is simply that governments are not used to taxing, nor the rich to being taxed. It is, however, also true that a relatively high level of taxation can discourage investment if the plan relies to any extent—as most do—on local and particularly on foreign private enterprise. To this difficulty we shall have to return.

Where should the new resources go? To infrastructure, clearly—to fill in the gaps of the old pattern geared only to exports; and it is perhaps relevant to note that most developing governments underestimate the need for power and transport once growth begins in earnest. India's bottlenecks in its Third Plan are largely due to this. Yet the "infrastructure" of trained minds is even more important than railways or transmission lines. And in this vital field of education, it is very easy to get the balance wrong. Western and Eastern Nigeria have learned what happens if primary education is made very nearly universal before rural life has been improved enough to attract the school-leavers, or urban employment expanded to absorb them as they stream into the cities.

For this reason a new emphasis is appearing on the need to plan investment in manpower in such a way that it fits into the general pattern of investment in the economy. The Ashby Report for Nigeria is the first model of an attempt to produce trained minds and match them with the opportunities that will be available. Manpower budgeting is certainly to be increasingly used in planning for development, the more so since education should not be understood narrowly. In the broadest sense of training, it is essential to the two key sectors in all strategies of development—modernized agriculture and growing industry.

Undoubtedly static farming is the toughest obstacle to overcome. If export crops are to be produced at decreasing cost and food production is to begin to expand adequately, the farmer's

thinking has to be changed; yet his environment does not change. On land he and his fathers have cultivated for generations as shifting African cultivators or depressed and indebted tenants, he has to learn to use fertilizer, better seed, more efficient tools, better techniques of planting. Only the most intensive farm extension services are likely to make an impact on his mind, and their effectiveness is in any case determined by two further conditions: Are they themselves well organized? And are the basic structures of land tenure such that the farmer has any real inducement to change?

It is not often, at present, that both conditions are fulfilled. The order, the planning, the sheer business efficiency that go, say, into the building of a dam abruptly vanish when it is a question of the water the dam provides. Peasant settlements are not ready, plans for land use do not exist, and where there are villages established, better seed is left out in the rain and fertilizers arrive when the crops are half grown. In Pakistan, the government hopes to improve the efficiency of its agricultural services by setting up a new statutory body, an Agricultural Corporation, with direct responsibility to get supply lines clear down to the villages. In India, "special project areas" are being tried to secure a concentration of efficient effort. Without a breakthrough here, the farmer will not change.

Nor will he if he stands to gain no material benefits by the change. For this, he requires a rather larger scale of operation and freedom from too many middlemen. Where, as in large parts of Africa and east of the Andes, land is available, the need is for new land settlements combining, as in Western Nigeria or the cotton estates of Sudan's Gezira, individual ownership with general managerial supervision and a coöperative structure. But where no more land can be opened up, there is no alternative to drastic land reform, establishing the peasant as owner on the land he has formerly tilled as sharecropper or tenant, and backing him with a full coöperative apparatus. Japan, with its intensive farming and developing coöperatives, is the model here.

The farmer produced by these reforms not only provides enough surplus food for the cities; he can also afford to buy the products the cities begin to manufacture. This is the essential link between modernized agriculture and growth in every other sector. All through the developing world today, agriculture is tending to lose its Cinderella status and to become the first preoccupa-

tion of governments and planners. Yet this sensible shift of emphasis does not make industrialization any less essential. All developing countries need to break from their total dependence on primary exports. All are, by definition, under-industrialized. The problem is to pick the right types of activity. Preliminary surveys such as the short, brilliant study undertaken for the Gold Coast (now Ghana) by Dr. Arthur Lewis in 1954 can usually indicate where the processing of local materials and import-substitution—the “beer, boots and bricks” stage—can most usefully begin. The possibilities are as diverse as the resources that are available locally. In fact, only one generalization is possible. The universal test for all enterprise, public or private, must be its ability to operate at a profit. No doubt pioneer industries need reasonable tariff protection and other forms of government support to offset inexperience and the lack of an industrial environment. There is little hope of building up an internal market in depth without such assistance. But profits must be made or the melancholy process of *disinvestment* sets in. It is not enough to plan to build an industry. There must be a formal check on subsequent performance.

Profits imply above all a managerial competence and it is at this point that government planners tend to be most interested in the possibilities of investment by foreign firms. True, the capital they bring in is indispensable since virtually all developing countries have balance-of-payments problems and not one can hope to finance out of its own export income the foreign-exchange element in its plans for development. But even more dire than the scarcity of capital is the lack of industrial skills at every level, especially at the crucial level of management. The period of extreme dependence on outside skills can, however, be drastically shortened if the foreign firms are prepared to undertake imaginative programs of training. Such schemes undoubtedly increase the acceptability of foreign enterprise.

Yet there is an unsolved dilemma here. Massive foreign investment may hasten development; equally, however, local nationalist resentment will grow if a large part of the new industrial sector emerges—as it did in Cuba and could in Nigeria—under foreign control of one kind or another. A number of compromises are being explored—joint ventures, management contracts, local government participation, agreed schedules for the transfer of shares to local investors. But the difficulties remain—between

local desire for a measure of control and foreign distrust of local intervention, particularly by government.

There is no escaping the problem. Foreign capital is an essential element in all industrialization since under-industrialized countries lack, by definition, the tools and machines for growth. And at this point, we begin to confront the developing nations' critical shortages of foreign exchange and the need to build a world-wide economic system which fosters growth in the developing world and does not tend, in its casual, unplanned way, to inhibit development.

Today, such a system does not exist. The workings of the world economy do not at present naturally provide sufficient access to the currencies of the developed, industrialized West. Western investment has always tended to go to other developed lands. The trend has not changed. If investment in oil is subtracted, the flow of private capital remains quite inadequate. When government grants and loans of all kinds are added, the flow today may reach between \$7.8 and \$8.7 billion a year—the O.E.C.D. figure. Yet, according to United Nations estimates, if over a billion developing peoples are to stay ahead of their exploding population and increase their rate of growth from 2 or 3 percent to 5 or 6 percent a year, capital coming in from outside should amount annually to some \$10 to \$12 billion. These are only broad orders of magnitude. The real gaps can be measured only plan by plan. But no one denies the gap. Nor does anyone maintain that the developing nations themselves, by increasing their trade with developing countries, can fill in the gap themselves.

Here the current system works wholly against them. The golden days for development in the last decade have had little to do with aid. They were sparked by the boom in world commodity prices after the Korean war. Then such lands as India and Nigeria financed their entire developmental expenditure. Today no poor nation can do so. The reason is not simply that the plans are bigger. In country after country in the last five years, the effect of economic aid has been very largely nullified by the steady fall in what the nations could earn by their primary exports and as steady a rise in the price of manufactures they import.

Nor is it simply a matter of unfavorable price levels. There is hardly a facet of Western trading policy that does not entail some disadvantage to the developing nations. The relative share of Atlantic income spent on raw materials produced elsewhere is

still declining. A developing nation's first alternatives to primary exports—cheap textiles and semi-processed goods—are limited by Western quotas and differential tariffs. In some countries, such tropical products as coffee and tea have to pay internal duties as well. The picture is one of universal discouragement.

To counter this contraction, the United Nations seeks a ten-point recovery in primary prices and a 2 percent growth in the poorer nations' share of the world market—conditions they enjoyed in the 1950s. The aims are modest enough but the means of achieving them are more complex. One possibility lies in securing world-wide commodity agreements which fix prices and export quotas. Another aims at maintaining income by giving primary producers more generous drawing rights on the International Monetary Fund. There are suggestions that the developed nations should take off all internal taxes on tropical products and permit "one-way free trade" in them. They might also "vacate" certain fields—some kinds of cheap textiles, for instance, or competitive products such as soya bean or beet sugar—in favor of increased imports. In short, policies are available. What is unsure is the political will to adopt them.

III

With this question of the will to bring about the needed changes, we reach the tough political core of the assistance effort. At least three-quarters of the processes of modernization can be accomplished only by the recipients themselves. Yet bitter experience in the last ten years has shown that some kinds of society can do nothing with aid but waste it. When presidents fly in by air pink Italian marble for their bathrooms, when aid dollars turn up in discreet private accounts in Swiss banks, what is to be done?

In theory, the path is clear. No government is worth supporting unless it is prepared to undertake the two or three key policies needed to set growth in motion. But in practice such governments often do not appear or cannot be coaxed into activity. After a century of Western control or at least predominant influence, nearly all developing governments react strongly, even violently, against attempts at direct Western political guidance. It represents precisely the tutelage from which they are trying to escape. In some areas, the reaction goes further. It does not take much insight to see that some of the necessary steps toward modernization imply radical social change. Mass education, land re-

form, wider taxation—all these break up the traditional patterns of authority. Can leaders be persuaded to reform themselves out of power? Is it not more likely that they will simply resist all changes in the name, say, of anti-Communism?

These risks vary from continent to continent. Broadly speaking, ex-colonial governments are less conservative and immobile than those which have kept a nominal independence—Iran, for instance, or Thailand or Latin American countries. Colonial societies have tended to go through some kind of social upheaval during the struggle for independence and the new leaders usually represent a more or less clear break with the conservative past. In Asia, it is a supreme piece of good fortune for the West that the Indian sub-continent is largely governed by men who emerged at the time of independence as moderate reformers; it would be little short of tragic if Western irritation over some Indian leaders and some Indian postures in international affairs led to a lessening of sustained support for the Indian Plan under which over one-third of the people in the developing world are being coaxed and prodded towards effective modernization.

In Africa, too, the new leaders have little commitment to a conservative, tribal past. All are eager for modernization, especially for the widest development of education. The most frequent problem is lack of skill and experience, and, next to it, waste. Frenchmen call Africa *l'Afrique des princes*, and it is astonishing how much savings can be swallowed up by the “personality cult” or disappear into the pockets of ministers who stand at the center of a vortex of grasping tribal kin.

The worst deadlocks seem to arise in Latin America. Many of the rulers remain profoundly conservative—no recent colonial upheaval has widened their ranks. They enjoy friendly links with local American business interests. Neither group is precisely passionate for reform. Moreover, opinion in the United States—especially in Congress—inclines much more to conservative orthodoxy than does opinion in Europe where virtually the entire gamut of political upheaval has been traversed in the last 30 years. If a Modibo Keita in Mali announces the founding of a socialist state and starts excluding Frenchmen from the country's commerce, the French—having drawn realistic conclusions from their catastrophic withdrawal from Guinea—send as ambassador the man who knows most and feels most warmly about Mali to keep tempers sweet, to ensure Mali's continued association with

France's franc zone and to let it be known that there is substantial aid to come. Such flexibility is difficult to achieve in America's relations with South America. The politician who makes life more difficult for local businessmen—including Americans—and so inspires Congressmen to reach for their appropriations axe may be the only man ready to break the deadlock of feudal farming and of industry restricted by lack of purchasing power and lack of skills. Leaders like Señor Betancourt who are at once reformers and moderates cannot be conjured up at will. The choice may well lie between reformers verging on left-wing extremism and leaders—often army leaders—all too ready to suppress Communism and every flicker of reform as well.

What can be done? It is at this point that Western governments have to remind themselves of what they are really trying to do—to build viable states capable of cooperating in a viable world order. They have to remember, too, that they are not operating solely in terms of immediate conflicts, failures and successes but are attempting, over time, to produce profound modifications in the social order. To prop up, on any terms, a régime which will neither analyze its economy nor take the crucial steps to set it in motion can do no more than stave off and finally aggravate revolutionary upheaval. The reason why Latin America is more unstable now than it was five years ago has something to do with Fidel Castro. But it has much more to do with five years of declining export prices, general economic stagnation and perhaps 15,000,000 extra mouths to feed.

In some particular situations, subventions may be necessary—to counteract a bad harvest, to maintain a local army or check incipient guerrilla fighting, to tide over a balance-of-payments crisis. But—as the Alliance for Progress attempts to recognize—these grants should have nothing to do with economic assistance. Funds given as foreign aid have to be given within a framework that at least aims at a strategy for growth. Governments with no plans for popular and technical education, with no policy for raising taxes toward the needed 20 percent of national income, with no ardor for land reform, with no general strategy for fostering savings and channeling them into productive investment—such governments are simply incapable of becoming valid partners in a serious effort of economic aid. Generous assistance must wait upon a change of heart and plan. The judgment may seem harsh. But what other way is there of convincing hesitant leaders that

the reforms needed for growth, far from being window dressing, are the preconditions of assistance?

The refusal to give aid can, moreover, be somewhat sweetened. If the local government is simply not technically competent to produce an effective plan, it can be given time, temporary financial assistance and the help of planning experts to put a program into shape. Such experts can and should be drawn in part from international agencies and from the country or continent in which the plan is being carried out. Under the Alliance for Progress, "Nine Wise Men"—all Latin Americans—are empowered to check the feasibility of its programs. India has declared that it would be ready to accept a World Bank audit of its use of aid in return for sustained commitments. The U.N. Special Fund has found it possible to lessen local extravagance on the plea that its funds are collected from rich and poor nations alike.

This greater use of local and international expertise is not simply a manoeuvre designed to increase political acceptability. Western governments and their experts simply do not yet know the answers to a large number of the problems thrown up by social blocks and inhibitions lying in the way of modernization. If they intervene in dogmatic detail, they not only madden local opinion. They are probably wrong as well. Far closer consultation with local opinion, more joint research work in Western and local universities, more field work by joint teams—all these are needed not as sops to local opinion but as essential guarantees of success.

Yet the most persuasive pressure is likely to come not from the negative side of refusing aid where reform is lacking but from the positive side of aid generously given when conditions are favorable. So far, this "demonstration effect" is missing. If the West seriously intended to coax the laggards along by carrots as well as sticks, the scale of Western commitments to India's Third Plan would not have been allowed to seem certain in 1961 and dubious again in 1962. Nigeria would not be wondering, six months after the publication of a sensible six year plan, whether, in addition to the \$250 million pledged by the United States, any more of the \$950 million it needs from abroad will in fact be available. Yet the experience of France suggests that aid on a really massive scale has its effects. The \$300 million made available each year for some 25 million people in French West Africa have given each local government elbowroom, offered inducements to stern anti-colonialists to keep their links with Paris and preserved a frame-

work of community comfortable enough even to tempt runaways like Sékou Touré. The policy is not cheap. But it cannot be said, so far, to have failed.

The maintenance and extension of generous programs of aid would ease the Western task in yet another way. Among new politicians in ex-colonial lands, among young firebrands in backward, caste-ridden societies, among the rising intelligentsia of the developing continents, the reaction to the West is all too often one of resentment and suspicion. It reflects a recent past in which the "new men" chiefly discern dependence and exploitation. So far, this image has not been effectively dimmed. If, however, the aid programs continue, if pressure for reform is sustained and the officials who administer assistance are not identified with the old order but look intelligently and devotedly toward new relationships, these facts cannot fail to have a vital political impact. In spite of all the cries of "neo-colonialism," the impact is felt already. Less certain is whether it will be maintained long enough—and boldly enough—for the full political harvest to be reaped.

IV

Do the Western powers really intend to develop an imaginative long-term strategy? The evidence seems rather contradictory. True, one can point to a number of promising signs that the Western effort is becoming more accepted and institutionalized. The funds available to the International Monetary Fund and to the World Bank have been doubled and the International Development Authority has been set up to provide less bankable loans. The United States agency for aid has been reorganized to make it more capable of undertaking sustained programs and Congress has given the Administration some latitude in aid-giving on a longer basis. France and Germany have Ministries of Coöperation, Britain a Department of Technical Coöperation. There is also more coördination—with the Alliance for Progress, under the Treaty of Rome with its common European Fund for Development, through the Atlantic-wide Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development with its Development Assistance Committee, through the United Nations Decade of Development.

Why, then, should one hesitate? The chief reason for concern is the fact that behind a good deal of governmental rhetoric and some solid governmental spending, the shape of a genuine Western strategy for aid and development remains very hazy. In other

words, the second great task of world modernization—to provide a viable international framework for the developing nations—still hangs fire. If one takes three key issues in assistance—manpower, capital and trade—it is still impossible to discern anything like a clear and interrelated structure of policies.

To begin with manpower, development planning implies the availability of development planners. A start has been made in certain universities and international agencies to train them, but they are still so scarce that their lack has become a bottleneck to advance under the Alliance for Progress. There are also few firm plans—apart from France's effort and that of the small but valuable Peace Corps—for providing the massive number of teachers needed to carry out modernization, especially in Africa.

The capital contribution made by the West is difficult to establish. No one has yet agreed on a yardstick to separate aid proper from ordinary commercial lending. But of the Western governments, only France and the United States have certainly fulfilled the aid target of 1 percent of national income. Even including all forms of capital, the annual flow is still too small by between \$2 and \$3 billion a year. Moreover, unbalanced contributions to foreign aid are one more factor of disequilibrium in the West's balance of payments and could inhibit the most generous of the donors—the United States.

But it is over the issue of trade that one has most completely the sense of a blank in Western strategy. Only in the last year or so has the realization become more general that almost every aspect of Western trade policy discriminates *against* the developing world, and just as Western minds began to focus on this fact, the debate has become engulfed in the passionate issue of Britain's entry into the Common Market and of the trading relations which might evolve in an eventual Atlantic partnership. Here the division of policy does not lie between the developing and the developed nations. On both sides there are leaders who wish to continue the exclusive, preferential arrangements which tie Western Europe's ex-colonies in Africa to the Common Market. Equally, other governments, rich and poor alike, follow America in seeking to open the fabulous demand of the Six to the trade of all developing nations, keeping Western tariffs to the lowest level—or where possible to zero—encouraging local industrialization and compensating those who lose preferences by means of generous aid and world-wide commodity agreements. In this, there is

indeed the outline of a general strategy. But it is not yet clear whether European governments or their partners in Africa are prepared to break with a preferential past.

Behind the delays and tepidities of Western governments lies the indifference or the ignorance of Western electorates. Few voters feel a natural passion for voting themselves into taxes in order to assist foreigners. In Britain, aid is barely discussed. In France, some voters listen to the journalist Raymond Cartier when he demands that aid money be spent not at Dakar but in the Dordogne. And the reactions in the United States Congress betray a gathering impatience which must in some measure reflect the prejudice and muddle of opinion outside.

Given this political context, efforts to persuade and enlighten the electorates of the West have to be intensified. The passage of time has not lessened the force of any of the old arguments. Enlightened self-interest among the trading nations of the West is still involved in any policy which systematically expands the economies and purchasing power of millions who, today, do not enter the market at all. In fact, the argument may now be stronger since, in the Western world, there are signs on all sides that Atlantic demand is near to saturation and new markets and new needs have to be opened up to keep the vast industrial system in trim.

There is equally no change in the argument that the alternatives to assistance are all worse. Aid may not absolutely ensure progress. But there is no "may" and "might" about the unchecked regression of unaided, unreformed economies toward anarchy and collapse. Aid, therefore, in the most literal sense, remains an essential instrument in Western security.

Above all, nothing has modified the argument which should be decisive for peoples who still like to boast of their Christian and humane inheritance and contrast their performance with the evils of "godless Communism." In the last decade, the national income of the Atlantic powers has grown by at least 3 percent a year. In the next decade, it is their declared intention to add to it another \$500 billion. During this same period, the people of the poorer countries are barely keeping pace. In some areas, there has been a sharp decline. Given this contrast, no Western nation can plead inability. The issue is quite simply an issue of moral will. One may be forgiven for doubting whether the rich man's professions of idealism or religion have the faintest validity so long as the world's homeless are not sheltered and the hungry are not fed.

FORTY YEARS ON

By the Earl of Avon

FOR those who were close to international events in the nineteen twenties and took a part in the errors and shortcomings of the next decade, there is a fascination in contrasting the two world wars with the experience of the present time. If we can learn from a generation ago and apply the lessons of that period to our present problems, we might render a useful service, for even then all was not folly.

The casualty lists of the First World War were cruel and horrifying. They were also much heavier in proportion for France and for the British Commonwealth than those of the longer Second World War. The few survivors of my own age soon grew used to hearing themselves referred to as the missing generation. The tag was true, and the extent of the holocaust created an intense determination to prevent its return. The claim that we were fighting "the war to end war" was sincerely accepted, to an extent which it may be difficult for a more sophisticated modern public to believe. The will to make a repetition of these experiences unrealizable, to create and impose a rule of law to halt or fend them off, was widely and even passionately shared. In my library I have a beautifully produced French annual review entitled *L'Armoire de Citronnier*. This little book was devoted to literature and the arts and had no direct concern with politics; yet, at the end, when I looked for the date, I found it expressed in these words: "In the year one of the League of Nations." In that sense we were all revolutionaries, intent on our new era.

The young League of Nations had need of all this faith and fervor to set against its besetting weakness, the lack of universality. In its beginnings a League of allied and associated powers, eight years had to pass after the armistice before Germany could be admitted to membership, as a sequel to the Locarno Treaties. Revolutionary Russia had to wait eight years more until Barthou found her a place; and meanwhile Japan's aggression in China had compelled her withdrawal. None of these events, however, was comparable in significance with the misfortune which dogged the League of Nations from the outset of its career: the decision of the United States not to ratify the Anglo-American guarantee to France or to take up membership in the League.

The Covenant, which was the League's charter, was well drafted and was on the whole a fair and balanced document. But its association, even though in part technical, with the terms of the peace settlement, gave Hitler a grievance he was always ready to exploit. The fact that Germany had entered the League, after the Locarno Treaty, on equal terms with the victorious allied powers, and enjoyed the same rights to a permanent seat on the Council, was the answer to Hitler's complaints. It remained true that, for the majority of powers around the Council table, it was an important obligation to uphold the peace settlement and, by so doing, to ensure that Germany was not in a position to become again a menace to Europe.

This conviction was strongly held in France, which had suffered most in life, less so in Britain and the countries of the Commonwealth, where, though the casualties had been very heavy, the sense of historic sequence was not so acute. There was a pardonable but not prudent willingness to shake hands and hope that all would be well. At times this was tinged with impatience against those in Europe whose suspicions were not so easily allayed. The further from the fire, the more tolerant the generosity, with the result that there were soon three circling rings of apprehension spaced from the German center. France, and her immediate allies of the Little Entente in the closest ring, Britain and the British Commonwealth in the next, the United States and some of the more remote powers, including those of South America, in the third.

The connection of the Covenant with the peace settlement was not, in my opinion, the misfortune it has often been dubbed. It expressed a reality: a revival of German military power was something to be feared and guarded against. Nor were the terms of the settlement so harsh, except for the reparation demands, which made little sense and had rapidly to be scaled down anyway. One consequence of the link between the Covenant and the peace settlement was to enjoin, among many members of the League of Nations, a convinced adherence to existing treaties and a respect for them. This was not so baleful an influence as well-meaning Anglo-Saxons often pretended.

There were many to argue that if the defeated nations played their part peaceably in upholding an international order, they were entitled to some relaxation of the terms of the engagements they had made. This might be so, but it was not the whole

story. It remained healthy and desirable that if peace were to be upheld, international engagements must be respected. Observing our own experience in recent years, I would contend that a growing weakness of the United Nations has been its failure to uphold just this principle. There has been too much neutrality between respect for the pledged word and the ambitions of growing nationalism. There has been too much accommodation between the fire brigade and the fire.

The United Nations must be law-abiding and support those who wish to uphold the law, and not base its conduct solely on what seems at the time expedient, or excusable, because, as an afterthought, the international engagement itself may not seem everything that it should be. There can often be strong arguments for the revision of existing engagements by agreement. There is none for allowing them to be torn up. The League of Nations was certainly firmer on the side of the enforcement of international law so far as it could be defined. The United Nations has too often preferred to look the other way if the international cause were unpopular, with consequences which history has shown to be inevitable.

The widely held respect for written engagements which the Covenant of the League enjoined had consequences even among what we should today call neutral opinion. All other things being equal, there was an inclination to accept that the existing order deserved respect and even support. I do not think that it is an accident, or otherwise an influence for peace, that "neutral" opinion today is so blatantly ready to find pretexts for the misconduct of the Communist powers, as in the matter of Russia's sudden resumption of nuclear tests, and so ready to blame the United States because it could not accept to give the Soviets this stolen advantage indefinitely.

In another respect the League of Nations attempted, until the lawlessness of Hitler smashed this and much else besides, to uphold a certain standard. International property or the property of foreign nationals in a nation's midst was not something which could be seized with impunity and kept without apology. Material grab was not encouraged, even though part of the motive for this resistance to predatory appetites was that those who had the power also had the possessions. This state of affairs was, none the less, an influence for peace.

The actual machinery of the League of Nations was not com-

plicated and it worked well; failings in universality and later in will were in no sense its fault. The regular quarterly meetings of the Council, almost always attended by the Foreign Secretaries of the principal powers, were a valuable practice. These men got to understand each other, knew when they would meet and could prepare with regularity the topics they had to discuss. They did so and, in the years of their authority which immediately succeeded Locarno, they created as serviceable a piece of diplomatic machinery as I have ever known. It had evident advantages over the present practice, when our Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers have to span the world for meetings of NATO, CENTO and SEATO, while those who meet at the Security Council of the United Nations are usually not the men with chief responsibility for the conduct of their countries' foreign affairs. In part this is a consequence of the Soviet abuse of the veto which has crippled the effectiveness of the Security Council. The tendency to bypass its authority in favor of the Assembly, which cannot take its place or do its work, has only heightened confusion and multiplied weakness, until the United Nations has become an instrument ready to the hand of the prejudiced propagandist, but not always so pliant to the patient toiler for peace, through fortifying confidence in engagements given.

The principal lesson of the nineteen thirties, therefore, remains the significance which must be attached to respect for treaties and the dire consequences which result from denying them. U Thant tells us that history does not repeat itself. I do not think that there is much danger that the nations will heed past lessons too closely. On the contrary, there seems a determination to learn from anything except experience, and there is certainly no limit to man's capacity for making the same mistakes over and over again.

II

The existence of nuclear power and the shattering destructive force its weapons can command have created dismay in many a land. Parades and calls for the abolition of such devastating engines of war are held in many countries, including my own, and it is certainly true that if nuclear war were once loosed, the world would be destroyed. Yet I do not believe that these well-meaning persons are aiming at the right objective.

The very horror of the destruction which must be caused by a nuclear war will give pause to even the most hardened dictator in his search for plunder. All our recent would-be conquerors, down to and including Hitler, embarked upon their careers of aggrandizement believing that, on balance, victory in arms would increase their power. None, except perhaps Hitler at his last gasp, would have deliberately brought destruction on all, himself included. Yet this we now know must be the consequence of nuclear war.

It is further possible to argue that the existence of the nuclear deterrent has been the most powerful influence for the maintenance of peace since the day of the Nazi surrender. Most of us are convinced that it was the knowledge of the preponderant power of the West in this arm which stayed Soviet ambitions in the immediate postwar phase. Certainly, there was no other barrier of force between Soviet arms and the Channel ports, and he would be a bold man or a careless one who accepts that any other influence could halt a Communist power in any plan it wished to execute. It is true that as familiarity with nuclear secrets spreads more widely among the nations, the risk of foolishness or accident which might trigger off the employment of these weapons must inevitably grow. Even so, the boldest and most thoughtless can be expected to hesitate before destruction which must include himself and his land.

Another danger seems to me more likely to spread widening confusion, with perilous consequences. This stems from the small part the United Nations has played in upholding international order. Foreign affairs are a continuing process; they cannot be divided up into chapters, closed and put comfortably away. There is surely a connection between the facility with which President Nasser could seize the Suez Canal by force and threaten Israel, and the impunity with which, less than a year later, Indonesia took possession of Dutch shipping with no presentable offer of compensation. This practice was perfected by Dr. Castro in Cuba, where the scale of the theft of American properties surpassed any attempted before. Others have followed in his wake again, until in Indonesia plans are pointedly prepared for the "liberation" of territories in Western New Guinea, which are administered by the Netherlands and occupied by native populations having no racial connection with the country which would now make them part of a new colonial empire. These

depredations vary in character but unless they are checked their cumulative effect can be serious. Anarchy may be a greater danger even than the nuclear bomb.

Certain remedies can be employed. The International Bank wisely declines to give financial aid to any country which is still in default upon its payments to foreign creditors. It would be reasonable to include another condition, that the country to be helped must first have concluded arrangements to compensate foreign powers or foreign nationals for the seizure of their properties within its territories. This is not interference in the internal affairs of any land, any more than is the request that foreign debts should be paid. But such a practice would set a standard and check license which otherwise will certainly grow.

There is another reason for insisting that this maxim of conduct should be enforced. If the underdeveloped countries are to be helped economically on a scale and at a speed which bears relation to their needs, a formidable financial effort will be called for from those powers which have the necessary resources. It is not going to be easy, it is not even easy now, yet the effort must be made. If those who must try to afford it are to be encouraged to make it, they are entitled for their security to know that they or their nationals are not going to be singled out in any revolutionary process by the theft of their property; or at the least if they are, that these deeds will not be passed over when the country which has permitted them asks once again for international financial help. Neither good political relations nor economic plans for mutual help among the nations can develop except in an atmosphere of confidence in which respect for engagements holds first place.

The situation in Western New Guinea on which negotiations have been concluded between the United Nations, the United States, the Netherlands and Indonesia calls for comment. Some uneasy precedents have been set in this business. It is necessary to recall that the territory of New Guinea was expressly excluded from the Agreement of November 1949 when Indonesia became a state. The Agreement stipulated only that the "political status" of West New Guinea was to be determined through "further negotiations." Pending an outcome of such negotiations, there could have been no pretense that Indonesia had a legitimate claim to control Western New Guinea. It therefore seems strange that the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations should

refuse to send observers to report on events in New Guinea, following on Indonesian parachute landings and other inroads into the territory. The Netherlands Government made this request and it was not met, on the pretext that it would be a departure from neutrality to send observers unless both parties agreed that this should be done. This doctrine could mean that both the aggressor and the victim have to agree before the United Nations can send observers to the scene of an alleged aggression. That is not a tenable doctrine on any basis of international equity.

The Netherlands has now, under pressure from the United States and the United Nations, yielded its trusteeship in Western New Guinea, first to the United Nations and then to Indonesia. Only after seven years of Indonesian administration are the native inhabitants to be allowed to decide by plebiscite what their future should be. Yet a vote in such conditions can hardly carry confidence.

It has sometimes been urged in defense of such an arrangement that Soviet Russia is encouraging Indonesia to the early use of force against Western New Guinea, hoping thereby to embroil Indonesia with the West and fortify the appeal of the already formidable Communist Party in that country. This may well be the Soviet intention, yet the consequences for the free nations of sponsoring a solution which is not itself just can be grave; a little present ease may be gained, but probably at the expense of greater trouble thereafter. In the history of the last 30 years it has not proved wise to seek to assuage excessive appetites by unjust concession.

Since the Second World War there have been occasions when the temptation to yield to a dictator who is imposing unreasonable demands has had to be resisted. In Iran after Mosaddeq's accession to power and the seizure of the Anglo-Iranian oil fields, suggestions were made that this ruler should be given financial aid and comfort in the hope of staving off worse consequences. The supporters of this policy were influenced by the fear that the succession to Mosaddeq might be Communist rule, the same possibility as influences Western opinion toward Indonesia today. Yet fortunately the temptation was resisted in Iran, and Mosaddeq was not bolstered to an extent which would have enabled him to claim that he had triumphed through the methods he had employed. Even the risk of Communist rule as a consequence of this refusal was accepted. In the outcome, and after

a delay which admittedly carried its dangers, a responsible government succeeded to Mosaddeq's. A settlement was reached with this government which has proved to the financial advantage of Iran. The Consortium Agreement of 1954 still operates and it is clear in retrospect that the firmness shown then did not give the victory to Communism, but resulted in a check to its growing power in that country. Iran gained by obtaining much larger sums through the joint development of the oil fields than Mosaddeq could ever have obtained by his methods; and the world witnessed a salutary lesson.

III

A contrast between conditions today and those of the 1920s, when the League of Nations was still in fair health, is to be found in the means for the close development of relations between the Western powers. Though the world has become smaller since then and the decisions correspondingly more urgent, our machinery is still ineffective. NATO, officially at least, deals only with Europe, while the problems we have to meet together are world-wide. This caused me a year ago to appeal for an international political general staff; and in the intervening period it has become even more necessary.

While nuclear weapons are a powerful deterrent, it will be foolish not to accept that the development of nuclear armament creates other difficulties which must increase in complexity with the passage of time. We should do well to begin considering some of them now and to try to bridge the strategic problems they are already creating. These will not become easier to solve by merely ignoring them. They should be discussed between the Western allies and particularly between the United States, Britain and France. Britain and the United States may still be the only two nuclear powers in the West. If so, this does not seem likely to last much longer. France appears determined to be among them. When I write France, I refer not only to General de Gaulle and the present French Government, but to their predecessors and quite possibly to their successors.

There is nothing to be gained by sulking over this situation; it is better to face the dilemmas. Should active help be given to the French Government at the stage of development which it has now reached, or is it to continue at very heavy cost to cover unaided the ground which the Americans and ourselves

have already covered? It seems to me that the present situation, whereby they do this, is unreal and unreasonable. If, however, a solution is to be found, we are brought up at once against another question. If France is to be helped to obtain more quickly scientific knowledge which, in any event, she can gain in time and which the Communist world has already, we must reach agreement on the joint employment of our knowledge and production on behalf of the free world. Perhaps the final answer is a European atomic striking force, including American, British and French contributions. However that may be, a determination of our policies in this regard is becoming urgent.

Recently we have again heard the proposal, made this time, I think, by the United States, that Western defense needs stronger NATO conventional forces in Europe. If this is to be carried through, we must be clear about the purpose of the greater effort entailed. If it is merely to strengthen the defensive screen in Europe, personally I should doubt if its usefulness would justify this extra effort. If on the other hand it is intended to decrease the need for nuclear defense, I would regard that as a dangerous delusion. But here again is subject matter for close examination and decision by the highest authorities in the West, together. A related problem—what the joint policy should be on tactical weapons in the defense of the West—is also one which requires further probing and resolution. So, too, is the question whether means can be found of limiting the danger of destruction upon the civil population in the event of any outbreak of nuclear war. Frankly I am skeptical about this, and if there is no certainty in the matter, I would regard it as dangerous to hold illusions which could have as their consequence a lessening of the fear of nuclear war, because that fear is itself a deterrent and a factor for peace.

It would not be difficult to add other items to this list, which is already a formidable one. Enough has been written to show how necessary is some improvement in the methods of consultation between the Western powers at the levels where decisions can be taken. Better machinery by means of an international political general staff could, I believe, help toward this result. It is quite true that the heads of governments meet each other from time to time, but they do it two by two. Never are there meetings among three or four of them to attempt to straighten out differences which are today tiresome but could tomorrow

become dangerous. The outlook would be healthier if we could prepare for such a meeting with a fair chance of success. It is true that the leading Communist powers are at cross-purposes too; but we should forbear from too much cheering on that account and concentrate on mending our own affairs. Certainly we must be under no illusions about the character, intentions and determination of the Communist leaders. The hopes of the lovers of peace in the last 40 years have not been frustrated only because the machinery of international coöperation has been inadequate. Deliberate evil intent has prevailed over all our efforts.

My lifetime has seen a series of ruthless onslaughts against the ideas and practices of freedom. Many nations could have been saved from servitude if their law-abiding partners had combined their resources early enough. The West now faces from without a threat carefully organized and centrally directed. It can meet it only by an idealist faith in its cause and with plans which are closely unified and integrated. In combined strength we are far more powerful than international Communism, but our survival, let alone victory, will depend upon ability to see the realities with unclouded eyes. The scope is there, and the opportunity.

FAREWELL TO EMPIRE

By William L. Langer

NOW that the liquidation of Europe's overseas empires is all but complete, the world is in travail, beset by problems of readjustment and groping for new relationships that may make possible the peaceful and prosperous coexistence of more than a hundred states of widely differing characters and needs. The age-old expansion of Europe in terms of military power, settlement, trade, proselytism, territorial rule and, finally, social dominance has come to an abrupt end. Thoughtful people, particularly in the Western world, are bound to reflect on this epochal upheaval, and to realize that one of the very great revolutions in human affairs has taken place. They must be impressed, not to say awed, by the thought that the political and social structure of our planet has undergone such fundamental alterations at the very time when science and technology are opening to view the vast possibilities as well as the dangers of the space age.

Historians and political scientists have for some time been grappling with the problems of expansion, without, however, having come to anything like generally accepted conclusions. Political controversy has seriously beclouded the meaning of the terms *imperialism* and *colonialism*, while scholarly analysis has revealed ever more clearly how loose and unmanageable these words and concepts really are. I take it that, in its broadest sense, imperialism means domination or control of one nation or people over another, recognizing that there may be many forms and degrees of control. But there is probably no hope of ever constructing a generalized theory of imperialism. Indeed, the most violent differences of opinion persist with regard to the causes and character even of modern European expansion, with little if any prospect of reconciling the Communist doctrine, so positively formulated by Lenin, with the manifold theories advanced by Western "bourgeois" writers.

However, among non-Communist critics and students substantial progress is being made in the evaluation of European imperialism. The initial phase of expansion, consequent to the great discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, involved large-scale settlement of Europeans in sparsely populated areas of the world. This in turn led to the gradual conquest of vast territories,

along with complete subjection and at least partial extermination of the natives. But this earlier stage of imperialism, while it certainly remade much of the globe in the European image, had relatively little bearing on recent and contemporary problems of expansion. For in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries most of the American colonies of Britain, Spain and Portugal attained their complete independence of European rule. In the sequel Canada, Australia, New Zealand and eventually South Africa became British dominions, independent of the mother country in all but name. Meanwhile Siberia, which was overrun and partially settled by Russians in the seventeenth century, became an integral part of the contiguous Tsarist state.

This process of settlement and territorial extension occasionally brought in its train the destruction of highly developed cultures like those of the Inca, Maya and Javanese. But in general it touched only primitive, thinly populated regions, which previously had been outside the main stream of history. Such was the case also with the trading posts and military establishments acquired in the East by the Portuguese, Dutch, British and French in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only with the military victories of the British over local potentates and the repeated extension of their territorial domination in India did modern imperialism, in the sense of the rule or control of one state or nation over an alien people or culture, become a reality. Even so, India remained a rather special case, an almost unique instance of a private company over a long period of time ruling a huge area of highly developed cultures and constantly expanding its territorial control even at times when the home government was opposed to any extension of its responsibilities. For the European powers had, by the early nineteenth century, become highly skeptical about overseas commitments. It is true that both the British and the French made substantial territorial acquisitions in these years, but they resulted largely from the efforts of local officials to safeguard existing establishments and further trade. Only in Russia, where the government engaged in systematic encroachment and eventually in the conquest of the Transcaucasian principalities, was there anything like purposeful expansionism, though on this side of the Atlantic the war against Mexico was certainly a comparable demonstration of imperial acquisitiveness.

II

Imperialism revived only in the period after 1870 when, however, it developed to such a degree that most of Africa was quickly partitioned among a few European powers and some form of domination or control was established over many Asian peoples. Concurrently Russia, operating against adjoining countries, imposed its rule upon most of Central Asia and, having earlier acquired the Maritime Province on the Pacific, inaugurated a policy of peaceful penetration of Manchuria and Korea.

To account for this phenomenal spread of European authority is certainly a fascinating and challenging assignment for the historian. Innumerable theories, both general and special, have been advanced in the search for an adequate explanation. They run the gamut from the hard-hitting, straightforward propaganda of Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" to the highly sophisticated and daringly original speculation of Schumpeter's "Sociology of Imperialism." But the one conclusion to be safely drawn from all this ratiocination is that modern imperialism constituted a most complicated episode of recent history, that it was the expression of many and varied forces and motives, and that the economic explanation, so cogently argued by Hobson in his "Imperialism: A Study" (1902), and so fondly cherished by Lenin, is as inadequate as it is popular. Humanitarian, religious and psychological factors were clearly important, to say nothing of considerations of national power and pride. It should never be forgotten that the present condemnation and rejection of imperialism by the Western world is a very recent development. Prior to 1920, if not even later, European rule of overseas colonies was considered honorable and altruistic—definitely in the best interest of the "backward" peoples. It has been pointed out with complete justice that the campaign against the slave trade and the effort to propagate Christianity were among the prime motive forces behind modern expansion, and that the imperial powers as well as their agents were moved, with some exceptions, by a desire to play a beneficent role in the world, to fulfill a noble, national mission.

Recent monographic studies of various aspects of modern imperialism suggest also that certain elusive, not to say irrational, forces contributed to the dynamism of expansion. Schumpeter, and indeed both Kautsky and Hobson before him, gave emphasis

to the atavistic feature of imperialism. That is to say, they saw it as a survival in modern society of an outworn, feudal-militaristic mentality, devoted to conquest for its own sake, without specific objective or limit. One might underline also the importance of basic human traits such as aggressiveness and acquisitiveness, along with the urge to dominate, as fundamental to any analysis of imperialism. To do so would leave open, however, many instances in which powerful states with dynamic populations showed no inclination to express these drives in terms of expansion and domination. The American people's rejection of imperialism almost as soon as it was tried, in the wake of the war with Spain, would be a case in point.

Yet it does seem that there was something feudal or at least aristocratic about imperialism, even in its modern phase. It was, in fact, frequently criticized on this score. Colonies, it was said, were desired by the ruling classes in order to provide for their "clamorous and needy dependents." They were, according to James Mill, "a vast system of outdoor relief for the upper classes," and, in the words of Richard Cobden, a "costly appendage of an aristocratic government."¹ And much later, in 1903, Henry Labouchere referred to imperialists as magpies: "They steal for the love of stealing." Certainly the men who made the decisions for expansion were, in England, peers and great landowners, and on the Continent aristocrats, notables and soldiers. Bismarck, than whom no statesman of modern times had a keener sense of the requirements of power politics, reckoned at all times with the dynamism of the traditional military castes. He encouraged Russian expansion in Central Asia on the theory that it was better to have the military engaged there than on the European front. In the same spirit he attempted to divert the attention of the French from the blue line of the Vosges by supporting their activities in North Africa. And a particularly clear demonstration of the operation of feudal-military forces is provided by the history of modern Japan. The Genyosha Society, which was the driving power behind Japan's expansion, represented primarily the samurai elements which had been eclipsed by the Restoration.²

It may be argued that the above theory is at least in part invali-

¹ Klaus Knorr, "British Colonial Theories, 1570-1850." Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944, p. 356 ff.

² E. H. Norman, "The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism," *Pacific Affairs*, XVII, 1944, p. 261-284.

dated by the fact that imperialism enjoyed great popular acclaim. But actually this proves very little, for it was more true of England than of other countries, and in England, it will be conceded, the lower classes were traditionally interested in the doings of the aristocracy and readily applauded its achievements. Actually the common man, in England as elsewhere, knew little of the issues and policies involved in imperialism. Colonial affairs, like foreign affairs, remained the preserve of the ruling class. As for continental countries, it is perfectly clear that popular interest in and support for colonial enterprise were never widespread or sustained. Explorers, missionaries, publicists, professors and certain business interests were the prime movers in the cause of overseas undertakings.

With further reference to the economic interpretation of imperialism, I would say that recent studies of specific cases reinforce the proposition that business interests were much less important than considerations of national power and prestige, to say nothing of national security. A new analysis of the partition of Africa³ contends convincingly that Britain, concerned by the disturbance of the European balance of power by the German victories of 1870–1871, was driven primarily by concern for its communications with India to assume control of Egypt, and that this move in turn had such repercussions on international relations as to precipitate the “scramble for Africa.” It certainly becomes increasingly clear that much of modern imperialism reflected problems of power in Europe itself during a period when the alliance systems had produced a temporary deadlock.

The competition for markets and for sources of raw materials as well as the search for new fields for capital investment were much talked of in the heyday of imperialism and underlay the argumentation of a host of writers on economic imperialism. But it is well known now that in actual fact the colonies played a distinctly subordinate role in the foreign economic activities of the major imperial powers. These powers at all times remained each others' best customers. At the height of the colonial age, in the early twentieth century, less than a third of Britain's exports went to the dominions and colonies, and less than one-half of British foreign investment was in the Empire. The major European investments in this period were in the United States, Russia, the

³ Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, “Africa and the Victorians.” New York: St. Martin's, 1961.

Ottoman Empire and Latin America, where there could hardly be any question of true imperial domination.

If in fact the European governments in the 1880s and 1890s plunged headlong into the scramble for colonies, they were evidently acting in panic. Confronted with the entirely novel problems arising from progressive industrialization, and alarmed by the depression that set in in 1873, as well as by the strong tendency on the Continent to abandon free trade in favor of protection, they sought to safeguard their overseas economic interests by acquiring actual control of as much territory as possible. They hoped thereby to ensure themselves against unknown eventualities. Failure to act seemed improvident and dangerous. I would call this "preclusive imperialism," and would describe it as obviously a concomitant of the onrushing industrial revolution. A misguided effort, this reaction to hypothetical dangers, as we can now recognize; but in the late nineteenth century it evidently was so compelling that most statesmen, even the skeptical Bismarck, were carried away by it.

III

The final accounting suggests that the colonies brought their masters but indifferent returns. It has been frequently argued that even though the European governments may have spent more on their overseas possessions—especially in terms of defense, police, administration and public health—than they ever received in return, private interests made huge profits through the ruthless exploitation of native labor and natural resources. Bookkeeping in these matters is extremely difficult, because it is impossible to isolate and allocate specific items of expense. The best recent studies indicate that the governments, and so the home countries, did in fact make large and continuing outlays, in many ways anticipating more recent policies of aid to underdeveloped nations. An admirable analysis of the finances of the Congo⁴ arrives at the conclusion that that colony, unusually rich in raw materials such as ivory, rubber and copper, was indeed a source of considerable enrichment for Belgium as a country, but that between 1908 (when the Belgian government took over the colony from King Leopold II) and 1950 the Brussels government spent 260 million gold francs on the Congo in return for only 25 million francs in

⁴ Jean Stengers, "Combien le Congo a-t-il coûté à la Belgique?" Brussels: Académie royale des sciences coloniales, 1957.

taxes and other income. In like manner an eminent French authority⁵ has estimated that even in the period prior to 1914 the Paris government spent two billion gold francs on the French colonial empire.

In the large, the profits taken by private interests seem to have been anything but exorbitant—indeed, little above the average returns of home investments. Of course there were instances of huge profits made through forced labor and other forms of ruthless exploitation, as in the Congo of King Leopold, in German Southwest Africa and in British South Africa. No one would excuse or condone such practices, but again it is important to retain a proper sense of proportion. The mercantilist idea that colonies existed solely for the purpose of enriching the mother country persisted for a long time. Leopold II of Belgium, for example, was an ardent admirer of the Dutch “culture system” as enforced in the East Indies, and was interested in the Congo exclusively for the revenue it might bring. As for the treatment of the natives, it may be doubted whether it was any worse than that meted out to Russian serfs and American Negro slaves until past the middle of the nineteenth century. Sad though it may be, the fact is that the human race became sensitive to suffering only at a very late date. When one considers the heartless attitude taken toward the miseries of the early factory workers or even toward the Irish peasantry in the days before the great famine, one is bound to marvel at the callousness of human nature, obviously not restricted to the brutalities of Hitler’s Nazi régime.

Students of the problem have of late devoted much attention to the advantages which accrued to the colonies from European rule. They included defense and public order, suppression of tribal warfare and restriction of patriarchal tyranny, the establishment of adequate administration and justice, the furtherance of public health and, in many cases, substantial contributions to the development of communications.

No doubt the price paid by the colonies was a high one: the subversion of traditional institutions and social forms, not necessarily intentionally, but none the less effectively. To some Europeans as well as to many natives this has been a matter of real regret. But if in fact European expansion was the ineluctable expression of a dynamism generated by the economic and social

⁵ Henri Brunschwig, “Mythes et réalités de l’impérialisme colonial français.” Paris: A. Colin, 1960.

revolution of the nineteenth century, then it follows that the progressive destruction of static, traditional societies was inevitable under the impact of outside forces. Thinkers and statesmen of the Ottoman Empire, of Japan and of China recognized this feature of the situation at an early date. They saw that the only hope of survival lay in the adoption of Western technology and institutions, however distasteful they might be. The remaking of the world in the Western image began long before the tide of imperialism came to the flood.

IV

The South African War (1899–1902) not only drained imperialism of much of its emotional content but also induced the British and other imperial governments to reconsider their relations to the colonies. Far more thought was given to the welfare of the colonial peoples, and far more effort was made in the direction of development and improvement. The more liberal régimes encouraged the education of the natives and their participation at the lower levels of the administration. Thereby they fostered the growth of the native élite, members of which presently began to apply the lessons learned from the West to the task of getting rid of Western control. The imperial powers, having themselves inculcated the ideas of equality, self-determination, independence and nationalism, thereby prepared the way for the destruction of their own dominion. For it would hardly seem possible, in historical retrospect, that Western rule could have long withstood the weight of the arguments drawn from its own intellectual armory. Imperialism was bound to lose its moral basis as soon as the principle of equality was recognized and the notions of responsibility and trusteeship were generally accepted. The reaction of British liberals, radicals and socialists to the war in South Africa was in itself irrefutable proof of the incompatibility of democracy and imperialism. Without doubt the anti-colonialist movement that developed in Europe and in the United States following the war with Spain contributed heavily to the growth of nationalism in various colonies during the early twentieth century. So also did the defeat of the Russians by Japan in 1904–1905, for that defeat broke the spell of European superiority and invincibility.

The First World War then set the stage for the actual breakdown of imperialism. The fratricidal conflict within the European master race deflated whatever prestige the ruling nations may

still have had, while the employment of hundreds of thousands of colonial troops and laborers in the great war opened the eyes of multitudes of natives to conditions in the more advanced countries of the world. It is generally recognized that in 1919, while the victorious powers were busily applying the principle of self-determination to European peoples and as consistently ignoring it as regards the colonial peoples, imperialism had already received the mortal blow. The subsequent inter-war period then witnessed the rapid development of nationalist movements in many additional areas, despite the drastic measures of repression employed by some of the imperial governments. It took only the Second World War, fought as it was in many of the most remote places of the world, to loose the impounded flood-waters of colonial nationalism. The European nations were now so weakened and discredited that they could no longer offer effective resistance. Those which, like France, attempted to hold their possessions found themselves involved in long and costly wars, ending invariably in colonial triumph. In less than 20 years, millions of subject peoples attained their independence and more than 50 new states appeared on the international scene.

v

Ever since its advent to power in Russia, the Soviet Government has proclaimed the right of self-determination and has given all possible encouragement and support to the national movements aimed at liberation of the European overseas colonies from imperial rule. Soviet propaganda has to a large extent succeeded in restricting the definition of "imperialism" and "colonialism" to these overseas territories and in fostering the idea that Russia, having no such colonies, has had no part in imperial domination. Actually, it is impossible to draw a valid distinction between the expansion of Russia and that of other European states. The conquest of Central Asia was basically equivalent to the extension of British power in India. It began with trade interests, followed by conquest and annexation for reasons of security and prestige. And at the end of the nineteenth century Russian penetration of Manchuria and Korea was an integral part of the European effort to "partition" the Celestial Empire. Eminent Russian historians like Kliuchevski and Miliukov were just as bitterly critical of Russian expansion as were the anti-colonialists of the West with reference to the overseas empires.

The Russian-Japanese War put an early end to Tsarist aspirations in China, while the First World War, by precipitating the revolution in Russia, brought on a premature struggle for independence or autonomy on the part of almost all the subject peoples of the old empire. In this extremity Lenin and Stalin proclaimed the most conciliatory policy, even going so far as to recognize the right of any people to cast off all ties to Russia. It soon turned out, however, that these moves were purely tactical. Self-determination was to be restricted to the "workers" of the subject nations, which were warned by Stalin that if they seceded, they would surely fall victim to world imperialism. It was inconceivable, he added, that these peoples should abandon the Soviet Union, which was so dependent on them for food and raw materials. They clearly had an important contribution to make to the victory of socialism. In order to forestall "treason" on their part, the Soviet Government proceeded to suppress liberation movements, by force if necessary, carrying on a protracted war against even the avowedly Communist leaders of the various Turkic peoples.

For geographical reasons it is much easier for Soviet Russia to hold adjacent peoples in subjection than it was for countries like Britain and France to maintain their hold on distant overseas possessions. For a time following Hitler's attack in 1941, Soviet rule was, nevertheless, again seriously jeopardized. In revenge, the Kremlin in its hour of victory meted out the most ferocious treatment to the disaffected peoples and furthermore set up on its western borders a system of satellites reminiscent of the client system through which the great Napoleon controlled so much of the Continent. Whether for ideological or for security reasons, the Soviet Government now exercises effective control over adjoining states all the way from Finland in the north to Bulgaria in the south. To safeguard that control it will, if necessary, resort to military force, as was demonstrated so clearly in the case of Hungary.

In short, the Soviet Government has taken advantage of its contiguity to hold in subjection not only the ancient states of Eastern Europe, but also Armenians, Georgians and other Caucasian peoples, as well as some millions of Turkic peoples in Central Asia. Under the old régime, spasmodic attempts were made at Russification and at forced conversion to orthodoxy. In Central Asia much of the best land was appropriated by the con-

querors, while the natives were subjected to heavy taxation. On the other hand, the nomadic tribes were left largely to themselves and the well-developed khanates of Khiva and Bokhara enjoyed a large measure of autonomy. The Soviet Government, especially in Stalin's time, was much more repressive. The status of the subject nationalities as federated republics was altogether misleading, for all important political and economic posts were held by Russians or by carefully selected native Communists. Besides, the economic life of these puppet republics was regulated entirely by the needs of the Kremlin. For a time the Soviet Government carried on propaganda directed even at the language, religion and culture of the subject peoples.

In some respects this policy is still in effect. In any event, the subject nationalities have been deprived of all hope of freedom. Their leaders disappear before they can become dangerous. Unobtrusively, Russians are being settled among the native populations, so that by now some six or seven million Europeans are established in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan it has been reported that fully half of the population is now European. Furthermore, the Russian language is an obligatory subject in all schools and a Cyrillic-type alphabet has been introduced for the Turkic languages. While there is no concerted attack on non-Russian cultures, it has been made abundantly clear that the chances of success in life depend largely on identification with Russianism as well as with Communism.

In view of the realities of Russian imperialism, it is surprising that the Soviets have been so successful in their efforts at concealment and have managed so well to exploit the issue of "colonialism" to the detriment of the West. It is likely, however, that the effectiveness of their propaganda has already passed its peak. After all, the world cannot ignore the fact that the overseas empires have now been largely liquidated. Besides, the experience of some of the new states with Soviet guidance and aid has been disillusioning and disquieting. Already at the Bandung Conference (1955) there were round denunciations of Soviet imperialism, accompanied by pointed warnings against Communist designs on the freedom of colonial peoples.

It is unrealistic to suppose that either the European satellites or the subject nationalities of the Soviet Union can obtain their independence so long as the Soviet Government remains what it is and its objectives are unaltered. How long that may be is cer-

tainly a debatable question. The Soviet régime, having itself become outspokenly nationalistic and having systematically supported nationalist movements in the overseas colonies, can no longer condemn nationalism among its own subjects as a reactionary deviation. Furthermore, Soviet society is steadily evolving along lines familiar to us from Western history. It is at least not inconceivable that its transformation under the impact of industrialization may become accelerated and that, with the growth of representative institutions and the development of a more democratic mentality, there will come a change of attitude toward the imperialism that is now so basic to Russian policy. At the same time the economic evolution of the satellites and subject nationalities is speeding their westernization and strengthening forces which in the long run the Kremlin may find it difficult to hold in check.

The Soviet Government, with its prodigious military and economic power, can for the present certainly hold in subjection the adjacent nationalities of Europe and Asia. It may, indeed, succeed in exploiting the nationalist theme to the point of luring some of the newly liberated peoples into the Communist camp and thereby bending the anti-colonialist sentiment of the entire world to the purposes of the world revolution. But the subjection of weaker peoples by the stronger runs counter to the democratic sentiments characteristic of modern industrial societies. There may be serious lapses, such as the Nazi interlude in Germany. But the example of Western nations suggests that industrial populations are basically peace-loving and definitely averse to the subjugation and exploitation of other peoples. In the later nineteenth century the imperial aspirations of the French Government met their strongest obstacle in the opposition of democratic and socialist elements. It is most unlikely, therefore, that the Soviet Union, simply by denying its imperialism, will be able, in the long term, to shield itself from the forces inherent in modern society.

In this context, some reference to the forces of Chinese Communist expansion and indeed to the entire problem of world Communist domination is perhaps unavoidable. Communist China's imperialist aspirations permit of no doubt. They appear, however, to derive from traditional notions of universal or at least Asian empire as well as from more immediate considerations of national security or ideological zeal. The Chinese thus interpret their

efforts to establish control over Korea, Taiwan and the countries of southeastern Asia as a gathering-in of the *membra disiecta* of the millenary Celestial Empire, less as the conquest of new than the recovery of ancient domains.

As for the world revolution and the new world of Communism, it would seem that whatever validity this program might have would depend on its ideological content. If neither Napoleon nor Hitler could dominate Europe, it can hardly be supposed that Soviet leaders—on the whole a sober and realistic lot—imagine it possible for the U.S.S.R. to control the entire world. The developments of recent years must suggest to them the difficulties of managing even the present Communist domain. No doubt the Soviet Union would feel more secure in an all-Communist world, just as the United States would in a world made safe for democracy. But as the Soviet Union grows in strength this consideration is bound to lose some of its importance. It is quite possible, in fact, that Marxism, already so largely overtaken by events, may in time lose not only its revolutionary fervor but also its incentive to world domination.

VI

The end of European political domination in Africa and Asia does not alter the fact that the stamp of European ideas and institutions has now been put upon the whole world. Even the Soviet and Chinese Communists rely for their power upon Western technology and to a considerable extent upon the imitation of Western institutions. As for the newly liberated peoples, they have set themselves the same course. No doubt there are in all of them conservative and even reactionary elements which would like, if possible, to return to their traditional society. But in most countries the ruling group consists of men educated in Western schools and convinced that the future lies with the adoption of Western techniques. They have no intention whatever of reverting to pre-imperialist days. On the contrary, they want more and more of what imperialism brought them: greater productivity and a higher standard of living through industrialization; social improvements of every kind, and especially more and better education as a basis for democracy.

Their problems are many, and by no means exclusively economic. The transformation of assorted tribes into modern nations is in itself a stupendous undertaking. Besides, these new states

are for the most part too weak militarily as well as economically to stand on their own feet. Their political independence therefore does not by any means imply complete independence. Because of their almost unlimited need for economic and technical assistance they are certainly in some danger of falling again under the influence if not the control of powerful advanced nations, be they Western or Communist.

They can find some insurance against such threats in the antagonism between the free world and Communism, which enables their leaders to play off one side against the other. They are bound to derive some protection also from the strong anti-imperialism that has come to pervade the entire free world and will probably become ever more deeply enrooted. Indeed, the new underdeveloped states will be fortunate if Western disillusionment with empire does not reach the point where it will obstruct seriously the aid programs without which many of the former colonies cannot hope to survive. Happily some progress is being made in the coördination of the economic efforts of the free world through the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development. The Western world has so much greater an aid potential that it should be possible, with even a modicum of statesmanship, to maintain the connection of Europe and the United States with the erstwhile colonial world.

It is truly noteworthy that, for all the heat and rancor generated by anti-colonialism, so many liberated colonies have chosen to remain members of the British Commonwealth or the French Community. The enthusiastic reception accorded to Queen Elizabeth in India and Ghana provided occasions for the expression, on the part of their governments, of appreciation for the important contribution made by imperial rule. No doubt considerations of security have a significant bearing on the attitude of the former colonies, but it would seem that in the world at large the old—shall we say atavistic, aristocratic?—notion of domination and exploitation has given way to the concept of association and collaboration. Even in the Communist world it has become fashionable to speak of the “Socialist Commonwealth.”

VII

In bidding farewell to empire we cannot and must not suppose that human nature has undergone a sudden, radical change—that basic aggressive urges will disappear completely and that sweet-

ness and light will soon prevail. The argument of this essay has been that fundamental drives lay behind imperial expansion; that European dynamism, combined with technological superiority, enabled the European nations to settle the largely unoccupied continents and to found European communities all over the globe. It permitted them also, in the sequel, to impose their rule over many peoples of old and highly developed, as well as of primitive, cultures. So marked was Europe's material power and so alluring its political and economic institutions that within a comparatively short span of time the stamp of European civilization was put upon the whole earth.

Europe's political domination is gone. Its cultural influence remains, and there is no likelihood that it will be supplanted in the foreseeable future. The new states, while still vociferously denouncing "colonialism," may genuinely fear that cultural influence will eventually change to economic control and so to some new form of political domination. The Soviet Government is already accusing the Common Market of being a new device by which the Western powers will attempt to keep the colonial world in an economically subordinate and undeveloped state. In this connection the importance of the erstwhile colonial areas as sources of raw materials for the industrialized nations remains a prominent consideration. But imperialism provided no real solution for this problem, while for the future more, it would seem, is to be hoped from coöperation than from domination and exploitation.

It is highly unlikely that the modern world will revert to the imperialism of the past. History has shown that the nameless fears which in the late nineteenth century led to the most violent outburst of expansionism were largely unwarranted. The Scandinavian states and Germany since Versailles have demonstrated that economic prosperity and social well-being are not dependent on the exploitation of other peoples, while better distribution of wealth in the advanced countries has reduced if not obviated whatever need there may have been to seek abroad a safety-valve for the pressures building up at home. Even in the field of defense, the old need for overseas bases or for the control of adjacent territories is rapidly being outrun.

It is often said that human nature does not change, but it is none the less true that it does undergo changes of attitude. With reference to imperialism it is certainly true that there has been

over the past century a marked alteration of mood, reflecting greater sensitivity to human suffering and a greater readiness to assume responsibility for the weak and helpless. In our day, anti-imperialism runs as strong in the West as did imperialism a couple of generations ago. Domination and exploitation of weaker peoples by the stronger, which seemed altogether natural in the past, is now felt to be incompatible with the principles of freedom, equality and self-determination so generally accepted in modern societies. Imperialism has been on its way out since the beginning of the century and particularly since the First World War. Writing on imperialism in this very journal in the days when Mussolini was embarking on the conquest of Ethiopia, I ventured to disparage his undertaking and to describe him as being behind the times. The world, I opined, had outgrown the mentality of imperialism. I could not, of course, foresee that the edifice of colonialism would collapse so suddenly and so completely after the Second World War, but I suggested that if the tide of native resistance continued to rise, the abandonment of the colonies would soon become inevitable. To make this forecast did not require any particular prescience, but only recognition of the forces at work in modern society. At the present day the Soviet Union may still pose as the doughty opponent of a system that is already done for, but by maintaining its own imperial sway it is appearing more and more in the role of champion of an outworn and discredited system.

Imperialism's one great achievement was to open up all parts of the world and to set all humanity on the high road to eventual association and collaboration. In the process much has been lost of cultural value, but much also has been gained in the suppression of abuses, in the alleviation of suffering, and above all in the raising of the standard of living. The seamy sides of industrial society are familiar to us all, but it should never be overlooked that the machine age for the first time in history provided the common man with more than the requirements of the barest subsistence. This in itself has given human life a new dimension. It was perhaps the greatest of Europe's contributions to the world. Without the imperialist interlude it is difficult to see how the static, secluded, backward peoples of the globe could possibly have come to share in it. So much at least seems certain: without the period of European rule none of these peoples or states, not even India, would today be embarked on the course leading to a better and richer life.

NIGERIA LOOKS AHEAD

By Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa

THE Federation of Nigeria became a sovereign independent state and ninety-ninth member of the United Nations less than two years ago. Our entrance into the arena of international politics marked an epoch in our history, made even more memorable by the good will and affection with which we were received from all sides. Everyone hailed the appearance of Africa's largest state. To the leaders and people of Nigeria, however, this event was also a grim reminder of the fact that, for the first time in our history as a single unified state, we now have to fend for ourselves, and to sustain and consolidate our unity and freedom. We have to give real meaning to this freedom by making it an instrument for a better and more prosperous life for our people.

But determined as we were to shoulder our internal responsibilities, it was our added task to demonstrate that democracy could work not only in our own country, but in the other parts of the continent, if there were a will and determination to do so. We have not shrunk from the belief that our greatest contribution to Africa and the world at large would be in the example we show of good sense and reasonableness in our approach to problems, and the projection of those qualities into our conduct of external relations.

National unity is, naturally, uppermost in our minds, as it is self-evident that planning and prosperity can thrive only in conditions of peace and orderliness. It is less than 50 years since Lord Lugard amalgamated into one country what were then the northern and southern protectorates of Nigeria, and it was not until 15 years ago that a constitution was introduced which for the first time brought Nigerians from every part of the country into a common legislature. National unity has made remarkable progress since then; a feeling of common citizenship has developed and has been increasingly sustained by the challenge of independence. However, we have not trusted merely to chance and have ensured that there is an instrument—that is, a written constitution—by which this unity can be supported.

A federal system of government is always full of problems and difficulties, but so is democracy, because the art of persuasion is

much more difficult than a dictatorship though in the long run more rewarding and satisfying.

We are also fortunate in having a system of government with freedom of expression to provide a check on executive authority. Above all, we believe in the rule of law, and in an independent judiciary as an arbiter in disputes. The ready acceptance of both our governments and peoples of the decisions of courts of law even when against them is perhaps our greatest claim to maturity and confidence in our institutions and unity.

II

With a population of at least 40,000,000, growing at a rate of 2 percent a year and living in conditions considerably below those obtaining in the more advanced countries, our greatest task has been to make life more satisfying for our people. Even before independence, we had realized that this was the challenge before us, and at its tenth meeting held in 1959 the National Economic Council laid down that a National Development Plan should be prepared. The objective was to be the "achievement and maintenance of the highest possible rate of increase in the standard of living and the creation of the necessary conditions to this end, including public support and awareness of both the potential that exists and the sacrifices that will be required." It was to satisfy this aspiration that the first National Development Plan, 1962-68, was drawn up. The Plan was geared for growth—growth not in the sense of achieving spectacular, immediate or even short-term results, but rather in the sense of laying a solid and enduring foundation for future expansion—an essential prerequisite in Nigeria's evolution toward a self-sustaining economy.

The Development Plan, however, is not only an instrument for improved social conditions, but is also a forceful expression of the nation's faith in its future and unity. First, the conception and execution of a national plan is such that the program of the Federal Government or any one of the regional governments cannot be judged in isolation or be regarded as complete in itself. In other words, the development program of each of the four governments is an essential part of a composite and coherent whole. Nigeria has a federal constitution in which the Federal Government has exclusive constitutional responsibilities for certain major fields of governmental activities which, apart from the conduct of external relations, include: the defense of the nation and

internal security; the development of communications of nationwide significance; the expansion of electric power; certain major aspects of higher education; pure research in the fields of primary production and mineralogy; and, above all, the creation of financial institutions appropriate to a sovereign state and the maintenance of confidence in these institutions. It is, therefore, evident that the Federal Government not only can provide a lead to the regional governments in the achievement of the major objectives of the Plan—it has, for instance, voted £ 25,000,000 toward the expansion of activities in the field of primary production—but can use its constitutional powers in making the program a means of fostering national unity.

Our Plan has been very carefully prepared; it has been scrutinized by foreign experts and advisers, discussed and agreed to by all the governments of the Federation, widely discussed over the public media of expression, approved by freely elected parliaments, and given general approbation by the people as a means of securing a more abundant and prosperous life for them and future generations in conditions of freedom and unity.

Nigeria attaches the greatest importance to this Six Year Plan. The Federal Government has not, however, allowed itself to be carried away by the temptation to use the Plan to achieve power, and has not lost sight of the major objective, which is to maintain and, if possible, surpass the average annual rate of growth of 4 percent. We are, therefore, thinking of the benefits in real terms—the material prosperity of our people. To achieve our desired rate of growth, it will be necessary to invest approximately 15 percent of the Gross National Product each year and to ensure that as much as possible of this gross investment, whether undertaken by the Government or by private business, is channeled into the directly productive sectors of the economy. Only the achievement of a substantial rate of growth will make it possible to raise the standard of living and to provide the Nigerian people with the means for increased employment and improved education and health. The National Plan, therefore, accords highest priority to agriculture, industry and technical education.

In a country where over four-fifths of the population depend on agriculture, forestry, livestock and fisheries, and more than half of the Gross National Product is derived from these sources, expansion and modernization of agriculture and related production are of crucial importance to the development of the econ-

omy. For instance, the proceeds from export products will determine to a large extent the volume of imports which can be made available for economic development in other sectors; the efficient expansion of domestic food production will determine not only whether the people will eat better, but also whether they can effectively reduce their dependence on imported foodstuffs; the increased productivity in these sectors will determine whether the income of the great majority of the people can be effectively raised, and this will in turn determine the size of the domestic market for the new industries which are expected to spring up. Agricultural production, therefore, occupies the prime place in our Plan.

III

In order to implement our development program and sustain our independence, Nigeria requires the help, sympathy and understanding of other nations. The National Plan we have proposed will cost about £ 676,500,000, of which we expect to finance about 50 percent from domestic resources, leaving a gap of about £ 338,800,000. The governments of Nigeria, therefore, recognize the importance of contributions which the private sector of the economy and foreign capital can make toward the nation's economic growth. Nigerians will themselves make every sacrifice so as to be able to contribute themselves to the program, but it is evident that, with all the will in the world, our effort will be inadequate and have to be supported by help from foreign countries. Hence we welcome aid whether in the form of foreign investment, loan or grant. So long as this assistance is given in a spirit of genuine desire to make life happier for the people, we would gladly accept and welcome it.

We know that there is no assistance without some strings attached, and that those who invest in our country have a right to expect that their investment is secure, or that grants made to us are used in the over-all interest of the people rather than for the benefit of a few privileged persons. This, in fact, accords with our own national policy, and we cannot see a conflict of views or interests in this. We seek assistance, not only because we need it, but also because we think we deserve it. This is a challenge to those advanced nations which really desire to see the new African states stand on their own feet and make their own particular contribution to the peace of the world and the happiness of mankind.

They should realize that many of the new African states are indeed potentially rich and could contribute to improving the world but for the fact that they lack the technical knowledge and the financial capital necessary to develop their resources. The best way to assist the underdeveloped countries to reach maturity is by genuinely assisting them to develop their resources, and to educate their human material up to the standards which are necessary for proper development, without fomenting trouble by using aid as an instrument of ideological propaganda.

This leads me to the question as to whether foreign aid or even trade with Western countries can compromise national independence. The answer is, of course, yes and no. Having stated before that it is virtually impossible for the underdeveloped territories to exploit their resources fully without the help of foreign capital and technical knowledge, it goes without saying that aid can be a useful instrument for reaching their goal of development. In our own particular circumstances, we believe that aid fits into its proper place in the national scheme and could never compromise sovereignty. If, however, owing to a lack of planning or through the machinations of self-seeking people, aid is used to bolster up selfish interests, it becomes injurious not only to the body politic but to the national integrity. Also, if those who are in a position to render this assistance use it only as an opportunity to project their own narrow national interest or to propagate their ideologies, rather than seek a normal, fair return on their investment or the satisfaction of being of service to humanity, national independence is bound to be compromised.

However, some countries are not in the fortunate position of possessing the leadership and the resources necessary to ensure that the national will is not perverted by external aid and influences. In their interest, therefore, and in order to resist the temptation of partisans to introduce the cold war into their territories, we consider that aid should normally be channeled through the United Nations organization and its agencies, in preference to bilateral arrangements. This will not only eliminate the possibility of unhealthy competition among the emergent nations, but also reduce the risks of promoting conflicts.

Trade, like private investment, is in a slightly different category from aid since it is largely a transaction between buyers and sellers where the profit motive dominates. Consequently primary producers in the newly emergent countries have found that,

whereas their prices are subject to sharp fluctuations determined by consumer demand and other factors, the prices of the manufactured goods of the wealthier industrialized nations continue to rise at rates determined by the producer countries. This is not all. It is now clear that there is a long-term downward trend in the prices of most primary commodities on which the primary producing countries depend for their very existence. The gap in real income between the consumers and the producers is, therefore, ever widening at the expense of the primary producers. Our view, therefore, is that long-term trade arrangements should be considered at governmental and international levels, in order to ensure some price stability without which many underdeveloped countries cannot even plan in advance.

We appreciate the necessity for some countries to form themselves into the European Economic Community, and we understand Britain's desire to join this Community. But we are also interested in ensuring that the European Common Market does not impair traditional trade patterns to the great disadvantage of the primary producers, or create conditions of rivalry and unhealthy competition amongst them. As an African country, we consider that the Common Market is essentially a European affair and has political overtones which cannot appeal to Africans. We are, therefore, naturally distrustful of any institutions which may cause our future industrial goods to be discriminated against either outside or within the Continent, and which operate in a way to keep Africans perpetually as primary producers. This sense of dependence is itself an unstable basis for relations between the former metropolitan countries and the newly independent countries. We are also anxious to expand our trade outside traditional markets, for so long as the trade and industry of Africa are conducted with only one area of the world, so long will a feeling of dependency persist. In other words, having secured political independence, we are determined to see that this is also expressed in economic terms.

IV

We belong to Africa and Africa must claim first attention in our external affairs. Our policy has always been a pragmatic one, and even though we have been attracted by plausible expressions of Pan Africanism, we have thought it sensible to distinguish between ideals and reality. We appreciate the advantages which the

size of our country and its population will give us even in an intercontinental organization, but we are determined to treat every African country—big or small—as our equal, because we sincerely believe that only on a basis of equality can peace be maintained in our continent.

The colonizing powers of the last century partitioned Africa in a haphazard and artificial manner, and drew boundaries which often cut right across former ethnic groupings. Yet, however artificial those boundaries were at first, the countries they have created have come to regard themselves as units independent of one another, seeking admission to the United Nations as separate states. Therefore, we shall discourage any attempt to influence such communities by force or through undue pressure to change, since such interference can only result in unrest and harm to us all.

In an atmosphere free of distrust and suspicion, African states can find ways to coöperate in those matters in which common interests compel them to do so. By this coöperation and willing pooling of resources, the smaller African states especially will find their guarantee of freedom and independence.

At present, I cannot speak by telephone with my brother Prime Ministers in most African capitals without going through London or Paris. Whereas I can talk directly with someone in New York, it is quite often impossible to call someone in a neighboring country 200 miles away. And even if telephone communications were adequate, it would probably be impossible for us to conduct a conversation except through an interpreter. The first task of true statesmanship appears to us to remove the practical barriers, and to create the conditions for coöperation and a climate of understanding without which no effective political organization can be established.

Fortunately, most African statesmen now realize that we must proceed from the known to the unknown. In this way the differences between the various African groupings are being narrowed down. It is a matter of historical interest, however, that when Nigeria attained her independence in 1960, there were then the so-called “Brazzaville” and “Casablanca” groups of states. It was in order to bridge the gulf between them that it was agreed that unaligned countries like Nigeria and Liberia and two members of the Brazzaville and Casablanca states respectively should summon a conference in Monrovia to resolve the differences. Unfortunately, some African states who were co-sponsors of this conference with-

drew at the last moment, leading to a process by which the mediating group has now been labelled as partisan under the appellation of the "Monrovia-Lagos" group. We in Nigeria, however, still thought that it was possible to bring all Africans together, and issued invitations to all to attend a conference in Lagos this year. But unfortunately the rift continues. There are signs, however, that African leaders are beginning to realize the futility of this artificial division and are now doing all in their power to close ranks.

The unity of Africa presupposes the independence of all African states. Those that are now independent have a responsibility, therefore, to aid their fellows to freedom. We abhor violence because its memories persist and haunt the country long after independence has been won. Also, Nigeria's position, born of her experience, has been that peaceful and constitutional methods must first be exhausted in the struggle for freedom. In accordance with this belief, we have given, and will continue to give, moral and material support to dependent African states fighting for freedom.

We reject the view that any part of Africa is a province of a metropolitan country in Europe. We have consistently and vigorously condemned the attitude of those countries which persist in this outrageous and anachronistic belief. We are also equally opposed to a system which gives political power and authority to a minority community solely on account of an assumed racial superiority. We shall, therefore, continue to use all the means at our disposal, especially at the United Nations, to ensure that the last vestiges of racialism and colonialism are wiped off the face of Africa.

Our belief in the fundamental rights of all African states to freedom and independence does not imply that independence should be granted without regard to economic, sociological and political factors affecting the state concerned. There are obvious cases in which there is the need for a rapid build-up of administrative machinery and economic institutions to sustain the burden of self-rule. The European communities still have a contribution to make to the *over-all* development of Africa, and it will be a tragedy if by holding tenaciously to their present privileges they should compromise their future coöperation with the African. So far as Nigeria is concerned, we are committed to assuring independence for the whole of Africa.

V

In international affairs our position has been that with proper objectivity the policy for each occasion should be selected in Nigeria's national interest and in that of world peace. Our policy is to follow the path of truth as we conceive it, and we consequently consider it wrong for us to associate ourselves as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. This freedom of action has been an essential feature of our policies and has been founded on the moral and democratic principle on which our constitution is based. We do not, however, deceive ourselves into thinking that, provided we ourselves are honest and well-intentioned, it will be easy to follow a successful foreign policy. We have therefore not been rigid or inflexible in our diplomacy; whatever foreign policy we have adopted since independence has had to be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world.

We know our true friends and cherish our traditional associations especially with the Commonwealth, but we have refused to inherit the prejudices of anyone and have opened our hands of friendship to all those who respect our sovereignty. Our foreign policy has never been one of neutrality, but rather non-alignment. We have never, for instance, been neutral in African affairs, nor can we be neutral in matters pertaining to world peace. We have demonstrated both in the Congo and at the United Nations that we have the courage of our convictions in supporting what we consider to be in the interest of peace and harmony. And if this has meant supporting the policies of one bloc or the other at the particular time, we have not shrunk from it.

We believe in the United Nations as the only effective machinery for world peace. That is why we are naturally distressed when we see this organization being perverted for purely selfish and national ends. I do not think that it was ever the intention of any of those countries which were responsible for the creation of the United Nations organization to turn it into an arena where party politics would be played at the highest level, and where ideological differences would obscure the main objective of securing peace among the nations and stability in the world at large. Rather, the purpose was to enable all countries together to work out solutions to problems in a friendly atmosphere and to procure the peace and progress of mankind without discrimination as to race, color or country. We therefore hope that the United

Nations will not only purify itself of these tendencies, but will also be reconstituted to reflect its present membership.

The history of the organization since the last war shows that the structure was based on a wrong conception—namely, that only the great powers should have the last say in world affairs. But the general movement since the war has been toward a close association of nations from all over the world. What we now want is to reduce the differences between the nations and bring the world together. The United Nations organization appears to me to be the best instrument for this purpose, and it is my hope that African countries will be given effective voice in it.

For these reasons, I would like to see the disappearance of the veto power and a review of the structure and position of the Security Council. It is also unreasonable to disallow the People's Republic of China and some other countries with great resources from participating fully in the work of the United Nations at all levels. To all independent countries, especially the new and less powerful ones, the United Nations is the one sure guarantee of their freedom, and that is why all true lovers of peace have a stake in ensuring that the United Nations grows from strength to strength in the furtherance of international peace and discipline.

AFRICA'S FUTURE AND THE WORLD

By Sékou Touré

SUBJECTIVE interpretations are at the root of one of the profound misconceptions that prevent a true understanding of Africa's problems and the concerns and activities of her peoples. For the interpretations made by foreign "specialists" in African affairs are as a rule based on the conditions of their own social milieu, and thus take little account of the specific conditions of the various African societies. If the problems of Africa are to be understood, analyzed and solved, we must take into consideration the historical, economic, social, moral and cultural conditions which shape Africa's particular identity in the world—elements of the African evolution, in which total emancipation of the African peoples remains the main objective.

An attempt to solve specific African problems out of context, according to some half-understood universal concept, neglects the especially important social factors. Such an approach assumes that science has reached its limits, that mankind's present knowledge is absolute and immutable, and that in these matters there is nothing further to be expected, attempted or desired. It implies that human society, having reached maturity, begins to decline. On the contrary, everything indicates that it is still full of contradictions and imperfections and that these are the causes of its difficulties, its crises and its disequilibrium. Thus the course of progress, far from being limited, is infinite in time and space.

It is absurd to suppose that an American laborer can think and act in the same manner as the president of a great New York bank. It is just as absurd to conceive of the African or the African nations acting in terms that are supposed to be universal but actually are only relative, depending on particular historical or social conditions.

There are no simple solutions to human problems, nor will there be while vast differences in living conditions keep peoples apart, while agricultural and industrial overproduction constitutes a permanent problem in the most highly developed nations, and while a tragic lack of consumer goods and equipment remains a serious peril for the peoples of the underdeveloped or undeveloped nations. Poor peoples, underdeveloped nations, have needs and demands which are essential to the fulfillment of their hopes

and which have nothing in common with those of the highly developed nations and their rich populations. It is not strange that all peoples want security and seek to improve their standards of life, for man's universal aspiration is for progress, social justice, freedom, prosperity and peace. But each of these aspirations has a particular order of urgency for each people, and draws on infinitely varied potentialities and capacities.

Because of their historical past and their present state of underdevelopment, Asians and Africans obviously have more in common with one another than with Europeans. However, it is not from this point of view and with these given facts that we must study the problems posed by the relationships between peoples if we wish to avoid emphasizing the rift in the world and increasing the imbalance which already exists in society. These problems, it need hardly be emphasized, concern all peoples, nations and individuals, powerful or weak, rich or poor.

Hence it is pointless to expect the African farmer, with his rudimentary tools, his pathetically inadequate productive capacity, and his miserable living conditions (all of which may be interesting from an exotic point of view, but in human terms are tragic) to think and act like a factory owner. And it is pointless to expect the Guinean wage-earner, whether white-collar or factory worker, to think and act like a General Motors employee or like a worker in a metallurgical combine in a socialist country. In different social conditions, the same words refer to different realities, and these differences sometimes are very great. But to infer thereby that nations cannot understand each other does not advance the solution of the problem one inch. The fact that African crows are black with a white collar does not keep them from being crows, any more than the green plumage of Africa's pigeons keeps them from being pigeons. To understand both the language of Africa and its true content we must seek to find in its words, expressions, formulations, not the abstract character of a dialectic, but the substance and reality of the life they express. This life is made up of human imperatives, social demands and vital material needs; and these become increasingly explicit and urgent as the awareness of the African peoples develops and is able to measure the social injustice that characterizes their human condition.

II

The extent of the movement for national liberation, which has suddenly brought rebirth to a whole continent and made it part of international life, bears witness to the volume and strength of this collective awareness. It is not by putting Angolan heads on bamboo stakes that the Portuguese colonists—or for that matter colonialism in general—will stem the tide of this growing awareness. There would be too many heads to cut off for that. Actually, an important evolution in history is taking place, and its consequences, direct and indirect, will increasingly influence the evolution of world society as a whole. Indeed, the liberation movement will modify the international structure more profoundly than did the two terrible world wars.

The colonial and semi-colonial countries, although containing the majority of the world's population, had only geographical existence. They appeared on the map, of course, but their strait-jacketed peoples were regarded as unimportant because they were dominated and enslaved by others. In appearance they remained mute and motionless, but in fact the conviction that a struggle for freedom was necessary was stirring within them. Today, most of these peoples have won back their right to a free and worthy existence. The shameful racial segregation rampant in South Africa will change nothing; on the contrary, it sharpens the awareness of the African peoples and strengthens their character. It will harden them still more when the inevitable showdown with the Afrikaners, with their racist and reactionary views, forces the African peoples to face up to this problem. Steel is tempered by heat. Will not the same prove true of peoples? The more they are restrained and oppressed, the more able they become to fulfill their historic destiny. The more they are threatened in their liberty, their personality, their dignity, their hopes—in their very lives—the more powerfully they arm themselves for the battle to regain and keep their freedom and use their sovereignty in order to satisfy their needs and assure their survival and development.

Thus the struggle for independence, whatever the form, whatever the means, had just one meaning for the African peoples: to acquire the first tool to open the way for them to solve their problems as human beings fully conscious of their responsibilities. For anyone to imagine that everything is accomplished and that

efforts can cease with independence (which in any case still remains to be consolidated in most of the African countries) is to close one's eyes to the human evidence, to contradict the evolution of history, and ignore the existence of poor nations which realize what injustices they have suffered and burn to exploit their hidden potentialities. The equilibrium to be thus attained is not one between antagonistic forces so much as a harmonization of the world-wide levels of development.

For us, the element of need prevails over more philosophical and even ideological factors; for the human needs of which man is consciously aware and which are part of his very being constitute the true motive force of history. The intensity of this force is a function of the forces which hamper and combat it.

It is vain, then, to hope that Africa will evolve according to any specific form which might be imposed upon her contrary to her own wishes or understanding. She will evolve within her own authentic framework and in accordance with her own personality until her economic conditions lose their particular characteristics and become normal. It is futile to talk of "protecting" Africa, or to give her alms which will salve the conscience of some, blunt temporarily the awareness of others, and perpetuate inequalities between peoples by maintaining differences in their living conditions. And it is futile also to try to trace any one path that Africa must follow. Africa must be left free to follow her own historical path, starting from the imperatives of her destiny and taking into account the requirements of a fraternal and united world.

In other words, it is a question of affirming our "Africanity," that is to say our personality, without attempting to dress it up in Western or Eastern costume. What must be constructed harmoniously and rapidly is an Africa that is authentically African. Africa has her own needs, concepts and customs. She does not seek to deck herself out in borrowed clothing that does not fit.

This destiny, while presupposing the total disappearance of colonialism, the liquidation of imperialism and the establishment of a society free from privileges, also opens new and inspiring perspectives of justice, progress and universal peace. Need we recall that by holding onto their present privileges and technical superiority the highly developed nations are depriving themselves of the creative talent and productive capacities of hundreds of millions of people in the underdeveloped nations? Already the modern world's scientific capacities can no longer be measured

country by country. More and more, the utilization of recently discovered scientific methods calls for the coöperation of several countries, indeed of all countries together.

In view of this, it seems bitterly ironical that progress, upon which mankind's greater happiness depends, is hampered less by lack of knowledge than by the sealing off by certain selfish peoples of information about their scientific discoveries, experiments and achievements. As a result of their substituting the will to power for the will to progress, human happiness and the interests of nations are deliberately and irrevocably sacrificed. Paradoxically, it is in the name of safeguarding human happiness and the interests of peoples that men choose the perilous path of military power, leading perhaps to the end of humanity.

So far as Africa is concerned, this situation leads to something that is tangible and easily grasped.

Compared to other continents, Africa is relatively retarded. But to what is this backwardness attributable? To some natural inequality between black man and white? No, for there are black men who by their culture have an intrinsic value superior to that of certain white men. Hence in so far as individual capacities are concerned, there is no such thing as intellectual inequality among men whatever their color or race. Inequality exists solely in living conditions, in the accidents of history, that is to say in the political, economic and social conditions that have dictated, and still dictate, the levels of development in different parts of the world. This is true of the political situation within a nation in which political considerations have hampered national development (as in European countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece). It is true of the economic and social situation where foreign intervention has resulted in exploitation and social oppression (as in any country subjected to direct or indirect foreign rule).

But does the inequality exist in the realm of intelligence? We say categorically, No! Does it exist, then, in the ethics or social theory of the two groups facing each other? Again we say, No! Africa is not backward in the moral and spiritual domain. In truth, the African is keenly aware of the difference between good and evil, of justice, of liberty, of solidarity, of the virtues of work and human charity, as well as of universal peace; he has the same sense of his responsibilities as do the inhabitants of Europe, America, Asia or Oceania. He has, with some slight variations, the same scale of values; hence we cannot consider that he is,

even provisionally, backward either morally or spiritually. If there is inequality, then, it can result only from economic conditions. Far from being an inherent defect, it is the consequence of the low level of scientific, technological and financial development of our countries. And although in these respects Africa is backward compared to other continents, she must not on that account underestimate her human personality, her economic, moral and cultural values, her spiritual force or the contribution she can make to world civilization.

In the past decade, Africa has become well aware of her lag in material things, and is eagerly seeking to attain the level of development of the highly industrialized countries.

When we analyze the ills that have beset the African, indeed the whole black race, we are obliged to admit at once that economic factors are what have favored slavery, the deportation of our populations, racial discrimination, colonization and, today, neo-colonialism. Africa has been exploited and oppressed for economic motives; her legitimate desire for rehabilitation—social, moral, cultural—must be fulfilled by her economic development.

III

We of course know that the world today is interdependent, and Africa, which cannot live in isolation, does not intend to remain at the margin of this modern world. She thinks she is entitled to benefit from the experience of other nations as well as from the fruits of her own efforts. In turn, she must contribute actively to the creation of a world society in which each nation, while retaining its own personality, will be considered on an equal footing with the others and will, like them, take on its proper share of international responsibilities.

Africa has been carved up and divided. The evil of colonialism has not consisted just of exploitation and discrimination but of loss of liberty and seizure of sovereignty. Only when a people proclaims its independence, therefore, and exercises its sovereignty, can it put an end to every form of exploitation by establishing democratic institutions, freeing creative initiatives and assuring individual freedom by social progress.

Colonialism's greatest misdeed was to have tried to strip us of our responsibility in conducting our own affairs and convince us that our civilization was nothing less than savagery, thus giving us complexes which led to our being branded as irresponsible and

lacking in self-confidence. Our greatest victory, then, will not be the one we are winning over colonialism by securing independence but the victory over ourselves by freeing ourselves from the complexes of colonialism, proudly expressing Africa's authentic values and thoroughly identifying ourselves with them. Thus the African peoples will become fully conscious of their equality with other peoples.

The colonial powers had assimilated each of their colonies into their own economy. The French colonies were an economic branch of the French economy, the British colonies were an extension of the economy of Great Britain. Between Guinea and Sierra Leone, between "French Guinea" and "Portuguese Guinea," there exist common traditional bonds of custom, history and economy. Yet no economic relations existed between them, for each was a tributary of the colonial power's market exclusively.

We know that we must rebuild Africa. To win and proclaim a nation's independence but keep its old structures is to plow a field but not sow it with grain for a harvest. Africa's political independence is a means which must be used to create and develop the new African economy. Our continent possesses tremendous reserves of raw materials and they, together with its potential sources of power, give it excellent conditions for industrialization. This is why, though it would be unrealistic and irrational to think of associating the African nations with the European Common Market, or any other form of economic monopoly, it is to be hoped that an African common market will be organized which eventually can coöperate on a basis of equality and solidarity with other economic zones.

African unity is no more a goal in itself than was independence. It simply is a means of development, a force of inter-African coöperation. It is indispensable because of the unjust nature of the relationship between the underdeveloped African nations and the economically strong nations. The equality of this relationship must be improved in order to overcome the social inequalities and differentiations in the present levels of development throughout the world. The highly developed nations have economic relations among themselves either of coöperation or of competition. But their relations with the undeveloped nations are those of exploitation, of economic domination. The direct colonial exploitation of former days is being succeeded by exploitation by international monopolies, and this has a tendency to become permanent. Para-

doxically, it is the underdeveloped nations, exporting raw materials and crude products, which contribute an important share of the costs and the social improvements from which workers in the fully developed countries benefit.

The nature of our economic relations on the world market can be easily illustrated. In the matter of customs tariffs, for instance, let us glance at a few figures. In the period 1957 to 1961, the exchange value of raw materials and crude products in relation to industrial products fell 34 percent, although from 1955 to 1957 this rate had already fallen 50 percent in relation to the 1948 market. The extent of the decline on the international market is shown by the following statistics:¹

1. Immediately after the war the average per capita income in the U.S.A. was 1,000 dollars per annum, while in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America it was 100 dollars. Fifteen years later the average annual per capita income in the United States was 2,500 dollars, and in the underdeveloped countries barely 150 dollars. Thus while in the most developed part of the world the average income was ten times larger than that of the underdeveloped countries, which represent the vast majority of the world territory and population, this difference has now risen to seventeen times.

2. Since the war, the world average per capita production of food has increased by 13 percent. But in Africa the production per capita has fallen by 2 percent, in Latin America it has increased by 2 percent, in Asia by 12 percent, and in developed Western Europe by 21 percent.

3. Immediately after the second world war the underdeveloped countries' participation in world trade exchange was 38 percent. However, by 1953 its share was reduced to 36 percent, in 1959 to 31 percent, and in 1961 to 29 percent.

4. In the course of the last ten years alone the prices of industrial goods in international trade have increased by 24 percent, while the prices of raw materials have fallen by 5 percent. In other words, the underdeveloped countries exporting raw materials were, towards the end of the fifties, purchasing one third less industrial goods for a determined quantity of raw materials, as compared with ten years earlier.

In the light of these circumstances it is easy to understand that the economic unity and monetary independence of Africa do not signify, as has been naïvely suggested, that Guinea will be permitted to sell its coffee to the Ivory Coast, its palm-kernel to Dahomey and its bauxite to Ghana. It signifies that, as Africa enters the international market as a producer, all steps must be taken to establish a fair relationship in the active forces which

¹ Janes Stanovnik, "Simple Mathematics of the Cairo Conference," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), June 5, 1962, p. 3.

dominate international trade, replacing the position of dependence to which the underdeveloped nations are subjected now.

The mere fact that there are cries of alarm about the production of coffee, cacao or peanuts, while there is silence about the products for which the demand is increasingly active but whose prices remain stable, such as diamonds, gold, oil, radioactive ores, zinc and copper, illustrates the mercantile nature of the economic relations between the highly developed nations and the nations producing raw materials. In 1957, the total tax on coffee imported into France was 71 percent of its import value; it was 72 percent in Germany and 73 percent in Italy. Was it really a question of protectionist measures in the case of coffee, or of discriminatory taxation? It is a fact that in this same period the price of gold was lower on the French market than it was, for instance, at Siguiri, in Guinea, as a result of surtaxes designed to prevent its sale locally.

Actually, the difficulties appearing within the European Common Market with regard to the renewal of Association Agreements made by certain African nations prove that it is not the form of the economic relations that must be changed but their very nature.

Here, as in other realms, the interests of the African peoples are one, and the awareness of this unity is rapidly becoming more and more explicit. The African nations are realizing that in order to solve their urgent social problems they must speed up the transformation of their trade economy; and if this is to be done through industrialization, it cannot be done within the limits of our national micro-economies. But unconditional integration into a multi-national market consisting of highly developed and underdeveloped nations negates the possibility of industrial development in advance; it could only be the association of horse and rider. If they are to complement each other economically, the development of all associated nations must be carried out according to their united needs and common interests. Any concept which imposes implicitly and *a priori* a particular orientation and framework on the development of the various nations cannot work, for it does not bring a radical solution to the nature of the economic relationships involved or to the general problems facing integrated human communities. The leaders of the European Economic Community seem not to be aware of all this, at least as far as Africa is concerned, and make no secret of their desire

to achieve a political community of Europe which cannot be reconciled with Africa's desire for political independence; Africa remains as grimly hostile as ever to the division of Africa which began with the Congress of Berlin in 1885.

IV

The unity so much desired by all Africans will not be achieved around any one man or any one nation, but around a concrete program, however minimal. The rules of the union must favor and reinforce generally accepted concepts: equality of all nations, large or small; fraternal solidarity in their relationships; the common use of certain resources; and respect for the character and institutions of each state. Not only must there be no interference in the internal affairs of any state by another, but each must help to solve the other's problems. If we do not rapidly achieve such a framework of solidarity, permitting the peaceful evolution of our countries, we risk seeing the cold war enter Africa and divide the African states into antagonistic forces and blocs, jeopardizing their whole future in common.

The evolution of our countries in peace and harmony requires a high degree of coöperation. We have always thought that Africa should be considered like the human body: when a finger is cut off, the whole body suffers. The growing awareness that we all share the same future must make us increase our efforts for this coöperation, for solidarity and active and conscious African participation in world progress.

When we speak, furthermore, of rehabilitating the African Man, we do not indulge in a racist doctrine but act in accord with a historical and moral imperative. We have suffered too much from the malice and scorn of others. We must act so that they will respect us in future and this we shall do by respecting ourselves and honestly and competently exercising our responsibilities. It is a problem of human dignity and of conscience.

Some have claimed to see political antagonisms in the formation of various African groupings. Actually these were the first concrete manifestations of unity, and were inspired by human and historical necessity. Skepticism notwithstanding, this tendency toward unity will increase. Political choices which do not correspond to the needs and aspirations of our peoples—and it is important that this be understood—will inevitably fail.

As for what face a united Africa will wear, whatever the choices

she makes in her orientation, it will not be turned either against the East or against the West. It will be above all and essentially directed toward the emancipation and progress of Africa and her peoples. In our struggle for freedom there is no room for negative choices, but only for positive thought and constructive action. What will be destroyed or defeated in this struggle are those things that historical necessities, human needs and the forces of progress consign to destruction and oblivion.

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To attempt to interpret Africa's behavior in capitalist or Communist terms is to neglect the fundamental fact that Africa's present condition corresponds neither to the given facts of capitalism nor to those in the building of Communism.

Africa's way is the way of peaceful revolution, in which the morality of an action counts much more than its form and conditions. That some believe socialism corresponds best to the aims of the African revolution, while others suppose it is preferable, despite the lack of national capital, to espouse capitalist principles—these considerations will not in the last analysis prevent our peoples from deciding their own fate. It is they who are called on to make the sacrifices and the creative efforts necessary to ensure Africa's development. Their awareness is sufficiently keen to enable them to choose the way they want to go.

In deciding these matters our peoples will take account of the realities of the twentieth century: the tremendous possibilities of future human achievement as well as the knowledge, experience and discoveries accumulated in the course of past centuries. Their commitment will correspond to their hope of future benefits. It will be one which makes a real contribution to general progress in peace and human happiness.

African neutralism, then, is not shameful indifference, a sort of political demobilization. On the contrary, it is the expression of a lively faith in a happy future for mankind. It is something active, a participating force, an active agent in the struggle for the achievement of a world society—emancipated, fraternal and united. Let us hope that the highly developed nations and peoples can understand this historical movement in its universal significance, and that they will take full part in it, in the conscious desire to help build a free and prosperous Africa in a world of peace and brotherhood.

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COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By Bertram D. Wolfe

It was only towards the middle of the twentieth century that the inhabitants of many European countries came, in general unpleasantly, to realize that their fate could be influenced directly by intricate and abstruse books of philosophy. — Czeslaw Milosz

FOR four and one-half decades we have waited for the Soviet Union to mellow. Repeatedly, we have thought we were witnessing the longed-for change, of dynamism, direction or heart, which would make Communist totalitarianism in power just “one state among many”—different of course, but a member of the comprehensive genus of orderly, constituted governments, content to tolerate orderly neighbors and act according to the not-too-generous rule of live and let live by which governments, reluctantly, indifferently or a little contemptuously, suffer each other’s presence on the same earth.

A review of the judgments of statesmen and analysts over these 45 years makes melancholy reading. From the notion that Lenin’s régime would last but a few weeks or months (Lenin shared this view for a while) to the certitude that power and responsibility always sober; from Lenin’s N.E.P. to Stalin’s “socialism in one country” and Khrushchev’s “thaw”; from the celebration of Russia’s entry into the League of Nations through the shock of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to the Grand Alliance that was to build “one world”; from Stalin’s “peaceful coexistence” to Khrushchev’s “peaceful competition”; from the “collective leadership” following Lenin’s death to that following Stalin’s, to the personal rule of Khrushchev—at every zig we have proclaimed, “At last it has come,” at every zag muttered, “Surely it cannot last!”

In London I chanced some time ago on the diary of a deceased noble lady, one entry of which noted that Fridtjof Nansen had come to tea, bringing glad tidings: “Our troubles with Russia are over: Lenin is returning to capitalism.” The entry was made in 1922, the lady’s informant being one of the most knowing of Soviet experts in his generation.

Four decades after that entry, I read in a work of an American political scientist a rejection of the very conception that “totali-

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tarianism is a radically new social form," which, while it exists as such, will continue to maintain "its combative posture vis-à-vis democratic societies."

Even on a simpler intuitive basis, [the writer continues] one can question the basic assumption of the theory—namely, that society becomes completely atomized and rule is anomic and direct. In a *crisis* situation, a state can fragment all social life, and through terror, perhaps, mold a people to its will. But can a society live in permanent crisis? Can it hold such a rigid posture without either exploding into war or relaxing? The basis of all social life requires not only a minimum of personal security but the reasonable expectation by parents that their children will be educated, develop careers, and so forth. To that extent, a tendency towards "normalization" is at work in any crisis state.¹

Leaving aside the assumptions which our theme prevents us from considering (*viz.* that rule by secretaries, cells and transmission belts is "direct rule;" that totalitarianism is "anomic," *i.e.* either unstructured or without a value system, merely because these are given from above; and that militant totalitarianism is incompatible with giving children "education and careers"), the passage cited touches on the heart of the questions which will concern us in this article.

How can a régime which arose through a crisis (in Russia and our civilization) endure for 45 years? How does it differ from the usual "crisis régime?" How has it been able to prolong its "crisis" for close to a half-century? Is there a built-in eroding factor which will compel it, before too long, to "explode into war or relax into 'normalization'?" Is the "simple, intuitive basis" of Western thought a proper tool for understanding a society so different from the one in which that intuition was formed? Or is its concept of "normalization" applicable to the ideology and structure of militant totalitarianism?

Conversely, is the opposite extreme tenable? Can we deduce the twists and turns of Soviet policy by simple transposition from its ideology and totalitarian structure?

Or, as this article will seek to suggest, is not Soviet conduct a composite of disparate and conflicting forces, namely: (1) the influence of the traditional situation of the nation upon those who usurped power there; (2) the alterations forced upon them by recalcitrant reality; and (3) the drives and preconceptions of the intensely held ideology which they possess, and which possesses them?

¹ Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology." New York: Free Press, 1960, p. 308-9.

Forty-five years, it goes without saying, have brought important changes—cumulative changes which come from expanding power, lengthening experience in power, and changes in the outside world. Hence a central question of this analysis must be: Are there discernible, amidst these changes, fundamental features of the ideology and institutional framework which have endured, which are decisive for the shaping of foreign policy, and with which we are likely to have to continue to reckon for the foreseeable future?²

II

Let us begin with the easiest part of the problem: the influence on Bolshevik policy of the imperial heritage.

Lenin seized power, not in a land “ripe for socialism,” but in a land ripe for seizing power. “It was as easy,” he wrote, “as lifting up a feather.” His coup was supposed to touch off a European socialist revolution; but while the revolution “matured,” the opportunity presenting itself was to seize power in the Great-Russian Empire. “The point of the uprising,” he chided those who hesitated about Russia’s “ripeness” for his blueprint, “is the seizure of power. Afterwards, we will see what we can do with it.”

Many of the things Lenin and his successors had to do were those which any new tsar would have attempted after an interregnum, a ruinous war and a shrinkage of empire: namely, to reestablish order (their kind of order); to identify Russia’s interests in the minds of their subjects with their rule; to subdue and reconquer seceding provinces and peoples;³ to end the war as best they could, reestablish Russia’s frontiers, and resume under new forms and for new purposes Russia’s secular expansion.

In so far as there appears to be identity between the policy of the stronger tsars and that of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev, this

² This last phrase, by implication, tells all that I shall have to say in the present article concerning our own foreign policy in dealing with the Communist powers. As to the enduring elements of the institutional framework, I have discussed them in my paper, “The Durability of Despotism in the Soviet System” (contained in readings of Inkeles and Geiger, Boston: Houghton, 1961; of Dallin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960; and in my “Communist Totalitarianism,” Boston: Beacon Press, 1961). The present article deals only with the enduring elements of the ideology.

³ Twenty-eight years ago in this journal, Karl Radek wrote: “The attempt to represent the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as a continuation of Tsarist policy is ridiculous. . . . Tsarism, or any other bourgeois régime in Russia, would necessarily resume the struggle for the conquest of Poland and the Baltic states. . . . The Soviet Union, on the contrary, . . . [considers] their achievement of independence a positive and progressive historical factor.” (*Foreign Affairs*, January 1934, p. 194.)

Alas, poor Radek . . .

springs from the fact that, more often than not, the same territories constitute the objectives of reincorporation or conquest. Georgia, Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic States, Bessarabia, the Balkans, the Dardanelles, Persia, the Turkic Empires, Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea—all these have appeared in the pages of Russian history before.

The same geographical situation gives the same neighbors. The Soviet Empire is still the Eurasian heartland, subject to pressure from East or West or both at once, capable of exerting pressure on East and West—on one at a time under the tsars with their limited aims—on both at once under the Bolsheviks with their unlimited ones. As before, Russia is the great land power, many of whose policies are conditioned by the traditional contests between land power and sea power. As before, in moments of strength, this land power still strives for control of its bordering seas.

If the dream of controlling the Pacific proved a wild chimera and Alaska and California had to be abandoned, the Caspian proved easy. With a little luck—and the Dardanelles!—the Black Sea would prove easy, too.

The conquest of the Baltic Provinces and Finland had started Russia's way around the Baltic. Stalin's desperate effort to seize Hamburg, his annexations in East Prussia, his claim to fortify Bornholm, would have startled us less had we borne this inherited appetite in mind. Certainly it explains more concerning Russia's "geopolitical" attitude toward her bordering seas than does the journalistic cliché of "hunger for a warm-water port." Not as exporter or importer but as the great land power blocked in its secular ambitions by surrounding sea powers does Russia look on her bordering seas.

The military advantage of the land power is its interior lines of communication (providing its transport and logistics are adequate). But one disadvantage is that the sea powers are more mobile and can strike at any of its many frontiers, or several at once, compelling Russia to keep large armies in reserve at all her borders. This is further complicated now by airpower; by the radar, plane and missile bases all around the empire; by the missile-launching submarine.

Another preoccupation of the power sprawling across the open Eurasian plain is the "rectification" of its frontiers to get more defensible lines. The Pripet Marshes were one such to the west,

which was too bad for Poland since a more defensible line for one meant a less defensible for the other. The Carpathians played a similar role to the southwest. To the historian there was no novelty in Stalin's partition of Poland with Hitler, fumblingly reconfirmed by the Grand Alliance. The novelty was the military ignorance (or was it faith in Hitler?) that led Stalin to station his main armies *in front* of the river and swamps, so that these served to hinder not the Wehrmacht's advance, but the Soviet armies' retreat.

The "rectifying" of borders is, of course, a traditional objective. Kutusov, between 1812 and 1815, urged his sovereign to take advantage of Russia's advance on Paris to "rectify" Russia's borders along the Carpathians and the shortest line along the Oder to the Sea, and "compensate" the Prussian King—as Stalin was to "compensate" Poland—by lands to the west. Actually, Alexander I had too much consideration for his brother sovereign, the King of Prussia, and for the diplomatic practices of his day. His forbearance arose out of the code of personal conduct of nineteenth-century sovereigns, "cousins" all, and the generally limited nature of the aims which characterized the European system from 1815, when Napoleon fell, until 1914, when peace fell.

Despite a certain archaism carried over from the days of Russia's isolation, the foreign policy of the tsars was the customary policy of a great national state. Its vague ideological overtones were no different from those of other nations. The belief that the tsar's power and duty came from God is analogous to the divine right of kings. The idea of the "Third Rome" played no larger role, indeed not as large as the doctrine of the Holy Roman Empire played over the long period from Charlemagne and Barbarossa to Napoleon. France, like Russia, concerned itself with the "protection of the Holy Places," while St. Petersburg's fluctuating interest in the Ottoman Slavs was less intense than Austria-Hungary's absorption with Slav stirrings inside and below its Empire. Panslavism and Slavophilism remained feverish fantasies of isolated intellectuals, suspect at court, analogous to, and not as influential as, Pan-Germanism in the German Empire.

Though the diplomacy of the tsars resembled that of Stalin and Khrushchev in its freedom from the overt and organized pressure of public opinion and the natural inclination of autocrats to engage in summitry and personal settlements, Russia's diplomacy as a whole was conventional, employing professional

diplomats, following the practices of a world-wide diplomatic tradition which has almost vanished from memory now that conferences and negotiations are habitually put to the uses of a revolutionary power. Foreign policy aims were limited, pursued on the whole circumspectly and in a certain sequence, expressed in the prevailing terms of national interest, balance of power, concert of Europe, spheres of influence, rectification of frontiers, protection against incursions, respect for engagements and alliances, readiness to take into account the opinions and pressures of the other great powers (as in the various settlements with Turkey).

Just as autocracy, though it claimed absolute power, did not dream of totalist power within its own realm, so it had no global aims in foreign policy, no all-embracing plan for the world, no over-all unifying idea. Neither an ideocracy, nor insurrectionary, its generals brought no plans for revolution in their baggage. It had no fifth column as its servant, no world to bury and no world to win. Though it might prefer autocracy in its neighbors, it did not feel impelled to set up a replica of its own régime wherever its armies entered; nor did it feel "insecure" and "provoked" unless all the world should consist of autocracies.

Alexander I marched into Paris at the head of the most powerful armies in the world, then withdrew leaving no permanent traces of his occupation and the essential France much as before. The same was true of the other countries he occupied en route. If Stalin could have possessed such overriding military power and led his armies to Paris in 1945, the result would have been startlingly different, for he would have brought with him a set of rulers for each occupied country and a set of rules, an ideology covering the whole of life, a totalitarian structure and single-party rule.

III

It should be clear, then, that the men who make policy in the Soviet Union think and act differently from the tsars, and that we neglect their ideology to our peril.⁴ Once this is recognized, it might perhaps seem that all we need do is study their ideology to discover their "operative code" and foresee their every move. But ideology is not a set of Euclidean theorems.

Even for Communists there is no automatically "correct trans-

⁴ See Donald MacRae, "The Appeal of Communist Ideology," in Inkeles and Geiger, "Soviet Society: A Book of Readings." New York: Houghton, 1961, p. 104-113.

lation," no one-to-one correspondence, between any segment of ideology and any particular act. Their doctrine combines a religion and eschatology of salvation; a vast accumulation (from pre-1848 to the present) of political commentary and judgments, most of them out of date if they were ever valid; an economics now irrelevant; a historical sociology and critique of economic and social institutions, much of which is still suggestive; a philosophy which is little more than verbal casuistry. To make matters worse, every assertion in the voluminous, contradictory writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin is held to be part of a single science, a canon of which any sentence may be treated as having probative value. Hence the application of the doctrine to any given situation is subject to argument, and it is not always easy for the Communist leaders themselves to deduce from it the appropriate conclusion or action.

If it is hard for them (they solve their problem by forbidding factional controversy and developing the institution of the infallible leader as sole authorized interpreter at any given moment), how much harder is it for us!

"What matters," Sir Lewis Namier once wrote of political ideas, "is the underlying emotions, the music to which ideas are the mere libretto." All we can master is the words; to their music we are tone-deaf.

Though the doctrine operates persistently and powerfully to shape their vision, passions, thoughts and actions, it does not operate in a vacuum. It must be applied, in fragments and contradictions, to a real world of which even the doctrinaire, and particularly the adepts of this doctrine, take account. The masters of the doctrine have inherited from Lenin—and continued to develop—a distinctive Bolshevik blend of dogmatism and empiricism.

Nothing could be more deceptive than the inclination to answer from within ourselves the questions: "What would I believe if I accepted this proposition which they accept? How would I act in the situation facing them if I held their beliefs?" The illusion that we can easily "put ourselves in their place" contains a built-in trap, that of tending to put them in our place and tending to think that they think and feel as we do.

When we do pay attention to their ideology and its emotional context, we tend to be so impressed by its dogmatic character that we forget that it is dogma applied to reality. It is true that

this application has its ambiguities. When they study the world for "theoretical" purposes, dogma has priority over reality, which has orders to confirm and reinforce their faith—"confirm the truth of our science." Thus filtered, it does. Still it is their contention that their dogmas are derived from the empirical study of society and the universe. And it is their pride that the science enables them to appraise reality, react properly to it, judge the exact extent to which the "concrete, objective situation" and "real relations of power" permit them to advance on the path marked out for them by it.

Moreover, we do them wrong to imagine that they will abandon this path and choose rather to blow up the world when given no other choice than open retreat. This *Götterdämmerung* frenzy or petulance was a constituent of Hitler's spirit but not of Lenin's. Lenin was as proud of knowing "when to retreat" and "how to retreat in good order" as he was of knowing when to advance and push to the limit. For him, offensive and defensive, retreat and advance, probing and holding actions, open frontal attacks and simulated withdrawals and outflanking manœuvres were all precious elements of a strategy of protracted conflict which was to last until final victory. For every battle, his favorite adage was taken from Napoleon: *On s'engage, et puis—on voit!*

Within rather strict limits, contact with refractory reality has forced upon these men adaptations ("creative extensions") of their doctrine. "Facts are stubborn things," Lenin would say. They could not, of course, refute "science." But they could show him that a particular tactic or plan of a given moment had to be abandoned, or a particular proposition reinterpreted.

Lenin and his successors are always at pains to show that their "creative extensions" do not constitute a "revision." This is more than mere casuistry, for it corresponds to a genuine psychological and political need and possesses an underlying meaning.

Though Marx's views of his last years were different from those of 1848, there was an enduring framework of dogma and continuity of spirit which made it not unwarranted for disciples to make of his teachings an "ism" and an orthodoxy. More fearful of "revisionism" than the founding fathers, the "orthodox" sought to turn every possible aspect into a dogma. Yet, most dogmatic of Marxists though he was, Lenin found it needful, consciously and unconsciously, to transform what he adopted, give it a Russian cast, put on it the stamp of his own temperament.

Repeatedly he “creatively developed” the doctrine, so that the Leninism of the foundation period (1902–14) was profoundly different from the Leninism of the First World War (1914–16). In 1917, he made even more drastic changes, so that he had to fight all the old leaders of his party—they quoting the Lenin of the foundation period against the living Lenin. Still more startling was the next transformation: from the pronouncements of the six months from spring to autumn of 1917 (anarchistic, decentralist, spontaneous mass-actionist, syndicalist, equalitarian) to the Leninism of firmly established power. Each of these stages represents a significant break in strategy and tactics against the background of an even more important and fundamental continuity of dogma, spirit and long-range aim. Moreover, all these variform pronouncements of Lenin, like those of Marx, are now held to represent a single sacred canon. Yet each of these “creative extensions” in its day caused not only opponents but often devout disciples to believe that Lenin was “abandoning Leninism.”

With these complexities in mind, let us enter the thicket of Communist doctrine, to see what trails we can find leading from dogma to policy.

IV

Marxism-Leninism is a “science,” indeed a super-science of the laws of motion of both nature and society. It makes a science of history, politics, sociology, social and individual psychology, and all the subtle realms of the spirit.

Its God is personified History, the Future His Word and His Kingdom. Its mythology, as Herbert Lüthy has observed, has an astonishing “conceptual realism,” which puts on the stage of history as living, thinking and acting personages such abstract concepts as Capitalism, Imperialism, Socialism, as in the morality plays of the Middle Ages Jealousy, Slander or Avarice were accustomed to appear. Those who can juggle with these puppets and possess this conceptual wisdom are masters of the plot, bearers of History’s will, beneficiaries of History’s guarantees, executors of History’s judgments.

A predictive science, it works to fulfill and is destined to fulfill its prophecies. As it includes its own verification, so it includes its own morality—what history intends being at once scientifically and morally right. Whoever and whatever hastens the com-

ing of the future is thus doubly sanctioned; whoever or whatever gets in the way is both unscientific and immoral.

The final victory of history's millennial intentions will usher in a state of absolute grace in which history-as-conflict ceases and loses its imperatives of harsh struggle; man can at last become human and humane, love can replace hatred, and all be made whole. This exempts "correct," *i.e.* scientific and moral, action from the possibility of wrongdoing.

Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht, but in this court justice is not blind, for judge's bench, jury box, attorney's stands, courtroom public and executioner are provided by the Party. Only the accused is an outsider, known in advance to be guilty as charged, undeserving of mercy. Mastery of the law carries with it the ability to penetrate subjective disguises and recognize the "objective meaning" of the assertions, acts, illusions and very existence of the accused. Doubt, question, deviation, uncertainty, opposition, indifference or willful attempts to escape the judgment, absent one's self from the spectacle, or any impulse of sympathy with the accused, are impermissible. "If we do not allow free-thinking in chemistry," as Comte once wrote, "why should we allow it in morals or politics?" Why indeed if morals and politics are science?

The chief significance which the infallibility of the ideology and its adepts has for foreign policy is the combination of strength *and* flexibility which comes from knowing that you have History on your side. This goes far to explain the unresponsiveness to argument, the stubbornness and repetitiveness of Communist negotiators, the lack of communication in dialogues which are only ostensible dialogues. How can there be genuine dialogue without some consensus? How can there be give-and-take between that which is self-evidently and totally right, and that which is self-evidently wrong, both scientifically and morally?⁶

V

Marxism-Leninism is a combative ideology. At the core of things, it finds conflict, antagonism, clash. Progress (development) comes only through struggle. In this development the

⁶ "They say," Khrushchev declared in Albania on the eve of the Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1959, "that 'with the U.S.S.R. you must negotiate in the following fashion: concession for concession!' But that is a huckster's approach! . . . We do not have any concessions to make, because our proposals have not been made for bartering. . . . [Their] proposals do not contain a single element for negotiation. . . . They are not based on a desire to find a correct solution."

most important moments are those when accumulated tension and clash go over into open struggle, the highest point of all being apocalyptic, chiliastic and eschatological. Toward this all history moves. With it history as "the history of class struggles" will come to an end.

Until then, in the unending war, there can be frequent pauses, indeed must be pauses. The ideology gives its possessors the wisdom to know when pauses are necessary, the pride to "crawl in the mud on your belly" without a sense of humiliation, the skill to "keep a clear line for manoeuvring," for "retreating when possible and necessary" lest you lose all you have gained, for "renewing the attack" when that becomes possible, for "using treaties as a means of gaining strength," bringing up "fresh forces," obtaining a "better rather than a worse peace as a respite for another war," a "breathing spell."⁶

Even the Apocalypse is divided into stages. That is the meaning of the discussions on the possibility of "victory at first in several countries, or one country taken separately," of "socialism in one country," and of the scholastic distinctions between stages in "the construction of socialism," "the extended construction of Communism," and the "attainment of complete Communism."

Ebbs and "compromises" are "necessary" then, but necessary only in an evil and wretched sense, because the enemy is tough and strong, and man is refractory material for the great experiment. The long war is made up of many campaigns and armistices before "final victory;" the road to revolution is "not as straight and smooth as the Nevsky Prospekt."

But Lenin trained his disciples to hate compromise for compromise's sake. His Hell is full of "compromisers," "opportunists" who do not seize opportunities to advance, conciliators, procrastinators—"Verily, procrastination is like unto death." The lowest circle of Hell is reserved for those who would compromise in order to come to real agreement, settle matters or call off the struggle

⁶ All the expressions quoted are from Vol. VII of Lenin's Collected Works (London: Lawrence, 1962), where he discusses the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Similar views are found throughout his works. Analysts who become aware of the apocalyptic element in Communism are apt to overlook this realistic, calculating, pragmatic element. This is one of the main sources of our continual misunderstanding of Communist peace manoeuvres, retreats and "agreements." Lenin taught his disciples: "If you are not able to adapt yourself, if you are not ready to crawl in the mud on your belly, you are not a revolutionist but a chatterbox." Neither Lenin nor Stalin was a chatterbox. Khrushchev, despite his unending chatter, analogous to a stage magician's line of patter, is not a chatterbox either.

⁷ The first formula in quotes is Lenin's, the second Stalin's, and the others have been used by Stalin and Khrushchev.

in favor of permanent and enduring peace. They would not succeed, for history decrees otherwise, but they must be cut off as dead limbs lest they spread rot.

Clearly, in our relations with the Soviet Union we are not dealing with a "crisis" régime that will settle down to "normalcy" as soon as it has solved the crisis which brought it to power. Lenin managed to seize power because of a crisis in another régime. His purpose was not to resolve the crisis, but to use the new-won power as a mighty base for waging the war to which he was committed—a twofold war: on his own people, until he had remade them according to his blueprint (the New Soviet Man in the New Communist Society); and a struggle for the world, until that too is reconstructed to the same blueprint. That is the meaning of all the gentle little homilies with which Nikita Sergeyevich assures us that "Your grandchildren will live under Communism" and "Do whatever you will, we shall bury you." This is not a "crisis régime" seeking to end the chaos caused by total war and economic breakdown (that crisis has long been ended), but a state-of-siege régime seeking to conduct its own total twofold war until it achieves that total victory promised by its ideology.

In this war, though armistices and temporary agreements are necessary, the essence of any agreement is that it is temporary, not that it is an agreement. The struggle may have to be continued "by other means" for a "shorter or longer period." But war itself is only the continuance of the politics of peace, and peace the continuance of the politics of war, "by other means." This is the wisdom which Lenin has distilled from Clausewitz.

To continue an undeclared war or to launch an open war, no *casus belli* is needed, only fresh breath and favorable circumstances. The war itself has been decreed by history and was declared by Marx once and for all in 1848 when he wrote: "The Communists scorn to conceal their aims . . . the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions . . . a world to win."

Between irreconcilable opponents, one of whom is destined by history to be destroyed, the other to conquer, agreement—like dialogue—can be only ostensible. It cannot form the basis of an enduring peace, for it aims only at respite and advantage, or the limiting of disadvantage, in a continuing and scientifically and morally correct struggle.

The implications of these views are manifold, and too all-pervasive even to be listed here. At the least, however, they suggest

that in every encounter we remind ourselves that “negotiate” and “agree” have different meanings for them than for us. To them lulls cannot conceivably or decently be preliminaries to all-out peace. Nor are separate issues really separate, except in the sense that they have been separated out for strategical or tactical convenience from the general context of struggle. Every negotiation, every issue, even every day’s session they regard primarily as a move in that irreconcilable conflict. While we doubtless must, according to our aims, treat each negotiation and issue on its own terms, we will be lost if we forget what it means in their aims, and what “negotiation” and “settlement” mean to them.

Only if we bear this in mind will we be less likely to be caught off guard by broken treaties (how many our government has noted in the past decade!); by agreements which, on the day after adoption, prove to be disagreements on what was agreed; by the helplessness of “neutral” “enforcement” commissions; by the “irregular” or “volunteer” or “guerrilla” detachments, officially disowned but quite openly recruited and supplied, which continue the efforts to unsettle what has been “settled.” Only then can we remind ourselves that all “agreements” must be defined with more than “Byzantine” rigor, and be self-enforcing—which, generally speaking, means that they must contain arrangements for ourselves and our allies to have the forces at key places to defend our interests.

Finally, this awareness should enable us to avoid the trap which we have set for ourselves by the practice of conventional diplomacy: to call off actual combat when negotiations are on, “in order to create an atmosphere favorable to peace.” Theirs has been the revolutionary practice: to step up hostilities when negotiations begin, prolong them if the battle is going favorably, seek to gain by combat the most favorable position for a possible status quo, and the best jumping-off place for the eventual renewal of the conflict.

VI

In all politics, Lenin taught his followers, there is one central question. This he expressed in lapidary form: “Kto kogo?—Who whom?” In Russian no verb is needed; here the first word is subject, the second object. But besides the compact form, Lenin’s works supply various verbs in different contexts: Who beats

whom? Who takes advantage of whom? Who uses whom? As long as the question "Who whom?" has not been finally decided by the victory of Communism on a world scale, tension is the breath of life.

Even the atom bomb and intercontinental missile do not permit of the conflict's being called off, although they require more care than ever in preventing it from going over into all-out war. Early in 1961, Khrushchev said:

Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists. . . . These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable . . . the peoples can attain their freedom and independence only through struggle, including armed struggle. . . . We recognize such wars and will help the peoples striving for their independence. . . . Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. . . . But these are wars which are national uprisings. . . . What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? . . . The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with peoples waging liberation struggles.⁸

Like Lenin and Stalin, there are two things that Khrushchev tries with all his might and skill to avoid: all-out war and all-out peace. Because time is "on their side," and because they set the highest value on power and their possession of a great power base from which to accelerate history and fulfill their mission, they will not voluntarily jeopardize its possession. Hence all-out war has always been avoided. Fission and fusion bombs and missiles have only served to further strengthen this determination. But they have not persuaded the Soviet leaders to tolerate all-out peace.

For a movement whose essence is struggle, the most dangerous periods are those of comparative relaxation, entailing as they do the perils of loss of vigilance, acceptance of peace as natural, passivity, complacency, letdown, the danger of being "influenced" by the too "friendly" and persuasively powerful enemy—in short, the menace of spiritual demobilization and ideological disarming. "Revolutionary Social Democracy," Lenin wrote in mid-1906 when the high tide of the previous year seemed to be receding, "must be the first to enter on the path of the most decisive and relentless struggle, and the last to have recourse 'to methods that are more roundabout.' "

Methods that are more roundabout—Lenin abounds in instructions for going roundabout toward the unabandoned goal when

⁸ Speech of Jan. 6, 1961, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement." It was originally delivered at a closed meeting in the Kremlin and released for publication abroad some ten days later. Khrushchev has returned to the same thought a number of times since.

it is clear that, for the moment, you cannot break through. Far from "losing face," a Bolshevik is tested above all by his ability to retreat in good order, and show skill in methods of struggle that are more roundabout.

To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie [Lenin admonished the Communist International], a war which is a hundred times more difficult, prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilize the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible (even though transient, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies—is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, in the difficult ascent of an unexplored and heretofore inaccessible mountain, we were to renounce beforehand the idea that at times we might have to go in zigzags, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes abandoning the course already selected and trying out various others?⁹

It is these "retracings of steps" and "zigzags" that have been the undoing of so many of our analysts. At each retreat, we have been told: "This is for good; now relaxation has set in." At each zig, there have not been lacking those who saw in it the longed-for permanent change. They extrapolated the zig, prolonged it in a straight line out towards the horizon. Caught in outer space by the zag, they have rushed back to the turning point, only to prolong the zag on a straight line towards the other horizon. Perhaps this explains, as Leonard Schapiro once observed, the noiseless and not unwelcome obsolescence of so much of our Sovietology.

An awareness that the ascent of the mountain is tougher than they thought carries with it no reassurance that they have abandoned the ascent. Lenin's retreats and zigzags were meant to circumvent impassable ravines, not renounce the climb. Flexible tactics can be undertaken without misgiving precisely because Bolsheviks are inflexible (certain) about their goal, and have history's guarantee that they must reach it. The peculiar Bolshevik blend of dogmatism and empiricism, tactical flexibility and goal-seeking inflexibility, action-affirming myth and pragmatic ability to take account of the "real relations of power," are all part of, and reinforced by, a peculiar blend of rationality with what can only be described as a paranoiac vision of self and "enemy" and reality that is not subject to rational refutation. And all these "blends" are at the heart of their movement and ideology, having been there from the beginning and having been reinforced by their long war.

⁹ Collected Works," v. 10, p. 111-12. London: Lawrence, 1962.

I cannot therefore take comfort, as Chester Bowles does in his interesting article in the preceding issue of this review, that “the power of indigenous forces, the pressure of events and the increasingly pragmatic response of Soviet leaders have been steadily eroding the ideological foundations of Communism,” thus creating “a crisis of faith” or at least a “private doubt” in the leaders about the usefulness of the ideology as a guide to the long war, and to the manœuvres and zigzags of each particular stage.¹⁰

In the past 45 years has history not encouraged them to believe that they are the future and we the decaying past? At the outset—unless it should be saved by World Revolution—Lenin barely ventured to hope that his rule would “last longer than the Paris Commune.” It is rounding out four-and-a-half decades secure in its might, the second power on earth straining to be the first, the stronghold of a “socialist camp.”

What reason does a man looking with Khrushchev’s eyes have for abandoning the view that “capitalist-imperialism” is decadent when it is losing all its colonies, did not show the resolution to protect Hungary’s freedom or complete the unification of Korea, failed to make the military moves to prepare its sort of peace during World War II, thereby letting maimed and bleeding Russia pick up all of Eastern Europe, half of Germany, win powerful allies and partners in Asia, expand the “camp of Communism” from one-sixth of the earth to one-fourth, with one-third of the earth’s population? We may offer our explanations of all this. None of them would seem to him to refute his simple explanation of “decadence” and “progress.”

VII

Khrushchev and his lieutenants were born in the ambience of their ideology, like a fish in water, and educated in that ideology’s tenets and techniques. This ideology-technique guided his upward path from *rabfak* graduate and local student secretary to a place as one of Stalin’s most vociferous and active claue-leaders, to wheelhorse of the post-Stalin machine, to sole authorized interpreter of the doctrine. In a world where power is knowledge, his power to interpret the ideology—after consultation or off-the-cuff—has given him knowledge of all things from breeding sows and raising corn to directing poets and philosophers and space-probers.

¹⁰ Chester Bowles, “Is Communist Ideology Becoming Irrelevant?”, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1962.

The monopoly power of the machine he heads, and the institutional framework through which it operates, are given legitimacy (in so far as the word is applicable) by the ideology which is the well spring of the Party's power, and its image of the world. The Party is the word made flesh: Khrushchev cannot permit its well spring to be polluted; it is the source of his emotions, his sense of the meaning of life, his insight into it, his vision of himself, his power and worth. What would give him the claim to rule over a great and ancient people and have his voice heard with awe in the councils of the mighty, if not his mastery of the remarkable machine rooted in this ideology?

VIII

The vagueness of the ideology should not blind us to the definiteness of its myth-affirmed will to action or the intensity of the passions it evokes. It nourishes not so much love of the future, which is vague, as hatred of the present, which is clear and visible. Until the millennium, the god of history is a god of wrath. Only after Judgment Day's dreadful work has been completed will there be room for love among the saved. "Class hatred," wrote Lenin, "is the prime mover of revolution." Since hatred for "the oppressor" predominates over hatred of oppression as such or love for the oppressed, the movement finds no obstacle to sweeping away all existing restraints on power and developing a tyranny of its own, more systematically, pedantically, profoundly and all-embracingly ambitious in its oppression than history has hitherto known. Since there cannot be evil in this system, the paranoid mechanism of projection attributes all evils, and evil itself, to capitalism-imperialism. Domestic shortcomings can be but "vestiges" and "survivals" of the enemy that has not yet been totally rooted out, or the work of conscious or unconscious agents.

But the mechanism of projection is notoriously invulnerable to fact and argument. The doctrine teaches that the enemy must be conspired against, subverted, overthrown: therefore the enemy must surely be conspiring, subverting, striving to overthrow the system which spells his death. In that field the dogma is not shaded by the ambiguities of self-doubt or self-understanding. When the enemy offers gifts, fear him; when he offers kindness, then is he most suspect.

If the principle of reality could have penetrated this paranoid barrier, the Grand Alliance of wartime would have done it. "Ex-

perience" should then have said: "After all, there is not a single enemy; the imperialists have not formed a 'single, hostile camp;' they did not gang up to put an end to us, their mortal foe; instead, the best and mightiest have offered alliance and friendship." When the Axis should be obviously beaten, it might look as if Communism were at last without an enemy!

But the ideology was equal to this, potentially the gravest crisis in its history. Even before the tide turned, as General Deane, Churchill, Djilas and others have testified in their reminiscences, the men in the Kremlin were determined to keep it what it was to them: a "strange alliance." They could hardly wait until the tide had in effect securely turned at Casablanca and Stalingrad to begin the "cold war" within the United Nations before the dying hot war was over. Even in 1943 they began to subjugate where their armies had liberated, to create by their acts, or recreate, the enemy whom even as "ally" they had so carefully kept out of their citadel. The Zhdanov campaigns completed the rearming of those who had yielded to the illusion that Communism was now without a mortal enemy. When the "two camps" were separated once more by a no-man's-land, the infallible interpreters of the infallible doctrine felt comfortable again in their totalist power at home and their total aspirations abroad.

Khrushchev's main accomplishments in this have been two: domestically, to reestablish the clear lines of party control of all transmission belts (including police, managers, officials and army) which Stalin's "many hats" and manias had somewhat blurred; externally, to apply Lenin's and Stalin's teachings about "depriving the enemy of even the weakest allies," in a new world of neutralist infant nations.

IX

Finally, there is one aspect of the Communist ideology which distinguishes Leninism from all other varieties of Marxism and it is central to our problem: namely, Lenin's absorption not with the dream of socialism but with the mechanics and dynamics of organization and power. In a world where most intellectuals were in love with ideas and accustomed to the gap between dream and deed, Lenin's idea was organization. He was an organization man, *the* organization man of whatever movement he participated in. An enemy alike to the dawn-to-dusk discussions of the intelligentsia and the "unreliable," "spontaneous" flareups and subsidings

of the masses, he was all his life at work on a machine to control untidily, unreckonable, detestable "spontaneity."¹¹

Organization, control and centralism were the sacred tripod of power. "Now we have become an organized party," he early wrote, "and that means the creation of power, the transformation of the authority of ideas into the authority of power, the subordination of the lower party organs to the higher ones." When a delegate to the 1903 Congress spoke liturgically of the Central Committee as "Spirit, one and omnipresent," Lenin shouted out from his seat, "Not spirit, but *fst!*" This prosaic, repetitive, monotonous orator and crabbed writer was in his own way a poet: a poet of organization, centralism, control and power.

It was on these issues that Lenin split the Social Democratic Party at its "unification Congress." They are the unifying thread running through all he has said and written, down to the occasional scraps. The party he created was made in this image: a party of *apparatchiki*—men of the machine—concerned with seizing power, holding power, extending power over all the spontaneous, free and uncontrollable aspects of life, power to crush what must be crushed, to confine, direct and control the rest. "We must organize everything," Lenin said in 1918 after he had power, "we must take everything in our hands." To the authoritarian trend inherent in an infallible doctrine, he added the further dream of an *apparat*, a machine with "transmission belts," penetrating and using all organizations to "organize everything, take everything into our hands," make wayward, refractory life totally malleable and totally controllable. Out of this totalitarianism was born. Totally organized power over everything is the real core of its ideology.

In place of seeking to close our eyes to this, I am afraid we must learn to keep it in the center of our thinking for the foreseeable future. For of all the appetites of man, the appetite for power is the one most known to grow by what it feeds on, the least likely by its exercise to diminish, be sated or "erode."

¹¹ Lenin even created heresies of his own such as *khvostizm* ("tailism")—"dragging at the tail of the spontaneous mass movement," and "slavish kowtowing before spontaneity." In 1920 he wrote: "Petit-bourgeois spontaneity is more terrible than all the Denikins, Kolchaks, and Yudeniches put together!"

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE WEST

By Donald S. Zagoria

SINCE the dramatic developments at the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress last year, no one can seriously doubt the existence of a profound dispute between Russia and China. But opinions vary widely as to its causes, its likely future development, its consequences and its significance, if any, for Western policy. My purpose is to provide a framework for exploring the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for the West.

It should be emphasized immediately that Western policy toward the Communist world cannot be based solely, or even principally, on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Many other considerations must be weighed. Moreover, as a result of the dispute, dangers as well as opportunities are open to the West, and such opportunities as are offered are limited. In some respects the dispute has complicated and intensified our problems. We can no longer assume, for instance, that basic Communist policy in Southeast Asia originates entirely in Moscow. We shall be faced increasingly with the need to evaluate not only Soviet policy and intentions, but also those of Peking and even of such key third parties in the Communist movement as the North Vietnamese, who exercise considerable influence on Communist policy both in Laos and in South Viet Nam. Our dangers may increase if Peking's charges that Moscow is soft toward the West goad the Russians into adopting a harder attitude. Not only, then, do the problems we confront persist; our ability to exercise leverage on either Russia or China, and thereby to influence relations between them, remains extremely limited. Even assuming that the few instrumentalities in our possession are used as well as possible, the United States, as the leader of the "imperialist" camp, will remain the major enemy of both Russia and China and its ability to exploit the rift will be greatly limited.

In the final analysis, a secularization of Communism's messianic and universalist ideology can be brought about not by manipulating developments within the Communist world but only by strengthening the unity and vitality of the non-Communist world. The Communists can ultimately be persuaded to reconsider their aims only if over a sustained period they are con-

fronted by superior military power as well as by dynamic, purposeful leadership, alive to the demands of many areas of the world for social and economic reforms.

To recognize the limitations on our ability to profit from the Moscow-Peking quarrel is not to underrate its importance for the entire non-Communist world. It has altered the nature of the Communist bloc, perhaps irrevocably, and has had a considerable impact on both Soviet and Chinese policies in many directions. While we may not be able to widen the breach much by our own actions, we should consider all our objectives and tactics toward the bloc in the light of the dispute. Up to a point, the West has always been, so to speak, the unrecognized third partner in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Western action or lack of action, strength or weakness, resolution or irresolution, have affected the course of the dispute considerably and will continue to do so, since the conflict in part concerns Communist strategy toward the West. Conversely, certain Western problems arise directly out of the Sino-Soviet dispute. What attitude should we take, for example, to the Albanians, now that they have broken with Moscow and accepted Peking's support? Should we reëvaluate our strategy toward Communist China? In short, Western policy is bound to affect and be affected by the rift and we must try to determine what new problems, new dangers and new opportunities it presents.

Before we can talk about policy, however, we must have clearly in mind what are the essential causes of the dispute and what the future shape of Sino-Soviet relations is likely to be. To my mind, the basic cause of controversy between Russia and China lies in the irreconcilable clash of their revolutionary interests. I speak of "revolutionary interests" rather than "national interests" because, although the latter are not irrelevant in this connection, the term as normally used fails to take adequate account of the urge to expedite the revolutionary process so central to the world views of both the principals. The widespread assumption that the conflict demonstrates that the U.S.S.R. is becoming a status-quo power is, in my opinion, quite erroneous. The Russians prescribe a different and more cautious strategy for world revolution than the Chinese, but it is not the strategy of a status-quo power. Reduced to its simplest terms it is based on the view that the demonstrative power of the Soviet state, when combined with diplomatic manoeuvre and economic and political manipulation, will promote Communism with less risk than will direct revolutionary-

action tactics employed by Communist Parties in various parts of the world. The Russians maximize the Communist camp's ability to exert by example a decisive influence on world events, while the Chinese maximize the classical importance of wars and revolutionary violence.

Throughout Communist history, alternative revolutionary conceptions have been intimately tied up with struggles for power. If Stalin and Trotsky had genuinely different revolutionary conceptions at the beginning, it soon became difficult to tell whether their divergent views were being advanced merely as part of a power struggle or whether they reflected deeply felt convictions. It would be an oversimplification to argue that either Russia or China is cynically advancing its own revolutionary strategy simply as the best way of extending its own power and ensuring its ultimate hegemony over the future world Communist empire; but quite clearly there is a large element of conscious power-seeking in the policies of both.

The Chinese Communists have long been ambitious to lead the nationalist, anti-imperialist, as well as Communist, revolutionary process in the underdeveloped and largely colored areas of the world. Indeed, there has been latent claim to this effect in Maoist writings for three decades. If Peking yields to the Soviet strategic conception, it will have to reconcile itself to a secondary role in the underdeveloped areas. For the Chinese simply do not have the resources to compete for influence and prestige with the Russians by means of military and economic aid programs, technicians, trade and so on. Their principal means for gaining hegemony in these areas are armed struggle and guerrilla warfare. They probably calculate that the insurgents, whether nationalists like the Algerian rebels, or Communists like the Pathet Lao, will come to Peking for advice, training and support. Thus while Russia plays a more cautious game, China will get a foot in the door and ultimately take the leading role.

The Chinese challenge to Soviet influence in the underdeveloped areas manifests itself in many ways. First, there is the towering image of an all-knowing Mao which the Chinese have been building up since 1958. Mao is said to be the "most outstanding" of all living Marxist-Leninist theoreticians; he alone has adapted Marxism-Leninism to the needs not only of China but of all the underdeveloped areas. Second, there is the implicit Chinese claim that their own revolutionary model, both for seizing power and

for "building socialism," is more relevant to the colonial and semi-colonial areas than the Soviet model. Third, there is abundant evidence of the intense Chinese activity throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, where Peking is operating independently of, and often in obvious competition with, Moscow. Rivalry in the large, pro-Communist trade unions and student organizations, as well as in the local Communist Parties, is acute. The Chinese challenge to Soviet policy in Asia extends beyond the Communist and pro-Communist organizations. Completely indifferent to Moscow's arduous efforts to win Nehru's friendship and to cut Indian ties to the West, Peking shows little interest in resolving a border dispute with India that could lead to war.

Why, it may be asked, have Moscow and Peking not been able to divide the world into spheres of influence in which each would reign supreme? For one thing, Communist ideology claims to be universal, and the existence of two competing ideological centers might sooner or later undermine the common beliefs that still bind all Communists together. Secondly, both parties recognize that such a division could never be stable. Nothing could prevent a European Communist state such as Albania from defecting to Peking or an Asian party such as the Indian from defecting to Moscow. Even if there were no overt defection, there would be no way of abolishing factionalism; one faction could look to Peking for policy guidance while another looked to Moscow. Moreover, the policies pursued by one partner in its own sphere might violate the interests of the other.

Since sharing of authority within the international Communist movement does not seem to be workable, the only alternative is for Moscow and Peking to arrange that one of them is clearly recognized as the senior, the other as the junior partner. It is inconceivable that Moscow could ever reconcile itself to a junior status. The evidence of the past four years suggests that Peking will not easily accept it either. It follows that China's restiveness will grow as it approaches great-power status.

In spite of its seriousness, the rift is not irreversible; nor is an open break inevitable or even likely in the near future. Events since the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress suggest that, although the rivals are too far apart to resolve their differences easily, they both recognize the necessity for containing the rift. There has been little change in the positions taken by each side on the important questions of ideology, strategy and authority.

But there has been a notable effort to mute ideological polemics and to resume some limited coöperation on the conventional diplomatic level. Thus, the Chinese Ambassador has returned to Moscow after a prolonged absence; trade protocols have been concluded between China and most of the countries of the Soviet bloc; there has been an increase in the number of Chinese cultural, "friendship" and trade-union delegations in Moscow; and a new agreement has been signed for joint exploitation of Amur River water power.

For some time to come, relations between Moscow and Peking will probably move unsteadily in the middle ground between reconciliation and complete disruption. Because there is no room at the top for more than one Communist power, a complete settlement appears unlikely. But the two powers will continue to have major interests in common. Both want to advance the Communist cause in non-Communist areas. Both would like to see the American alliance systems in Europe and Asia eroded and erstwhile allies turned into neutrals. Both would like to preserve at least the nominal unity of the international Communist movement. Both have an interest in maintaining the 1950 Treaty of Alliance, which pledges each to provide the other with military and other assistance in the event it is attacked by Japan or a country allied to Japan. To the Chinese, the treaty is important for both offensive and defensive reasons. As long as it is operative, the United States will be uncertain how far it can go in opposing Chinese initiatives without risking war with Russia. This constraint should be worth a great deal to the Chinese. China must also value the defensive benefits of the treaty, for the large movement of troops to the coastal provinces last June testified to its growing concern over a possible invasion from Taiwan. The Russians, for their part, will have a continuing interest in deterring any kind of Western attack on China and particularly an attack of such magnitude as to threaten the Chinese Communist régime.¹

On balance, we may expect Sino-Soviet relations to fluctuate between tolerable and bad in the coming years. Looking somewhat further into the future, the deaths of Mao and Khrushchev might open the way to reconciliation, but it seems unlikely that it could be permanent.

¹ On July 2, Khrushchev warned that anyone daring to attack Communist China "will meet with a crushing rebuff from the . . . entire socialist camp"—a clear indication of Moscow's continuing interest in deterring an attack on China. Peking's newspapers gave the statement prominent attention.

II

Within the international Communist movement, the Sino-Soviet rift has accelerated the already existing trend toward diversity and independence of the U.S.S.R. The Communist bloc never was as monolithic as is sometimes imagined in the West. But it was a tightly disciplined association of states ruled by a Soviet-dominated hierarchy. There seldom was much significant variance between the policies, foreign or domestic, of the bloc members. By and large, Communist Parties everywhere were responsive to Soviet demands and followed Soviet policies.

Today all this is changing. The Sino-Soviet rift has accelerated a process of change that has been under way since Stalin's death. Increasingly one can observe important differences in domestic views on socio-economic matters within the bloc. Poland, for example, has not yet collectivized its agriculture and retains a larger margin of domestic freedom than, say, East Germany. The process of de-Stalinization has gone much further in Poland and Hungary than elsewhere. One can observe significant differences between Communist states even in their attitudes toward the West and on major East-West issues. The North Korean Party, for example, like the Chinese, has shown much more hostility toward the Kennedy Administration than Moscow or most of the East European states have done. At the other extreme, the Poles have expressed a greater fear of war and a livelier interest in disarmament than most other Communist states.

As long as Moscow and Peking offer different roads to socialism, such diversity is likely to increase. Moreover, along with political and economic differentiation goes a growing measure of independence of Moscow. Neither of the two Asian satellites, North Korea and North Viet Nam, followed Moscow in attacking Albania at the Twenty-second Congress. Perhaps even more significant, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, although European neighbors of the Soviet Union, did not follow Moscow in breaking diplomatic relations with Albania.² This decision was almost certainly made against the wishes of the Russians who were clearly anxious to demonstrate to the Albanians that they must surrender or face diplomatic isolation. Had Moscow and Peking re-

² The motivation was probably different for Poland than for Rumania and Bulgaria. The Poles, while disagreeing with Albania, nevertheless support the right of local Communist Parties to domestic autonomy. The Rumanians and Bulgarians share some of the Albanian world view, particularly the hostility toward Yugoslavia.

mained united, it would have been difficult for the smaller bloc members to gain even such a limited amount of independence of Moscow. But with the two large Communist powers at odds over basic questions of foreign and domestic policy, the smaller Parties, particularly those in Asia, can increasingly play Moscow off against Peking and thus gain greater independence of both.

The Sino-Soviet conflict weakens Soviet control in another way. It prevents large conferences of all the Parties from agreeing on a common line, so that Moscow must increasingly rely on bilateral rather than multilateral discussions in order to change policy. Thus, after deciding earlier this year to seek anew a rapprochement with Tito, Khrushchev journeyed to Bulgaria and Rumania, the two satellites which together with Albania have been most hostile to any such development. While he evidently succeeded in his purpose, he probably had to undertake genuine bargaining with the satellite leaders. Diplomacy has thus replaced *diktat* within the Communist bloc.

An important task for Western policy-makers in the coming decade will be to encourage the incipient pluralism in international Communism. Our instrumentalities for exercising leverage are, of course, limited. Nevertheless the non-Communist countries do have a variety of economic, political and cultural relations with the Communist states, and they could harness these to a common purpose. Lately, for instance, it has become clear that the bloc as a whole is extremely interested in increasing trade with the West. Unquestionably it needs such trade more than the West does, a fact which in itself is significant. In the past, Western economic relations with the bloc have been limited by a number of export controls, and these have been interpreted much more strictly in the United States than elsewhere. Our approach has been guided by the negative principle of deciding what not to export rather than by any positive attempt to define our purposes in entering such a trading relationship.

This negative approach is, I believe, deficient in two respects. First, it is impracticable. In most cases the United States has not been able to stop its allies from selling a variety of goods to the bloc. In addition, Western trade with Communist China is almost certain to increase in the future as a result of the radical decline in Chinese trade with the U.S.S.R. and the East Europeans. In 1961 Sino-Soviet trade was down to about half the volume for the year preceding. This decline may be only temporary; on the

other hand, a substantial reorientation of Chinese trade may be taking place. Two of the four Chinese commercial attachés have been formally withdrawn from the Soviet Union and have not been replaced. Hints have been thrown out that Peking desires increased trade with the West and possibly exchanges of technical personnel. China seems prepared to abandon its earlier insistence on political prerequisites for trade with Japan, and the Japanese have indicated that they will increase trade with China to the same level as that of West Germany and Italy. The Chinese are already negotiating with the British for aircraft, and they also have indicated an interest in turbines, generators and other equipment which, presumably, they no longer obtain from the Russians.

Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are reportedly forming ambitious plans to develop a wool market in China, and Canada seems to believe that China can provide a steady and expanding market for food products. The Commonwealth countries, in particular, will be under heavy pressure to increase trade with the bloc if their traditional markets are constricted as a result of Britain's joining the Common Market. A new trading relationship between these countries and Communist China would probably lead to the granting of diplomatic recognition by those which have not already done so. There is already substantial trade between the bloc and some of our European allies. The West, for example, accounts for 40 percent of Poland's trade and 30 percent of Hungary's. West Germany's trade contributes vitally to the East German economy. Given the hard economic facts of life, there seems little that the United States can do, even if it so desires, either to bring about a decline in East-West trade or to prevent an increase.

The present policy of export restriction is not simply ineffective; it fails to exploit the need of Communist countries for trade with the West. No American administration has yet developed a consistent policy designed to do this. A policy for this purpose might start, it seems to me, by reexamining with our Western allies those common political principles that should determine trade with the bloc. Selectivity might be one such principle. Trade, as well as political and cultural relations, should be intensified with those Communist states which are moving toward moderation in their external policies, some degree of independence from the Soviet Union, and genuine de-Stalinization and

reform in their internal policies. Where a Communist state meets some but not all of these requirements, the West should insist on at least some signs of movement in a favorable direction. Clearly, we should avoid the impression of rewarding the more militant of the bloc countries. At the same time, we should explore the possibilities of securing some degree of moderation in return for a minimum economic commitment that could be subsequently withheld or increased.

It would also be desirable to have a single negotiating agency through which European countries would establish terms for trading with Communist countries.³ This may be facilitated by the Common Market. Such a centralized bargaining agent would make it more difficult for the Russians to play one Western country off against another—a key element in Soviet strategy. It would also help to bring American and West European trade policies closer together, since the United States would find it easier to harmonize its policy with that of a unified European agency than with a variety of separate national policies. Finally, a central bargaining agent would make it easier to apply commercial sanctions.

In the United States, the decision as to which of the bloc countries meet specified criteria for trade and aid must be left to the Executive department and cannot be considered a suitable matter for Congressional legislation from year to year. The Senate's vote last June to bar aid to all Communist states demonstrated how domestic political considerations and lack of understanding can combine to inhibit a policy designed to take advantage of, and promote, pluralism in the bloc. Such actions harm our efforts to encourage liberal elements in the Communist states and give a powerful argument to those that want to reduce ties with the West and link their economies more closely to the Soviet Union.

We are already practicing a policy of selectivity in relation to Poland and Yugoslavia. This should continue, and most-favored-nation tariff treatment should be given to their products. Polish and Yugoslav enterprises should be allowed to obtain regular commercial credit in the United States, as well as limited development loans and credits. The Battle Act might well be amended in order to give the Administration more flexibility in regulating trade with Communist countries. We ought also to consider ways

³ This idea was developed by Horst Mendershausen. See "The European Community and the Soviet Bloc," The RAND Corporation, May 1962.

of lessening the adverse effects of the Common Market on the Yugoslav economy.

If the Administration decided to adopt this approach, it would have to explain to Congress, the American public and our Western allies why it is so desirable to have a differentiated approach to trade with the Communist nations. The guiding principle should be to provide Gomulka and Tito, and any who wish to emulate them, with sufficient leverage to maintain or increase their independence of the Russians. At the same time, we should quietly impress upon them that the West is not giving them a blank check and that we expect them to continue to follow independent and moderate policies.

The way in which Communist orthodoxy and organization are eroded by Polish and Yugoslav ideological and economic innovation is easy to illustrate. Polish journals and newspapers are eagerly read wherever they can be found in Communist countries, because they often contain news and articles not otherwise available. The Yugoslav press is considered so "subversive" that it is not generally admitted. The Polish theatre has been described as the most experimental in Europe; its plays are often thinly veiled attacks on the more totalitarian aspects of Communist rule or on the basic assumptions of Communism. The first abstract art exhibition seen in Moscow was Polish, and it created considerable stir amongst Soviet intellectuals. In the realm of foreign policy, Tito and Gomulka were both ahead of the Soviet Union in emphasizing the dangers of nuclear war and they have vigorously attacked the high-risk strategy advocated by Peking. The continuing assaults on "revisionism," particularly heavy in the Stalinist satellites, testify to the fear of the Old Believers that their rule may gradually be undermined by Western ideas and influence transmitted via the dissident Communist countries.

It must be recognized, at the same time, that there are limitations on the ability and even the desire of Communist states to depart substantially from Soviet-approved positions. Even those that are dissident share a number of common interests and goals with the Soviet Union. Their independence, therefore, can be assessed only in relative terms—a complex task that can be performed better by Administration experts than by members of Congress. Moreover, the essential issue, as Ambassador George Kennan has pointed out, is not whether we should continue to aid Jugoslavia or Poland, but whether the Administration is to

be allowed the latitude and flexibility necessary to manage our commercial relations with Communist countries in general.

When a bloc country, even one as ill-disposed to the West as Albania, actually breaks with Moscow, the West should be receptive to requests for economic and political support of a limited kind. It should be made clear that such support will continue and increase provided the country in question maintains a moderate attitude toward the West. This could make the difference between a temporary defiance of Moscow and a long-range decision to try to go it alone. Yugoslavia, for example, cut its ties with the bloc only after it knew it could obtain Ruhr coal. Once a Communist country breaks away, there is a chance that no matter how militant it was prior to the break its policies may change, as Yugoslavia's did after its break with Moscow in 1948. Albania, since its schism with Moscow, has moved rapidly to improve relations with its non-Communist neighbors, Italy and Greece, and has indicated a desire to improve relations with the West generally. If Communist states that have broken with Moscow are denied Western economic and political support, it will only serve to deter others from seeking a greater measure of independence.

It may be objected that the West should not support a country such as Albania which breaks with Moscow only to embrace Peking more warmly. Such an objection is overruled, in my opinion, by several considerations. First, the alternative course—continuing to isolate Albania—would facilitate the Kremlin's efforts to pull that country back into line, particularly in as much as China can give it only very limited material aid. If Moscow were to succeed in its efforts to re-subjugate the Albanian Party, a pressing and immediate issue between Moscow and Peking would be removed. It is therefore very much in the Western interest to help maintain a dissident Albania, particularly one that embraces Peking; for the existence of a pro-Peking satellite within the European bloc exacerbates Sino-Soviet relations and makes it extremely difficult for Russia and China to compromise their differences. Secondly, as the Albanians do not represent a serious political or military threat to any of their non-Communist neighbors, strengthening them would not involve any risk to the West. Thus, a policy of supporting a dissident Albania would involve few risks, would offer large potential gains, and would enable us to determine whether closer ties of this kind would in future prove profitable.

The most controversial problem in our strategy toward the Communist world today concerns our approach to Communist China. Two diametrically opposed strategies have been suggested in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict. One school of thought contends that we should continue trying to isolate China from the world community and should maintain our trade embargo. Several arguments are advanced for this strategy in addition to those that are familiar. Thus it is contended that any indication that the West was wooing China might have the effect of making Russia more aggressive. It is also argued that American isolation of China has been a powerful factor in causing Sino-Soviet tensions, and that any reversal of this policy might reduce them; further, that American overtures would have the effect of strengthening China's position in the Communist world. Again, it is argued that the establishment of economic and political relations with Communist China would enable it to overcome present severe economic and political difficulties and to reestablish its former high rate of industrialization; hence, we would be strengthening a power that might well turn out to be our principal enemy in the coming decade. Finally, it is said that since the Soviet Union has not been able to moderate China's attitudes, despite all the sanctions which it has available, the West cannot possibly do so; and in any case, if China should indeed become more moderate, it would move closer to Moscow. So we would lose either way.

The opposing view is that since it is unrealistic to expect the Communist régime in China to be overthrown, we should adopt a strategy designed to bring about a change in Chinese Communist thinking and objectives. The rift with Russia, it is contended, and the severe economic crisis at home, provide us with the opportunity to establish, first, a trading relationship, and then a political relationship that can be used to try to moderate the attitude of China and to achieve some limited agreements with it. Since American isolation of China has greatly contributed to its militance, the argument continues, a change in this policy will make it possible for the more pragmatic elements in the ruling Chinese élite to gain the ascendancy.

Although some of the reasoning behind each of these positions is undoubtedly valid, there is, it seems to me, much to be questioned. It is dubious, for example, that modest overtures to Peking would have an appreciable effect on the Soviet Union,

much less make it more aggressive. Peking has already shown considerable interest in reorienting its trade pattern toward the West, this interest has been reciprocated, and no noticeable change in Soviet behavior has followed. On the other hand, it is even more dubious that, in the short run at least, such overtures would succeed in appreciably moderating the policies of Peking. If China were to become more moderate, however, it does not necessarily follow that its dispute with the U.S.S.R. will end. As I tried to indicate earlier, the Sino-Soviet conflict has to be understood in large part as a power struggle that will continue even if there is agreement on some aspects of strategy toward the West.

Any strategy toward China must be risky since it is based on a number of imponderables. Yet it is possible to conceive of a policy, between the two positions just described, that would be alive to the possibilities of tactical change in Chinese Communist behavior. If Peking does substantially increase its trade with non-Communist countries, it will have to balance its desire to support "liberation wars" against the possible loss of important Western supplies, provided, that is, that the West has achieved some coordination of policy.

If the leaders in Peking decide that the militant forward strategy they have been advocating since 1958 has not paid off, or is too risky to pursue without Soviet support, they may well revive the "Bandung spirit" in the hope of making gains by more peaceful tactics. Several considerations will inhibit a sharp swing to the right in China's foreign policy in the near future—not the least of them being the Chinese commitment to the more radical elements in the international Communist movement. Yet the possibilities for some degree of change are present. Moreover, Peking's verbal and ideological attacks on the West have always been less restrained than its military policy. The widespread picture of a reckless leadership ready to risk a nuclear Armageddon has never been supported by Chinese behavior in the face of superior power. However much Mao may "strategically despise" the American enemy, he has consistently shown his "tactical respect."

In the light of these facts, the United States might consider the sale of food to China on a small scale in order to determine the impact, if any, of our economic assistance on Chinese foreign policy. As a minimum quid pro quo the United States could demand the release of American political prisoners. We might also consider such a modest step as approving an international air

route from Paris to Peking, as a sign of the West's readiness to expand relations with China under the proper conditions.

Another possibility would be to send to China an informal delegation of highly respected Americans to learn from the Peking leaders the limits within which bargaining with the West may seem to them worthwhile. At present, it must be admitted, the area of worthwhile negotiation probably seems as small to them as it does to us. But much depends on the pressures which they are currently feeling. Their receptivity to Western approaches will be affected by such factors as the depth of the Chinese economic crisis, the East-West balance of power, the extent of China's dependence on Western suppliers and changes in its relations with the Soviet Union. A wider range of relations with Communist China could be to our advantage if it is made to recognize the contingent nature of Western assistance and if its leaders are aware that they must meet certain criteria for these relations to be maintained—this all on the assumption that the West is pursuing at the same time a united policy.

China's appetite for power cannot, of course, be appeased by a few gestures. Although it is advisable to keep the door to Peking slightly ajar, the most insistent problems that the United States will face with China in the coming years are not how to negotiate with it, but how to contain it and how to prevent it from dividing us from our non-Communist allies. One of Peking's major goals has been to eliminate American power from Asia and to break up the Western alliance throughout the underdeveloped world.

Moreover, messianic, radical, chauvinist and xenophobic elements have been increasingly apparent in Chinese Communism over the past few years and, as Russia has discovered, they will not easily be eliminated or muted. The Chinese extremists insist that the Communist bloc must foment and support "liberation wars" in various parts of the underdeveloped world. Negotiations with China, or any reduction in tension between it and the West may well be impossible unless the West demonstrates that it has both the will and the capacity to resist indirect aggression, and that the risks that a small operation may grow into general war are considerable. We should remember that Russia is also interested in restraining China's more ambitious ventures, and in this respect we share an important objective with the Soviet Union.

Moscow has made quite clear in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute that it has no intention of being drawn into hostilities

with the United States in areas where it now has only a marginal interest. A vigorous American response to Chinese-sponsored "liberation wars" in Southeast Asia therefore need not appreciably raise the danger of nuclear war. In the event of a new crisis we should intervene quickly so as to prevent the local Communists from gaining a foothold and calling for Soviet support. Moscow will have much stronger motives for supporting "liberation movements" once they have achieved partial success. Since the Peking régime believes, or has believed in the past, that the West can be forced to accept local defeats out of fear of nuclear war with Russia, the United States must be prepared to assume a high degree of risk and to make credible its willingness to do so.

The Off-Shore Islands will continue to present a difficult problem for American policy toward both Communist and Nationalist China. As long as the Nationalists unwisely insist on maintaining large forces on these islands, the Communists can raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait at will. So, of course, can the Nationalists, who could put us in the awkward position of having to support an attack on the Mainland of which we did not approve, or leave them to almost certain defeat. If Communist China believed that the United States would support a Nationalist assault on the Mainland, it would be forced into closer relations with the Soviet Union. The United States, therefore, should continue to emphasize—as President Kennedy did last June—that its commitment to the Nationalists is exclusively defensive. At the same time, until we can persuade the Nationalists to withdraw from the Off-Shore Islands, we must also continue to deter the Communists from attacking these islands by associating their defense with the defense of Taiwan itself. To back down in the face of military pressure by the Chinese Communists would only encourage them to take greater risks.

Another difficult decision for the United States concerns the attitude it should take toward the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Without going into this tortured problem in detail, one can say that China, if admitted, would not necessarily vote with the Soviet Union on every important issue. On Kashmir, for example, China would probably continue to support Pakistan, while Russia continued to back India. There would probably be important differences in the Soviet and Chinese attitudes on aid to underdeveloped areas and on disarmament. Also, there would very likely be major differences in their

attitudes toward interventions by the United Nations in colonial or former colonial areas. In 1960, public statements by the Chinese made it quite apparent that they did not agree with the Soviet vote supporting the initial U.N. intervention in the Congo. China's admission to the United Nations, then, would have mixed effects. It would give greater public exposure to differences in the bloc and thereby exacerbate them. At the same time, it might weaken the capacity of the United Nations to act as a cushion between the two opposing power blocs. In view of this, the Sino-Soviet conflict cannot, in my judgment, be the determining consideration with regard to Communist China's admission to the United Nations.

III

It has already been suggested that Sino-Soviet competition will continue to be most intense in the underdeveloped areas, particularly in Asia, as a result of Communist China's ambition for leadership there. This competition holds both advantages and disadvantages for the West. As long as China and Russia pursue independent and competing policies, some of their strength will be dissipated, and we shall gain. Still more Asian Communist Parties will be torn into factions and perhaps, as in India, paralyzed at the national level by divergent allegiances. Furthermore, to the extent that local Communist Parties out of power take Chinese advice and exert increasing pressure on their nationalist governments, they will worsen their relations with the "national bourgeoisie" whom Moscow has been assiduously cultivating over the last seven years. Sino-Soviet competition in Asia and Africa will enable even the smaller independent countries there to exercise some leverage on both Russia and China. Finally, the abrupt deterioration of relations between China and India since 1959, and Moscow's decision to remain neutral in their border conflict, have greatly worsened Sino-Soviet relations in South Asia. The Russians have evidently decided that they will not jeopardize their friendship with India no matter what the costs in their relations with Peking. The Chinese, for their part, have moved closer to India's arch-enemy, Pakistan, and supported that country's claim to Kashmir—a rather clear indication that their ambitions and determination to pursue an independent policy outweigh their desire to heal the breach with Russia. Thus the Communist powers speak with sharply divided voices in

South Asia and their political attraction probably diminishes as a result.

On the other hand, Sino-Soviet competition will be dangerous to the West wherever local Communist Parties, with or without Chinese instigation, pursue strategies of armed struggle. Local Communists will be in a good position to bargain for the support of both Russia and China, since each major power will want to prevent the other from gaining predominance. It is quite likely, for example, that a major influence on Soviet behavior in Southeast Asia over the past three years has been the desire to ensure that Ho Chi Minh does not fall into the Chinese camp. When in 1959 Ho decided to sponsor an armed struggle both in Laos and South Viet Nam, the Russians either had to support him or risk his defection to Peking. Contrary to widespread opinion, Ho and other Asian party leaders such as Aidit in Indonesia are walking a tightrope of non-commitment in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Ho has in fact tried several times to mediate the dispute. Nevertheless, while most of the Asian Parties desperately hope there will be no open break, because this might deprive them of their leverage by forcing them to choose sides, they are all quite alive to the possibilities of taking advantage of the present situation to pursue their own interests. And Ho's interest lies in reunifying North with South Viet Nam, the principal source of rice for the food-short North.

Ho's increased leverage on Moscow as a result of the Sino-Soviet rift has forced the Russians to play a less cautious game in Southeast Asia than they might otherwise have done. The fact that Russia flew military supplies into Laos for the support of the Pathet Lao can probably best be explained by its fear that if it did not intervene to help Ho, Peking would. The Russians would thereby let Ho fall into Peking's arms and lose all control over his actions. Moscow did not want to be placed in a situation where the Chinese could control the risks of war with the West. No matter what Russia's reasons were for aiding the Pathet Lao, however, intervention was of a kind that may well have been decisive in turning the tide of battle in favor of the Communists. Thus, while it is almost certain that Moscow is not particularly interested in taking risks simply to bring about Chinese gains in Southeast Asia, and that it fears a major war in peripheral areas, it is quite likely to take limited risks to support gains by local Communist Parties in Asia.

In these complicated circumstances, the West has a strong interest in persuading Moscow that it is too risky to support Ho in military action, even if there is a danger of losing him to Peking. At the same time, Western attitudes must be such as to persuade both Ho and the Chinese that the allied response to "liberation wars" cannot be limited either geographically or in point of violence, since any limitation would favor the Communists. In short, although we must continue to show a willingness and ability to combat guerrilla warfare with counter-insurgency techniques, we must also make plain that we will not refuse to raise the level of violence and to extend the area of fighting, to North Viet Nam for example, if the Communists do not desist from armed struggle. Our actions must provide Moscow with the arguments to persuade both Hanoi and Peking that the strategy of armed violence is too risky. In our public pronouncements, for example, we should echo Moscow's view, expressed in its debate with Peking, that local wars between states will almost certainly escalate. Moreover, we should convince Moscow that its support of "liberation wars" in Asia will be costly to its own policies in Europe and on major East-West issues. Decisions on whether or not to talk about Berlin and disarmament, for example, should be directly and consistently related to Communist tactics in Southeast Asia. It goes without saying that we cannot oppose "liberation movements" only by military action and that in some countries it will be necessary to bring about a change in the political leadership if counter-insurgency activity is to be successful.

On the whole, the Sino-Soviet rift should make it possible, particularly in Southeast Asia, for the United States to take firmer positions without increasing the risks. In the past five years, a basic assumption in Peking—and of many persons in the West—has been that a missile gap would appear in the early 1960s and that the Soviet Union would gradually acquire a decisive strategic superiority. It has been the very essence of Mao's strategy of "brinkmanship" that the bloc could afford to pursue more revolutionary policies in the underdeveloped areas and to rely more strongly on armed struggle, subversion and civil war because the West, realizing that it was, or would soon be, strategically inferior, would not dare to risk escalation and would therefore have to accept local defeats. In retrospect, it would appear that both the Chinese and many people in the West were fooled about Soviet strategic missile strength. Indeed, it would not be surprising if

the United States turned out to have a much more accurate appreciation today of Soviet strategic capabilities than China, so poor has been the coöperation and exchange of information between the two Communist powers in recent years.

If this view is correct, it must have come as a great shock to the Chinese leaders to learn that the United States now considers the Soviet Union strategically inferior to itself and likely to remain so indefinitely. If they believe that the United States is right, their already critical view of Khrushchev's leadership will no doubt be confirmed. But it should also make them less anxious to pursue brinkmanship tactics themselves or to recommend armed struggle to other Communist Parties in Asia. For they will now have to assume that the West is well aware of its strategic superiority and can threaten effectively to raise the ante in any limited war. The main prop has been pulled from under the strategic concept that Mao has unsuccessfully pressed on the Russians over the past five years. There is some indication already that the Chinese recognize a new situation in world power relationships; recently Peking has soft-pedaled its thesis that, in grand strategy, the "East wind prevails."

If the Chinese, careful to appraise the balance of forces between themselves and their enemies, are really becoming more cautious, it should be possible for the United States to take a firmer line in Southeast Asia. It should be able, for example, to take whatever steps are necessary to close the Laotian corridor through which supplies and men reach the South Vietnamese rebels. It should also step up assistance to Thailand, which may soon be presented with a guerrilla problem in the northeast near its Laotian frontier. Laos, it must be squarely faced, is probably lost to the Communists. But Ho's major objective has been rice-rich South Viet Nam, not Laos, which is of value only as a springboard from which to attack Thailand and South Viet Nam.

Although foreign economic aid is clearly not a panacea for the numerous and complex problems of the underdeveloped countries, there is a particular reason, within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, why such aid is beneficial to Western interests. There is no question that the scale of Soviet aid to certain non-Communist countries, particularly India and Egypt, has been greatly resented by the Chinese, who believe it means less Soviet assistance for themselves. Moreover, they feel at a disadvantage in that they do not have the resources to compete for influence

in this manner either with the United States or with the Soviet Union. Yet the Chinese must offer such economic aid as they can, for one of their main goals is to establish their authority throughout Asia and Africa. Hence, Peking continues to offer limited aid to such countries as Guinea, Afghanistan, Nepal and Cambodia, despite the very serious economic crisis at home. The West, by increasing certain of its own aid programs, may be able to force the Russians and the Chinese to compete increasingly both with it and with one another—this, too, in a field where the West has the advantage. Aggravation of Sino-Soviet relations should not, of course, be the governing criterion for aid to underdeveloped areas, but it is a factor not to be ignored.

To conclude, it might be well to recall the Sphinx's reply, in one of Robert Frost's poems, to a question asking for the wisdom of the ages. "Don't expect too much," was the oracle's answer. The falling out of our two major antagonists does not remove any of the intractable problems with which we are faced and in some respects it only complicates them. No vast new opportunities have been given Western diplomacy, no magic doors opened to the end of the cold war. The Sino-Soviet dispute may prove of undoubted advantage to the West only in the long run, when the corrosive acids of nationalism may ultimately split the bloc asunder. Yet Communism already speaks with several voices, and one of the principal tasks of Western diplomacy will be to create an environment in which the voices of moderation can be given freer rein, while the voices of militancy are restrained.

AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA

By Robert J. Alexander

WHEN President Kennedy proposed a hemispheric Alliance for Progress to spur economic development and raise living standards in Latin America, he endorsed agrarian reform as a basic part of this effort. Land reform is not altogether new, of course, in Latin America. Simon Bolívar undertook, though with only limited success, to distribute estates seized from Spanish loyalists to the veterans of his revolutionary armies. In Haiti, when the republic was founded, the rebellious slaves killed most of their former masters who did not escape into exile, and the land was distributed among the Negroes. In the Dominican Republic, the Spanish colonial landowners fled before the Haitian armies which invaded the area in 1821, and from that time until the advent of the régime of the late Rafael Trujillo, most of the land remained in the hands of small peasant proprietors. Finally, from time to time during the nineteenth century there were sporadic efforts at land reform; in many Latin American nations, for instance, the church was deprived of its land, which was distributed in one way or another among the laity.

In recent decades agrarian reform has once again assumed hemispheric proportions. Mexico engaged in a massive redistribution of land in the years following the outbreak of its Revolution in 1910. The fundamental achievement of the Bolivian Revolution, which began a decade ago, has also been land reform. In Guatemala between 1952-1954 there was an attempt at a thoroughgoing redistribution of the land by the government of President Jacobo Arbenz, but this was thwarted when his régime was overthrown in the middle of 1954. In the last three and a half years Venezuela has undertaken a large-scale land redistribution scheme, and in a very different manner the same process has been carried out in Castro's Cuba. Within the last year, legislation calling for one type or another of agrarian reform has been passed in Colombia, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Brazil. Similar programs are pending in Peru and possibly in Ecuador.

The large estates which for four to five centuries have monopolized so much of Latin American agriculture were created by the Iberian conquerors, who either enslaved the Indians to work the land for them or brought in Africans to take their place. Today,

the remnants of these great landed estates (*latifundia*) hamper the whole continent's economic, social and political development. As they are cultivated by peasants who receive little or no money income, they severely limit the market for manufactured goods and thus slow down industrialization and other forms of economic development. In defiance of the spirit of the age, they keep a large part of the population in a state of semi-serfdom or semi-slavery. So long as the vast social chasms which they create continue to exist, democracy will be exceedingly difficult to realize.

Even relatively advanced nations are faced with the need for agrarian reform. In Brazil, large landholdings and antiquated methods of production keep an estimated 40 million of the country's 70 million people out of the market, with incomes so small that they buy virtually nothing. For the nearly 25 million peasants of northeastern Brazil, the situation is particularly acute. There the remnants of the slave system are especially marked, and the poverty is aggravated by recurring droughts which reduce even further the miserably low standard of living.

In Chile, sizable areas of the fertile Central Valley are kept out of production by the large landholders, who have little incentive to invest their already appreciable incomes in putting more acreage under the plough. The landholding pattern thus not only restricts the market for the country's urban industries, but also contributes to chronic inflation by restricting agricultural output.

In both Brazil and Chile the social and political pressures arising from discontent with the large landholding pattern are reaching the explosive point. Recently, unions of peasants and agricultural laborers have been developing rapidly under extremist leadership. In Brazil, leaders of the rural workers' movement are openly sympathetic to the methods used by Fidel Castro; in Chile the agricultural laborer may provide the margin of victory for a pro-Communist presidential candidate in the 1964 elections.

Argentina is one of the few Latin American countries in which land redistribution has never been a major issue. Although the greater part of the most fertile land is owned by large landholders, the agricultural system does not follow the semi-feudal pattern of other Latin American countries. For three-quarters of a century, Argentina has used modern methods and machinery for large-scale production of grains and meat for export. Elsewhere, however, Latin America is now being shaken by a groundswell of revolt against the traditional landholding pattern.

II

The oldest of the contemporary agrarian reform programs in Latin America is that of Mexico, where it has been in process for about half a century. With the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, Emiliano Zapata, whose peasant armies controlled several states in the southern part of the country, carried out a *de facto* redistribution of the land in areas under his control, allowing the peasants to take the land from the large proprietors. Commencing in January 1915, the government of President Venustiano Carranza began the legal process of agrarian reform with a law providing for the restitution of land which had been seized from indigenous landholding communities during the régime of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910). In subsequent years, this original law was greatly amplified to permit government expropriation of individual holdings in excess of minimums which varied with the nature of the land involved.

All governments since the Carranza régime have continued the process of agrarian reform. A high point was reached during the 1920s when nearly 4,500,000 hectares (a hectare is approximately 2.5 acres) were distributed over an eight-year period to some 2,200 villages containing nearly 450,000 families. An even larger effort was made during the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40), which distributed approximately 15,000,000 hectares of land. During the succeeding three administrations, the rhythm of land redistribution slowed down considerably, but today the government of President Adolfo López Mateos has once again increased the pace. By early 1962 the total amount of land distributed since the first decree of January 1915 had reached approximately 50,000,000 hectares. Some 12,000,000 peasants are estimated to have benefited, with the result that the land under cultivation is now approximately equally divided between the beneficiaries of the land redistribution program and other proprietors, most of whom lost land through the reform.

Agrarian reform in Mexico developed in a pragmatic manner, as did the whole Mexican Revolution. It was not until 1922 that the agrarian authorities decided upon the pattern which they wished to follow in establishing the new small proprietorships. Not until 1924 did they begin to face the problem of the new landholders' need for credit. It was some years later still before any major effort was made to develop an effective agricultural

extension service to help the peasants make better use of their land. However, as the first and most extensive effort of its kind, the Mexican experience has been widely studied by those planning similar moves in other Latin American countries.

One program which has been very much influenced by the Mexican example has been that of Bolivia, following the Revolution of April 9, 1952, which put the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria* in power. Mexican officials helped in drawing up the basic law, and others assisted in putting the law into operation. Like Mexico, Bolivia has attempted to restructure the whole rural economy of the country and to integrate the peasant masses into the civil life of the nation. All tenants were granted the land on which, under the traditional Bolivian latifundia system, they had been allowed to build their homes and to grow crops for their own use. As a result, every Indian tenant was immediately converted into a small proprietor. In addition, however, the Bolivian law promised that as rapidly as possible the land which the Indians had cultivated in behalf of their landlord would be divided among them. Almost a decade after this process began, it is estimated that about one-third of the land subject to redistribution has actually been given to the peasants. The main impediment to more rapid progress has been a lack of personnel to do the job of surveying and dividing the large estates.

The Guatemalan agrarian reform of 1952-54 was also much influenced by the Mexican example, at least in theory. As in Mexico, the Guatemalan law granted the peasants use-rights to the land rather than full title. It also left sizable amounts of land to the old proprietors, although it differed from the Mexican practice in taking only uncultivated land from private landowners. The actual process differed very much, however, from what was provided in the law. The Communist Party, which was a major force in the councils of the Arbenz régime, sought to use the agrarian reform as a lever with which to lift itself to power. It encouraged illegal seizures of land by the peasants, without waiting for the process of expropriation by the National Agrarian Department, with the result that much land was occupied which according to law should not have been subject to the reform. Finally, the whole process was reversed when President Arbenz was overthrown in the middle of 1954, and President Carlos Castillo Armas restored to the old proprietors the land which had been taken from them by his predecessor. Since that time, successive governments have sub-

stituted a process of opening up and colonizing government-held land in the northwestern part of the country, instead of dividing existing private holdings.

As in Guatemala, the agrarian reform in Cuba has been quite different in application from what was stipulated in Castro's law. The decree of May 1959 was relatively modest, providing that no corporation could own land, and that no private landowner could have more than 990 acres in most cases, or 3,300 acres in exceptional instances. Each tenant or agricultural laborer was to receive some 66 acres free and the opportunity to purchase an additional 99 acres at a low price. Although there was passing mention of establishing agricultural coöperatives, the whole emphasis of the law was on the redistribution of land to small proprietors.

In fact, the Castro government has operated in almost complete disregard of its own agrarian reform law. Compensation has not been paid. The land, instead of being given in fee simple to the ex-tenants and agricultural laborers, has passed into the hands of the all-powerful *Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria* (I.N.R.A.), which has organized it into collectives and state farms on the Soviet model. It is estimated that by the middle of 1962, about 80 percent of all cultivated land in Cuba was in the hands of the government, and the other 20 percent in the hands of small proprietors, who, however, were forced to belong to the government-dominated *Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños* and to sell their produce to the I.N.R.A., which was granted a monopoly in the purchase of all agricultural and grazing products. The small peasant landholder was not even allowed to slaughter any of his own cattle or chickens without its permission. In August of this year, Castro indicated that the remaining coöperatives would be converted to state farms.

The fifth major agrarian reform program undertaken in Latin America in recent years has been in Venezuela. A preliminary attempt was made between 1945 and 1948, but it proved abortive when the government of President Rómulo Gallegos was overthrown by a military coup d'état in November of the latter year, and most of the land redistribution which had been carried out in those years was undone. With the overthrow of the military régime in January 1958, the process of agrarian reform was undertaken once again; at first it applied only to land which had been seized from members of the fallen régime, but since 1960 it has operated on the basis of a basic agrarian reform law.

The Venezuelan law was probably the most carefully prepared piece of legislation of this type which has so far been seen in Latin America. It was drafted by a large commission which included representatives of the peasants' federation, the landholders' organization, the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela, the four major political parties of the time, the banking, commercial and industrial communities, the government, and organizations of agronomists, economists and other technicians with knowledge of the matter at hand. The resulting law represented a consensus of all of these groups. It provides for expropriation of large estates as well as the distribution of government-owned land, and undertakes to grant the land principally to small proprietors, although in some exceptional cases there is provision for establishing co-operatives, when large-scale production is technically desirable, as in the case of stock farms and sugar plantations. Since the government of Rómulo Betancourt was inaugurated in February 1959, it has pushed land distribution at an accelerating pace. The total land distributed by the end of February 1962 was 1,416,475 hectares to 45,348 peasant families, and in March President Betancourt announced that he intended to convey land to 100,000 additional heads of families before his term ends early in 1964.

The intensiveness with which reform has been carried out varies a great deal from one part of Venezuela to another. In the central states of Carabobo and Aragua, where the pressure of the rural population on the land was most intense, virtually all of the large estates have been expropriated and turned over to the peasants. On the other hand, in the state of Zulia, around Lake Maracaibo in the west, the process of land distribution really began only in the last months of 1961, while in some of the eastern states application of the law at present is only nominal.

In Brazil, Chile, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, agrarian reform is just beginning. Laws providing for land redistribution were passed in several Brazilian states in late 1961 and early 1962, and a national law has been pending before Congress for more than a year. In Chile and Colombia legislation was passed early in 1962, but the machinery for putting the law into effect is still being organized. In the Dominican Republic, agrarian reform has become the order of the day since the death of Rafael Trujillo. During the 31 years of his dictatorship, he had virtually converted the Dominican Republic into a large hacienda of the Trujillo family, through forcible seizure of land from the

small peasants and large landholders alike; some estimates of the family's holdings ran to as high as 60 percent of all arable land in the republic. Since the revolution of November 1961, these lands have passed into the hands of the government, and a handful have been distributed among the peasants living on them. But although an Agrarian Reform Institute has been established, no basic law has as yet been enacted and none is likely to be until a constitutional régime is established sometime early in 1963.

In Peru and Ecuador the need for agrarian reform is now widely discussed. While Pedro Beltrán was prime minister of Peru between 1958 and 1961, he proposed a program which he labelled "agrarian reform," but which in fact was designed to move Indians from the heavily populated valleys of the Andes to unoccupied government land on the eastern slopes of the mountains. In the recent presidential election campaign, virtually all of the candidates talked about the need for agrarian reform, but the tenacity with which conservative elements blocked the victory of the Aprista Party candidate, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, is a measure of the degree of opposition that still exists to a real program of land redistribution such as the Apristas have advocated for 30 years.

In Ecuador, during the last two presidential election campaigns, candidates have talked vaguely of the need for agrarian reform, but until 1962 no concrete step in this direction was taken. Finally, early this year President Carlos Arosemena issued a decree declaring that the small plots of land which the landlord has been accustomed to give to the Indian for growing food for his family and building his house were to be the property of the tenant. This move aroused violent reaction from the landlords. It is of doubtful legality, in any case, unless ratified by Congress, which at present seems most unlikely to approve even so mild a measure of agrarian reform.

III

The process of land redistribution raises a number of basic issues: What land should be taken? What compensation should be offered? To what degree should peasants be resettled on virgin lands? How can the new proprietors be provided with credit? How can they be given adequate technical assistance? How can they be aided in getting their goods to market?

In most of the countries of Latin America, the latifundia system

left idle a large part of the land available for cultivation. Some countries with agrarian reform programs, therefore, have confined themselves to seizing land which was not under cultivation. This has been the case in Chile and some of the Brazilian states, and was also true of the agrarian reform law of Guatemala. The Colombian legislation passed in early 1962 also puts primary emphasis on acquisition of unused lands by the *Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria*.

In other countries it has been felt that for one reason or another it was not sufficient to take only unused land. In Bolivia, for instance, wherever land was cultivated by semi-feudal sharecropping, all of it was taken; but where it was tilled by modern machinery and wage labor, it was to remain inviolate, at least below a fixed number of acres. In Mexico, the authors of the agrarian reform laws were content to permit the old landholder to keep a certain amount of land, regardless of how it was cultivated, the amount depending upon whether the land was irrigated or had a natural water supply, and whether it was used for agricultural or grazing purposes. In the extreme case of Cuba, where the procedure followed the Soviet model, all lands were seized above a very low maximum area. Fidel Castro himself is authority for the assertion that many of these seizures were in violation of the agrarian reform law of 1959.

A major question has been the form and extent of compensation, if any, which should be paid for expropriated land. It has received a wide variety of answers. In all cases, including that of Cuba, the land reform laws have called for some form of compensation. The Castro government has simply seen fit not to apply the law which it wrote; but elsewhere compensation has been paid. The Cuban, Mexican, Bolivian and Guatemalan agrarian reform laws have called for payment to the landowners of the value which the proprietors themselves had declared the land to be worth for purposes of taxation. In Venezuela, the National Agrarian Institute has negotiated with each landlord in an effort to reach a mutually agreeable figure. When this has proven impossible, the matter has gone to the regular courts which have fixed what they conceived to be an adequate compensation. Under the new Colombian law, the land to be bought or expropriated is appraised by the Agustin Codazzi Geographical Institute, and its valuation serves as a basis of negotiation between the landowner and the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute.

The form of payment for expropriated land has also been of great importance. It is generally impossible for the government to pay in cash for all the land it wants to expropriate. As a result, virtually all the reform laws have provided for payment in interest-bearing government bonds. In Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia and Cuba the legislation has called for complete payment in bonds, although in the Cuban case these bonds have never been issued. In Venezuela, the government pays 10 percent of the expropriation price in cash, and the rest in bonds of from 10 to 20 years' duration, paying not more than 5 percent interest per year. The new Colombian law provides that when unused land is expropriated, payment shall be made in 25-year bonds, paying 2 percent interest. In other cases, land shall be paid for in cash, with annual payments extending from five to eight years, depending upon the kind of land which is being purchased.

The provisions under which expropriated land is transferred to new owners have varied greatly from country to country. At one extreme is Cuba, where, as we have seen, the state has retained most of the expropriated land, organizing it increasingly as state farms. At the other extreme is Bolivia, which has given the Indian peasant title to his land and has not sought to impose any pattern for the organization and use of the land. In a relatively small number of cases, the peasants have (with government encouragement) organized coöperatives, but in most instances they are cultivating the land as individual farmers. In Venezuela, most agricultural land has been given to the peasants as individuals, but in the case of grazing estates the government has insisted that the large land unit be preserved by establishing a coöperative. In Guatemala's abortive reform in the mid-1950s, most of the land which was distributed was given to individual peasants.

Mexico has had its own peculiar method of resolving this problem. In the early days of the reform, there was prolonged discussion of whether the peasants should be given full title to the land they received or whether a pattern of collective agriculture should be adopted. As a result of a compromise in the early 1920s, the *ejido* emerged as the typical pattern, whereby land was granted initially to a village or community, not to the individual peasant. If the members then wished to divide the land among themselves, they were free to do so, with each *ejiditario* cultivating his own acreage. In only a relatively few cases have the peasants decided to work the ejido lands in common, although they frequently join

together for purposes of obtaining credit from the ejido banks, selling their products and other limited objectives.

Starting in the administration of President Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-46), the government began to issue individual title deeds which gave the peasant the right to use the land in perpetuity and to pass it on to his legal heirs, who were set forth in the deed. However, to this day, for the most part he may not sell or mortgage his land, and if he abandons it for as long as two years, it reverts to the community and can be granted to someone else. Until recently this process of granting individual deeds has moved very slowly, and the great majority of the peasants have still not received them.

For more than a decade a spirited controversy has been waged over the ejido by those concerned with agrarian reform in Mexico. One group has argued that it was time to put an end to the ejido on the grounds that the inability of the peasant to sell or mortgage his land reduced the incentive of the efficient farmer, since he was unable to increase his landholding in any case; the effect of this on the productivity of Mexican agriculture was negative, it was contended, and the ejido sector of the agricultural economy was lagging far behind that of the privately owned farms. These reform advocates favored granting peasants full title to their land, and the establishment of a maximum amount of land which any single family might own.

The other side has argued that the productivity of the ejido was not as bad as opponents maintained, and that in any case this was not the key issue. Rather, they have said, the major objective should be to prevent the reestablishment of large landed estates—a process which they believe would be inevitable were the peasants able to mortgage and sell their land. Therefore, to prevent the growth of a large landless rural proletariat, it was necessary to limit the peasant to use rights in his land.

Officially, the Mexican Government has never abandoned its ejido policy. However, the last two administrations have granted full property rights to individual farmers receiving land along the coast. For the rest, the present government has sought to increase the peasants' feeling of security in their titles to the land. In July of this year it announced its intention of greatly increasing the speed with which use-right titles would be granted to the individual ejido members who had not yet received them; some 2,000,000 more ejiditarios are to obtain them in the near future.

It seems probable that sooner or later the ejido will cease to form the typical pattern of Mexican agrarian reform. Most peasants now have enough experience so that if they are reasonably efficient they are likely to be able to hold onto their land—particularly if the government carries out its plans to extend the rural credit system. Furthermore, the economic, social and political climate of Mexico has changed so drastically as the result of the Revolution that it is virtually impossible for the country's agriculture to revert to the kind of latifundia system which once prevailed. Finally, there is urgent need to increase rapidly the productivity of Mexican agriculture in the face of the country's swiftly growing population, and this is more likely to come about if the more efficient peasant farmers are able to obtain larger amounts of land by displacing the less efficient.

Mexico is not the only country which has put a limit on the right of the peasant to sell or mortgage his land in order to avoid reconstituting large proprietorships. In Bolivia and Venezuela, beneficiaries of land reform cannot sell their land for the first 20 years, except to the reform authorities. A modified version of the same provision was written into the 1959 Cuban land reform decree and the new Colombian law.

Under most agrarian reform programs, the peasants are granted the land without having to pay anything for it. However, the laws of Colombia, Chile and some of the Brazilian states provide for more or less nominal payments to the government. After long debate this idea was rejected in Venezuela, although it was provided that in addition to the land which they were given gratis, the new owners might purchase additional acreage at low rates. Somewhat the same provision was incorporated in the Cuban legislation.

In many of the Latin American countries there are vast areas which are all but vacant of settled population. Being virgin land, much of it is potentially highly productive, and since it generally belongs to the government it is available for distribution to land-hungry peasants without the costs of compensation. However, these regions are likely to be a considerable distance from populated areas, and a good deal of investment is needed in order to make them suitable for settlement; particularly needed are roads to get settlers in and their produce out to markets. And, of course, the land often must be cleared before it can be used.

In virtually every Latin American country that has undertaken

agrarian reform, controversy has arisen over the advisability of concentrating effort on opening up and colonizing virgin hinterland as opposed to redistributing the holdings of the landlords. Over the last 50 years, limited colonization has been undertaken from time to time in the north central part of Argentina. In Chile, too, for almost two generations successive governments have engaged in small-scale colonization projects as a substitute for agrarian reform. As we have noted, a large colonization program has been pushed unsuccessfully in Peru. In Venezuela a bitter if somewhat farfetched controversy has arisen among the agrarian reformers concerning the merits of colonization as opposed to breaking up landed estates.

Actually, both of these approaches are needed. Where population pressure on the land is great, the division of large landholdings is necessary both to lessen the likelihood of social explosion and to obtain the ultimately more efficient use of the land. Redistribution is cheaper than colonization and it promises a quicker incorporation of large elements of the peasantry into the market economy. In many areas, however, sole reliance on land redistribution may merely substitute "minifundia" for latifundia. That is, there is danger that the land will be divided into such small holdings that they cannot be cultivated efficiently, or that they will never provide more than the barest subsistence. This has occurred in some parts of Mexico, where the ejiditarios have such small acreage that they are forced to supplement their income from their holdings by working as farm laborers on larger neighboring farms, or even by finding employment in nearby cities. Certainly where land hunger is keenest and where the developed land that is available will not go around, some of the would-be peasant proprietors must be persuaded to move to new areas, where more intensive work may be necessary but where the promise of an adequate livelihood is infinitely greater. Even Mexico's vast agrarian reform program cannot cope with the problem of overpopulation on the central plateau, much of which is arid. Succeeding governments have made valiant efforts to irrigate vast stretches of this plateau, but the only real solution is to convince the landless peasants there to move to fertile but unoccupied coastal areas.

A similar situation exists in north central Venezuela. In the state of Carabobo, where virtually all of the large estates have been apportioned among the peasants in plots which are consid-

ered to be of an economical size, there are still several thousand families without land. It is essential to convince these people to move to virgin areas in nearby states, where land is plentiful.

Finally, in Bolivia there is a marked need for colonization as well as land redistribution. Most of the peasant population lives in the high plateaus and valleys of the Andes, where living conditions are hard and agricultural production will inevitably remain low. However, two-thirds of the republic, most of it largely unoccupied, lies to the east of the mountains, in lowland areas stretching out to Bolivia's frontiers with Brazil and Paraguay. Much of this land is very fertile and can produce not only ample foodstuffs and raw materials for the Bolivian population, but sizable quantities for export as well. The government has spent large sums trying to prepare the way for colonization of these lowland areas. It has completed a road into the eastern province of Santa Cruz, it has established colonies of Japanese, Okinawan and Mennonite farmers in the area, it has employed a large part of the army to open up feeder roads from the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway as well as to clear land and build houses for settlers. Finally, it has offered the Indian peasants from the highland all of the land that they can cultivate in the eastern region. Only recently have the Indians, who are used to the bleakness and the rare atmosphere of the highlands, begun to come down in appreciable numbers. It is likely that the present trickle of settlers will soon become a rush which will begin to fulfill the Bolivians' centuries-long dream of opening up and settling the East.

IV

The mere distribution of land is not, of course, a sufficient reform by itself. An effective program of agrarian reform must make sure that the new proprietors have access to credit to finance their crops and to buy equipment, and it must provide technical assistance and help in marketing.

Unfortunately, the banking systems of the Latin American countries are not equipped or disposed to offer the credit needed. The private banks are generally interested in purely commercial transactions, especially in the field of foreign trade. The governments with an agrarian reform program, therefore, have had to establish an agrarian credit bank or to adapt an existing institution to this task. Generally speaking, this has been one of the least successful aspects of agrarian reform in Latin America. In

Mexico, for instance, regional ejido banks were established, but they soon curtailed their operations when many of the ejidos proved to be poor credit risks. Consequently, by the early 1950s these banks were helping to finance only about 20 percent of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, and a considerable number of peasants were being victimized by private moneylenders. In Guatemala, too, a special *Banco Agrario Nacional* was established to finance the new peasant landowners, but because of the overthrow of the Arbenz régime, it did not exist long enough for its efficacy to be judged.

In several countries, the attempt has been made to adapt already existing government banks to meet the needs of agrarian reform. Thus in Venezuela the *Banco Agrícola y Pecuário*, which had originally been established to provide credit for large landholders, was used for this purpose. Today, several years after the beginning of the land reform program, the B.A.P. is still inadequate for the job, partly because its funds are not sufficient, partly because the peasants resent "their" bank lending to the big landlords, and partly because political rivalries have arisen from the fact that the bank has been directed by members of one political party, the Agrarian Reform Institute by members of another.

The original plan of the Cuban agrarian reform was for the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, which had been set up a decade before the advent of the Castro régime, to finance the credit needs of the peasants receiving land. However, at the end of 1959 this bank was merged into the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, and with the adoption of a state-run system of agriculture, the nature of the problem was completely altered.

Although each government which has undertaken agrarian reform has sought to provide technical assistance and advice, the results have been somewhat meager. None of the Latin American countries has had adequate rural extension services or sufficient agricultural experiment stations. They have all lacked sufficient personnel trained in agronomy and related fields to serve the needs of the vast number of new landowners created by the agrarian reform. In several countries, the United States has helped to develop the kind of expertise needed by the new peasant proprietors. The International Coöperation Administration's program in Bolivia in the late 1950s was outstanding, and in

Mexico the Rockefeller Foundation was particularly successful in this field in the same period. In several countries, the United Nations has given small but valuable assistance, notably in Bolivia.

Some concept of the limited nature of the technical assistance which Latin American governments have been able to provide can be obtained from the case of Venezuela. When it undertook its task, the National Agrarian Institute had available only 4 civil engineers, 40 agronomists, 2 forestry engineers, 6 general forestry experts, 11 veterinarians and 97 miscellaneous agricultural experts. The Ministry of Agriculture had only about 30 people in its extension division.

Finally, all agrarian reform programs have faced the difficulty of getting the produce of the new peasant landowners to market. In some countries, the first problem was to arouse interest in the peasants in bringing their crops to market at all. This has been particularly true in Bolivia, where the Indian peasants have been accustomed to a self-sufficient, non-monetary economy. There is considerable debate among Bolivians and foreigners who have looked at the problem as to the net effect of the reform there on the Indians' output. Some people feel that they have tended to grow somewhat more for their own use, and as a result are generally eating better than they did before they received the land. However, there are other observers who feel that the majority of the Indians are growing very little if any more for their own families than they did before. The one thing which is generally agreed upon is that a large proportion of the new proprietors have had virtually no concern about growing a surplus for sale to the cities. Yet many of the Indian peasants in the Department of La Paz have shown a considerable interest in growing and selling enough to permit them to buy things which they never before were able to enjoy, such as bicycles, better clothes, and even radios.

Even where the peasant proprietor is generally interested in bringing produce to market, as is the case in Mexico, he has had little knowledge of what goods will sell best, and in many cases roads on which to move his goods have been lacking. It has thus been necessary to provide feeder roads to connect crop areas with highways, where produce could be picked up for shipment to market. Mexico, Venezuela and Bolivia have all had extensive programs in this field.

Another need has been for processing plants to absorb certain

kinds of produce grown in quantities which cannot be consumed locally. A widely publicized incident in Venezuela in 1960 underscored this need. A group of peasants who had received land under the agrarian reform decided to grow tomatoes, which had been bringing a very good price in urban markets, instead of their traditional crops of corn and cotton. However, they had not foreseen the need for sufficient transport to ship the tomatoes during the few days in which they reached maturity. In addition, they produced more than could possibly be absorbed by their natural marketing area. As a result, a large part of the harvest rotted in the fields. Fortunately, this particularly disaster will not happen again, because soon after the 1960 crop season a large canning plant was built which could absorb all of the tomato crop and provide means of transporting it to market.

In some cases the banks which have financed the peasants have also tried to help them with marketing problems. Thus the ejido banks in Mexico buy a considerable proportion of the produce from those peasants whose crops they finance. In Venezuela, too, the *Banco Agrícola y Pecuário* has undertaken to guarantee a minimum price and to buy several basic crops in whatever quantity they were offered by the peasant proprietors. It was intended that the *Banco Agrario Nacional* of Guatemala should engage in the same type of operations.

v

One of the basic purposes of agrarian reform programs in Latin America has been to increase agricultural output. However, in a number of cases the immediate result of redistributing the land has been a decline in production. The new peasant owners have not had the technical competence, nor in some cases sufficient interest, to maintain former output levels. The Indian peasant of Bolivia is not the only one who tends to ignore all but his own personal needs. In Mexico, too, the ejiditarios have lagged in terms of productivity, partly because they lack technical know-how, partly because the small size of many of the individual plots makes them inefficient. Most of the increases in output of Mexican agriculture in the last couple of decades have come from the lands remaining in the hands of the old landowners, now officially known as "middle-sized landlords."

One fundamental obstacle to higher productivity has been the innate conservatism of the small peasant. He is inclined to follow

the techniques of his ancestors, and to grow the crops which they grew, until he is thoroughly convinced of the value of changing his ways. This is particularly true in the countries with heavy Indian populations. Hence, virtually all governments undertaking agrarian reform are faced with a basic need for education.

Venezuela has been an exception to the general rule that agrarian reform results initially in a decline of production. From the beginning, Venezuela has achieved a notable increase in agricultural output as well as acreage under cultivation. At the same time, there has been some improvement in diversification of output on the lands which have been affected by the reform. This record can be attributed both to the relatively advanced state of the peasantry and its acquaintance with a monetary economy, and to the efforts of food and raw-material processors to stimulate production. The new Heinz canning plant and the users of hard fibres have been particularly active in persuading the new peasant proprietors to grow the products needed for their manufacturing operations. The textile industry has also taken steps in this same direction.

Whatever immediate effect agrarian reform may have on production, there is little doubt that land redistribution is fundamental to any long-run increase in output in most of the Latin American countries. Under the traditional large landholding system, the proprietors have had, and still have, little incentive to augment production sufficiently to keep up with the rapid rise in population. Since their exploitation of only a part of their land by ancient methods gives them plenty of income to indulge in the conspicuous consumption which is the prevailing mark of the landed aristocracy, they see no reason to divert part of it into investment in agricultural equipment and new methods.

Agrarian reform is part of the transformation which is carrying the economy and society of Latin America from semi-feudalism and semi-slavery into the twentieth century. It raises enormous problems, for, as we have seen, much more is involved than the redistribution of land. But these problems must be solved, not only because one of the fundamental aspirations of the masses of Latin America is to possess and work their own land, but because this development is essential for the economic growth as well as the eventual political stability of the whole continent. The United States has done well, through the Alliance for Progress, to associate itself with this movement.

THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN SPAIN

By Hugh Thomas

IN 1963 the United States can renegotiate her alliance with Spain. If neither party were to raise new conditions, the ten-year-old alliance would be automatically extended, to last another ten years. However, General Franco has already hinted that he wants to bargain for further military aid. The political structure of the country with which the U.S. Government is now probably preparing to confirm its friendship is at an especially interesting stage.

The National Movement, the *Falange Española Tradicionalista de las JONS*, is even less of a party than most single parties in authoritarian states. It derives from General Franco's clever amalgamation of the Carlists (*Tradicionalistas*) and the semi-Fascists of the Falange who were his main non-military supporters in the civil war. The most fervent Carlists and Falangists were either expelled or kept outside, and today the few radical Falangists (of whom the most extreme is the small hectic group known as "Young Nation") are nearly as critical of General Franco as is any Socialist. The Falange proper is really no more than the bureaucracy which staffs the ministries and the various organizations, including old soldiers who make use of the Falange ideology to gather some popular appeal. This ideology is partly simply emotive—making use of the phrases of the epoch of the civil war such as "crusade of liberation"—and partly based on the radical aspirations of the ambivalent founder of the Falange, José Antonio Primo de Rivera; but most of the original Falangists remaining—possibly as many as 60 percent of the pre-civil-war members were killed between 1936 and 1939—have settled down as middle-aged businessmen, profiting from the recent industrial successes or from the more long-standing profiteering.

More important than the party are the 23 national syndicates, forming the official trade-union organization of Spain, controlled by a bureaucracy under the secretary-general of the movement, usually of cabinet status. The principle behind the syndicates is that both capital and labor should be controlled by a threefold bargain between the workers, the employers and the state. Employers are forbidden to sack workers or to pay less than the agreed minimum wage; workers are not allowed to strike. The

syndicates have offices in almost every town in Spain, and whenever there is a labor dispute it is usually settled in this office. This "solution of the tension between capital and labor" is, according to General Franco, Spain's "answer" to the challenge of modern industrial conditions. It would be wrong to regard the organization as entirely a farce. The syndicates have, in fact, won considerable concessions both in the form of social security benefits and wage increases. For instance, last March the National Congress of Syndicates approved a resolution demanding a raise in minimum wages. Many suggestions were made for eliminating red tape in wage discussions. The Congress also approved a resolution which, among other things, advocated the election of some (but not all) officers by free and secret ballot; previously there was an element of free election only at the lower levels. The delegates also called on the Government to raise the nation's standard of living to the Common Market level by 1975, through a 15-year development plan. It is clear that Socialists, anarchists and even Communists are enrolled in the movement. It is also obvious that the syndicates do not articulate properly the wishes of either side ("sides" remain in Spain as elsewhere) and that the smooth working of the system is prevented by bureaucracy.

There have been several strikes over the last ten years, beginning with the near-general strike in Barcelona in 1951. In the spring of 1962 there was an upheaval inside the Falange when the vice president resigned after an effort to obtain free elections to the various offices. In April the most serious economic challenge to the régime since 1939 took place with the start of a two-month-long strike in the traditionally revolutionary province of Asturias. Negotiations had been going on since the previous autumn over a wage demand by the Asturias coal miners: they wanted their existing wage amounting to between 54 and 75 cents a day raised to a starting minimum of \$2.50. A rise in the price of coal had almost been agreed on in order to raise wages. But the miners were angered by the general rise in prices. When seven miners were dismissed over an unimportant incident at a mine in Mieres, 50,000 Asturias coal miners struck. Sympathy strikes followed all over Spain, especially in the steelyards of Bilbao, but also in the south and in Barcelona (there were no strikes in Madrid). The upshot was that for two months the economy of Spain was paralyzed. In June there was a general return to work, but only after the Government had agreed to negotiate an increase.

The significance of these strikes is, first, that the Government was forced to negotiate not simply with the local syndicates but with the representatives of unofficial workers' commissions; this really meant the admission of the existence of an unofficial opposition. Secondly, the workers came close to imposing their demands despite the lack of an official organization. This new-found workers' strength does not seem to have derived from any specific political creed, though once the strike had begun it was backed by all the old left-wing parties of Spain, both at home and in exile, including the Communists. Money had obviously been brought to Spain from abroad, presumably before the strike began, to compensate for the absence of strike funds. It came from the unions of the West (Belgium, France, West Germany and even the United States). The inaction of the Government came as a surprise. For a long time, nothing was done; then a state of emergency was declared and more troops were moved in. But even then there was a curious absence of tension, with the forces of both the régime and the strikers reluctant to use violence. A number of strikers were arrested; some were sent to Valladolid prison, but others were soon freed. The comparative lenience of the Government was undoubtedly explained by the fact that the church appeared increasingly on the side of the strikers.

II

The Roman Catholic Church in Spain dominates education, is represented on all censorship boards for TV, radio, books and newspapers, and owns about 1,600 publications of various sorts. All schoolmasters, even in state schools, are supposed to be practicing Catholics. The church is a strong instrument of national unity, for no other organization has so many branches (the priest and his church) throughout the country. The new lay order, Opus Dei, which grew out of student discussions in the late 1920s aiming to combat agnosticism, is now very important. Members are supposed to carry on their normal professions while observing the vows of chastity, poverty and obedience, and to influence events and their colleagues toward Catholicism. All income beyond the satisfaction of immediate needs must be given to the order. Laureano López Rodó, who, as Commissioner for Economic Development, is preparing a five-year development plan for Spain in conjunction with the World Bank, is technical secretary of the order. A typical member is Alberto Ullastres, the ascetic Minister

of Commerce, and an important figure now as Spain seeks to negotiate her associate membership in the Common Market. The order began as an attempt to oppose the supposed influence of freemasonry in pre-civil-war Spain; it is ending by seeming a Catholic caricature of it.

But the church's weight is not entirely thrown in support of the régime. Take, for instance, *Acción Católica*, inspired by Pius X's injunction to Catholics to form national associations to defend the church. The most common activity of this movement, which has about half a million Spanish members, often seems to consist of good works carried on by women of the bourgeoisie to try to draw workers back to church. However, *Acción Católica* could easily inspire a regular Christian Democratic Party and indeed, before the civil war, the nucleus of such a party did take shape for a time. The outstanding figure of this group is Angel Herrera, now Bishop of Málaga, and during the 1930s editor of the Catholic daily newspaper *El Debate*. Herrera has inspired a new model suburb in Málaga and, through the foundation of a social institute for priests, has laid the basis for a whole new generation of socially minded churchmen. He has also denounced the arbitrary nature of the régime's censorship. In May of this year, at the height of the strikes in the north of Spain, the *Acción Católica* periodical *Ecclesia* published an editorial in favor of the right to strike. In July, in an obvious attempt to placate this powerful group, Franco invited several members to join the Government.

In accord with *Ecclesia*, certain Spanish bishops issued pastoral letters at the time of the strike affirming that the right to refuse labor was an essential human freedom—thereby echoing the Pope's recent encyclical to the same effect. It is reliably reported that General Franco criticized both the Cardinal Primate of Spain, Dr. Plá, and the papal nuncio, Cardinal Antoniutti, for apparently countenancing this clerical support of the opposition. Then, a few weeks later, José María Gil Robles, the chief Christian Democratic statesman in Spain, leader of *Democracia Social Cristiana Española*,¹ was arrested after attending a European federalist meeting in Munich. Gil Robles, who had been the Catholic and middle-class political hope in the years immediately before the civil war, and who was for a long time a close political adviser of the pretender Don Juan, had returned to Spain from

¹ There is also a left-wing Christian Democratic group led by another ex-minister of the Republic, Jiménez Fernández, now a professor at Seville University.

exile only in 1957 to defend certain young Socialists at their trial. The meeting at Munich was attended by 80 people of varying political groups in Spain as well as by 38 Spanish exiles, including Salvador de Madariaga and Rudolfo Llopis, the secretary-general of the Socialist Party in exile. The meetings between Gil Robles, Madariaga and Llopis seemed to those present to heal the quarrels of a whole generation. A declaration was introduced by both groups of Spaniards, urging that Spain's entry into the Common Market should be made conditional on the Government's recognition of five elementary civil rights. (Incidentally, the declaration, by avoiding the statement that *all* offices in a future Spain should be open to election, deliberately left the way open for a monarchy.) There was no vote on the Common Market question, due to the Spanish Government's protests in Brussels and Bonn. Nevertheless, when Gil Robles returned to Madrid, he was arrested and given a choice of going to internal exile on the arid island of Fuerteventura in the Canaries or of going abroad. He chose to go to Paris. Thus the man who was in many ways the very conservative leader of the Christian Democrats passed into open opposition.

There is a working-class emanation of this clerical opposition to Franco in the small Catholic trade union HOAC (*Hermanadas Obreras de Acción Católica*), which is thought to have a membership of about 30,000, including both priests and workers. The aim of this group is specifically to try to rival the government-controlled unions. It publishes a magazine, *Boletín*, frequently containing political articles of a critical nature and therefore sold only by subscription. In 1962 many HOAC members took part in the strikes in the north. It seems quite well thought of by the few workers who have heard of it, in spite of the fact that there is obviously considerable hostility among workers toward any organization which owes ultimate allegiance to the Cardinal Primate, who also is president of *Acción Católica*.

Not only is there this working-class opposition within the church; there is also a great deal of clerical opposition centered on two traditionally separatist areas of Spain, the Basque provinces and Catalonia. In the former area, the many admirable Basque priests are close to the people, and one result is that church attendance there is the highest in Spain. In May 1960, about 350 Basque priests signed a long letter criticizing police torture and the absence of civil liberties and then circulated it to their bishops

and to foreign newspapers. In consequence, some were sent to other parts of Spain. In Catalonia also there is clerical opposition, chiefly centered on the powerful Abbot of the Monastery of Montserrat, Don Aureli María Escarré, who has shown great bravery in defending civil liberties and demanding recognition of Catalan rights.

Far from being a bastion of support for the régime, then, the church has recently provided some of its chief opponents. Possibly the new Pope, John XXIII, and a more socially conscious Vatican have been the direct inspiration of this movement. It could lead to the church actually deserting Franco—as it deserted Perón in 1955 and Trujillo in 1960. Looking ahead, one can see the possibility that if there were free elections in Spain a Christian Democratic Party of the size and importance of the parties existing today in both Germany and Italy could take shape. At present, however, the conservative Opus Dei is probably the chief force inside the Spanish church, and in view of its strong control inside the existing régime it presumably will be the last element within the church to abandon it.

III

The armed forces, the various police forces, the civil governments in the provinces, the ministries in Madrid—these are, of course, the instruments through which the régime carries on its policies. It is difficult to make any generalization about the degree to which they are loyal. In the past, rumors have often circulated about the loyalty of this or that general, some being too overtly monarchist, others being suspected of personal ambitions. But with the passing of time nearly all the generals who played dominant roles in the civil war (and who therefore might possibly rival General Franco) have died or have retired from active life. General Muñoz Grandes, who once led the Blue Division against Russia, became Vice Premier in July of this year, thus obviously being singled out definitely as the personality about whom the régime should rally if General Franco were to disappear suddenly. Most of the army officers share General Franco's own political ideology of a powerful and centralist Spain. They reject all "foreign" dogmas—Communism, liberalism, anarchism, socialism, freemasonry—as "*anti-España*," and all regional feelings as anti-Castilian; for the army, as for the Bourbons, Castille is the same as Spain.

The role of the army in Spanish politics since 1808 has, with some reason, given many officers the idea that they really hold the country together, and that were it not for the garrisons in the large cities, the country would fall apart into the old separate entities of Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia, etc. But at lower levels there is discontent over the bad pay, which often forces officers to take a second job. This gives them a contact with civilian life, and must serve to erode the conception of an officer class. The loyalty of the various police forces, including the famous civil guard, is not in doubt; the political police is universally acknowledged in Spain to be brutally efficient, with an impressive anti-Communist research department.

About the ministries and civil government it is also impossible to make accurate generalizations, though there are many persons, especially in the lower ranks, who have left-wing views and long for a change to a government which they could serve with more satisfaction. The degree to which the business world supports the régime is beyond the scope of this article, but many leading bankers and industrialists are deeply involved in it. Though actual corruption has probably decreased in comparison with what it was before the Stabilization Plan of 1959 (when three sets of books were common practice—one each for management, tax collectors and shareholders), nevertheless the relations between government agencies and leading industries of which the state approves is so close as to make the highest standards of either business or administrative morality almost impossible.

IV

In the center of this increasingly confused picture is General Franco, now on the brink of 70. His health appears good, though it is rumored that he suffered more than was admitted from the wound to his hand last December. He derives his prestige from his military victories in the civil war, from his diplomatic skill since, and from the simple fact that no other Spanish régime since 1808 has preserved internal order more effectively (however harshly). He is accepted so easily because he clearly lives without ostentation and without evident corruption. He obviously dislikes parties and apparently relies on no single person to advise him. He lives a patriarchal life surrounded by his family and a few old comrades such as General Alonso Vega, the Minister of the Interior. In comparison with the grander landlords and the upper classes gener-

ally he is almost progressive. He is undoubtedly interested in the increasing prosperity of Spain, provided this can be accomplished without any surrender of his long-held principles. The industrial advances of the years since 1951 (the index of industrial production has risen by nearly 50 percent since then) have obviously caused him to look upon himself as an enlightened despot who, given time, can make what is still after all a semi-developed country into a modern one.

However, per capita real income has risen since 1935 only about 25 percent—less than this for the workers. The industrial production of the last ten years marked the first rise after a period of total stagnation; it was not until 1954 that industrial production reached pre-civil-war figures, and the average rate of growth of 3.1 percent since 1951 is below the O.E.C.D. average.² At the same time, agriculture has slumped and production has not even kept pace with the rise of population. Yet a vast number of Spaniards, especially town dwellers, are better off and there is a good deal of evidence that the last ten years have created a “new middle class”; in Madrid people never seem to tire of pointing out the significant rise in the number of motor-scooter registrations. And these people yearn for still better conditions.

General Franco often assures audiences that the question of what is to happen when he dies is already settled. Since Spain is, by the Law of Succession of 1947, a monarchy, this settlement is expected to provide for a Council of Regency (composed of people like the Archbishop of Toledo, the Minister of the Interior, the Dean of the Madrid College of Lawyers, the Captain General of the Madrid region) which would itself impose a king. He would have to be a Spaniard, over 30 and a Roman Catholic. In fact, the choice is really limited to either the pretender Don Juan or Don Juan Carlos, his son.³ It is often thought that Franco prefers Don Juan Carlos as the more pliable; but the son is known to be dutifully filial, and has sworn that he could never reign before his father. Some believe that Franco himself wishes to impose a king on the throne before he dies himself, and perhaps stay in the background for some time thereafter. But in either event, what sort of monarchy would this be? A king almost as powerful as

² A World Bank group recently visited Spain and has apparently worked out a plan which would, if adopted, cause Spain to aim for an annual growth rate of 5 percent.

³ The still surviving and not negligible Carlist “Communion” backs Prince Hugo of Bourbon Parma, and there are some Falangists who favor Alfonso, son of Don Juan’s elder brother, Don Jaime, who renounced his claims in 1935 because of illness.

General Franco is himself? A constitutional monarchy in the English style? Surely impossible, since General Franco has so profound a distaste for liberalism of any kind. The General will presumably want the king to preserve the fabric of the new Spain, with its syndical "solution" of labor troubles and its exile of political parties as complete as that of the Jews or Moors in the sixteenth century. The arbitrary censorship would continue, with newspapers not only forbidden to publish news of matters such as the strikes but also forced occasionally to print false news given them by the Government.

The monarchists themselves are divided on all these questions. A committee of Don Juan's 43-member privy council is said to be even now working out a new scheme for the restored monarchy; Don Juan is plausibly reported to have been impressed by General de Gaulle's handling of the French National Assembly. In fact, almost all the full-time Monarchists (some being members of Opus Dei) are actively non-liberal. There is, however, a constitutional Monarchist group, *Unión Española*, which does not collaborate with Don Juan, but which is probably backed by thousands of Spaniards, who, while seeing nothing itself desirable in the idea of king, consider the monarchy as a good step forward—however long it may last—and as a possibly steadying institution to what might otherwise be a dangerous situation. The leaders of this group are Joaquín Satrustegui, recently exiled to Fuerteventura after the famous Munich meeting, and Professor Tierno Galván, the deprived professor of constitutional law at the University of Salamanca, a man well known in the United States, who was refused a passport to come here this year to lecture at Princeton. The Christian Democrats led by Gil Robles would also accept a king. The left-wing Christian Democrats of Professor Jiménez Fernández have gone on record as accepting a monarchy only if there were a new plebiscite in favor of it.

These are not by any means the only opposition parties in Spain. There is an influential if disunited group of Liberals, of whom the poet and sometime Falangist propagandist Dionisio Ridruejo is the outstanding leader. He too is now forced to live abroad due to his having been present at Munich. All the working-class groups of the time of the civil war retain followers in Spain, though their leaders are abroad. Foremost are the Socialists, much divided since the war by two questions: whether to accept a monarchy and whether to collaborate with the Commu-

nists. The leadership represented at the Munich meeting seems to have hinted "Yes" to the first, while confirming an old negative to the second. However, there is much tension between those Socialists who have been in exile since 1939 and those who, mostly younger, have remained at home—the latter feeling justifiably that the exiles have lost touch with conditions in Spain. There is also an anarchist organization at Toulouse, but it seems certain that the great following which this ideology had among the working class of Spain before the civil war has vanished.

The Communists (with La Pasionaria still its nominal president) are undoubtedly the best organized opposition group in Spain. They have the advantage of a powerful radio station, *Radio España Independiente*, operating from Prague, which, judging by the relevance of its broadcasts, clearly has close collaborators inside Spain. The Communist Party has concentrated on gaining a few well-placed followers rather than masses, and hard-working and disciplined party members exist in many villages in the south of Spain, among intellectual circles of Madrid, in the syndicates and even the ministries. The themes of Communist propaganda—reconciliation among the anti-Franco forces, opposition to United States bases, a moderate rather than an extreme economic policy—are naturally popular. With a censored press it is surprisingly easy for a pro-Soviet attitude to prevail in intellectual circles. In free conditions the Communists would probably expand. They might, for instance, absorb the semi-Marxist but also semi-Christian Democratic grouping of chiefly progressive and idealistic sons of the middle class, the Popular Liberation Front. This party, which actively regards itself as Castroist, was founded in 1959 by the diplomat Julio Cerón, who was promptly sent to prison, remaining there ever since. One hundred members of this party were imprisoned in June 1962 following the explosion of a number of bombs in Madrid.

The two leading separatist movements, the Basques and the Catalans, both maintain headquarters in Paris. Though neither has any effective organization in Spain itself, both have martyrs, notably Jorge Pujol, the Catalan doctor who was imprisoned in 1960 for singing the banned Catalan national song at a public meeting at which General Franco was present. Both these movements are less interested in actual independence than in limited local rights, including the recognition of the Basque and Catalan languages for use in schools. As in the past, the significance of

these separatist movements derives from the economic importance of Barcelona and Bilbao as large industrial towns whose hard-working and outward-looking bourgeoisie feel that they are made to carry the weight of the rest of Spain on their shoulders. Yet Catalan regionalism is a good deal less strong than before the civil war, due in part to the development of home-grown Spanish raw materials for the Barcelona textile mills.

Where the working class is concerned, no one could give an accurate answer as to the potential strength of these movements, nor can the attitudes of "the new middle class" be predicted. The age-old Spanish distrust of central government survives, especially against a régime so centralist as General Franco's. And in fact when the régime describes its opponents as *anti-España*, it almost speaks the truth; for what they especially oppose are those agencies of national unity which have been established, often with difficulty, throughout the country—the civil guard, the tax inspectors, the municipal officials, the local officers of the syndicates, the priest—all usually from outside the town in which they serve and all in some measure regarded even now by local populations as the agents of a Castillian army of occupation.

v

The foregoing suggests that Spain is in crisis. What are the forces which have caused this and will no doubt bring further changes, however slowly, in the future? The paradox is that the very forces which have over the last decade helped to enrich the régime are also eroding it. In 1950 Spain was poor, isolated from the rest of Europe, with few friends except Perón. The standard of living was so low that the working classes were cowed into apathy. It was easy for Franco to survive through the use of force alone. Only the anarchists could have broken this grip and they had been crushed. Since then things have changed radically.

First, there is tourism. In 1951 about one million foreigners visited Spain. In 1962 the expected number is ten million. This vast influx accounts for Spain's present large foreign-exchange reserves and enabled the Government to escape from its near-bankruptcy of the year 1958–59. At the same time the tourists bring new ideas. A Spanish tradesman who talks to one of his French colleagues hears how prosperous life is in the freer world north of the Pyrenees. Many have made money out of tourism, and this has merely conquered past apathy rather than calmed misery.

Second, the increasing wealth of the Common Market has been both a challenge and a lure. Economically, Spain has been increasingly liberal since 1959, and now foreign investments can be made freely in Spain and the profits taken out. Since Spain sells more to Britain than to any other single country she has been driven inexorably, now that Britain has applied for full membership in the Common Market, to apply for associate membership—leading in time to full membership. With this application the glaring differences between the political life of Spain and that in the Common Market countries have been made obvious.⁴ The treatment of Gil Robles and others who went to the meeting at Munich must have had an adverse effect on Spain's chances of acceptance at Brussels. The recent visit of three Common Market officials to General Franco and the Caudillo's later favorable mention of northern democracy—the first in 25 years—is a sure pointer to the future. General Franco is now faced with the hardest of all his choices: either to maintain his ban on intellectual freedom but risk rejection by the Common Market, thereby incurring a serious setback and possibly ultimate economic ruin; or to make concessions toward freedom in order to enter the Common Market as an associate, thus incurring the risk of beginning a snowballing process which might lead to the eclipse of his system.

A third factor in Spanish politics is the American alliance. Since 1953, the United States has provided General Franco's government with \$1.7 billion (\$543 million in military aid, the rest in economic aid). In return it has enjoyed the lease of lands on which to construct three major air bases and a large naval air base. There are also radar bases and a naval supply base. The effect of this alliance in the short run has inevitably been to bolster the régime. True, it is possible that the United States contributed to the inflation that raised the cost of living in Spain by nearly one-half between 1953 and 1958. But in fact this derived in the main from the general wage rise of 1956 and from the ill-balanced industrial advances of those years. Nor is there any truth in the argument that the United States did its best to spoil the Spanish cotton revival; it merely did nothing to assist a crop which it believed would for many years be sold at prices above the world market price. In fact, the whole of the economic achievements of the régime might have

⁴ Nearly 700,000 Spanish workers are now abroad, sending back money from West Germany or France or Britain to their families; when they return they will not find authoritarian Spain easy to live in.

been ruined had it not been for the loan by the International Monetary Fund in July 1959 at the time of the stabilization plan. Clearly, it was not in the American interest to let Spain go bankrupt. Apart from economic support, the Spanish armed services have undoubtedly profited from their new association with the United States, not simply because of the considerable supplies of military equipment and the training made available, but because of the increased *esprit de corps* that the Spaniards have gained as a result of working with American officers and military technicians.

Yet for a variety of reasons, both rational and irrational, with which Americans have grown familiar, there has been incessant Spanish criticism of the United States, some evidently officially inspired. At the end of 1961 there was a good deal of criticism of the American policy toward Portugal, and American economic aid to Morocco is unpopular because of Moroccan aspirations toward the Spanish outposts in Africa of Ceuta, Melilla, Ifni and Sahara. Spain maintains commercial relations with Cuba. In January of this year, Blas Piñar, the director of the *Instituto de Cultura Hispanica*, wrote an article in the monarchist paper *ABC* which denounced the United States as hypocritical for siding with Soviet Russia in the war and then planning her overthrow. The attack evoked a complaint from the American Embassy and the critic resigned. However, there have been other criticisms that have seemed officially inspired; all are probably aimed at strengthening Spain's hand in the forthcoming treaty negotiations.

The attitude of the Spanish Government itself to the United States is in fact ambivalent. Its anti-Communism would inevitably cause it to be an ally of the United States in any world war. Even though Franco might toy with the idea of keeping Spain out of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would allow the SAC bases in Spain to go unscathed. But even so the barely concealed official Spanish attitude is that Spain is doing the United States a great service by allowing her to establish bases on the sacred national soil. After all, a self-consciously nationalistic régime like Franco's could hardly admit the necessity of an ally. There is thus an imperceptible but undeniable attitude of contempt in official Spanish attitudes to the United States, just as there is a definite condescension by the more traditional upper classes toward the American way of life. And this national attitude is not simply one

deriving from the régime itself. Spain is still poor but still proud, and the riches of America impress only a small number of Spaniards. The anarchists in the civil war did not covet the riches of the bourgeoisie; they wished to destroy them as unclean. The long-standing Spanish hostility toward, and incapacity for, the idea of capitalism is in fact an inevitable undercurrent to Spain's relations with the leading exponent of the capitalist idea.

On the other side of the Spanish political spectrum, it is almost impossible to hear a good word for the United States among any of the opposition—the Christian Democrats included. Students and members of the Popular Liberation Front have been known to refer to American personnel in Madrid as the army of occupation—only half in jest. In the long run, however, the alliance must have an erosive effect on the régime. It has probably driven many people toward the left, thus increasing the opposition. It has also brought Spain into the middle of the cold war, so that any crisis in Spain is bound to affect relations between East and West. Finally it gives the United States an opportunity actually to influence events in Spain. Those who are setting out to renew the 1953 treaty might recall that General Franco today needs the United States more than the United States needs Spain. In fact, over the next few years, with the development of missiles, overseas SAC bases such as exist in Spain will become increasingly obsolete.

The signs are that Spain is heading toward a new period of change, whether caused by internal developments alone or by unacknowledged but firm pressure from the Common Market or the United States, and whether or not the changes lead to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. It is not at all fanciful to see the possibility of a society developing in Spain roughly similar in political balance to that of postwar Italy. The essential difference between Spain now and 30 years ago, at the time of its last free electoral system, is that there is no longer an anarchist federation a million-and-a-half strong which, through the noblest of motives, prevented the bulk of the Barcelona and Andalusia working class from collaborating with the régime. Nor is there a world depression; nor are the potential leaders of the future so bereft of essential economic and administrative knowledge (not to speak of international advisers) as their fathers were. No one should think that, because the second republic failed, democracy is unworkable in Spain.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political and Legal

THE GRAND DESIGN: FROM COMMON MARKET TO ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP. BY JOSEPH KRAFT. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 122 p. \$2.95.

In this brief but sensible and enlightening study, the "grand design" seen by Mr. Kraft is an Atlantic Partnership between the United States and Western Europe. More concerned with function than with form, he argues that such a working economic partnership is both feasible and necessary.

COLD WAR AND COMMON SENSE. BY THOMAS W. WILSON, JR. Greenwich (Conn.): New York Graphic Society, 1962, 211 p. \$4.95.

As the title suggests, the author is not an alarmist about the state of international affairs. He finds the Soviet Union not advancing and the West not retreating. A balanced if not particularly exciting appraisal.

AN APPROACH TO PEACE, AND OTHER ESSAYS. BY H. STUART HUGHES. New York: Atheneum, 1962, 204 p. \$4.50.

In these essays Professor Hughes, a Harvard historian and currently an independent candidate for the Senate, presents his frankly and at times polemically dissenting opinions about American foreign policy and cultural attitudes in recent years. Perhaps his most controversial views relate to his distrust of the strategy of deterrence and his advocacy of nuclear disarmament.

APPEASEMENT: ROAD TO WAR. BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. New York: Rolton House, 1962, 211 p. \$3.95.

In this tract for our times Mr. Chamberlin argues vigorously—with a number of criticisms of U.S. policy and other writers on foreign affairs—that the Communist powers are unappeasable and that our actions should follow from that grim premise.

NATIONS IN ALLIANCE: THE LIMITS OF INTERDEPENDENCE. BY GEORGE LISKA. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 301 p. \$6.00.

The author of "International Equilibrium" and "The New Statecraft" presents a theoretical analysis of the structure and dynamics of alliances—what creates them, holds them together, renders them effective or not, and leads to their dissolution.

MEN AND NATIONS. BY LOUIS J. HALLE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 228 p. \$4.75.

Mr. Halle, formerly a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and now a professor at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva, here undertakes to formulate for himself a political philosophy to meet the problems of practice and action that he has encountered.

KREMLIN TARGET: U.S.A. BY DONALD DUNHAM. New York: Ives Washburn, 1961, 274 p. \$4.50.

Chiefly a discussion of the methods, purposes and targets of Soviet propaganda and psychological warfare directed against the United States.

NO SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY. BY FRANK J. JOHNSON. Chicago: Regnery, 1962, 230 p. \$5.00.

After reviewing the international scene the author offers a quite explicit "blue-print for victory" over Communism.

THE NEW FRONTIER OF WAR. BY WILLIAM R. KINTNER WITH JOSEPH Z. KORNFEDER. Chicago: Regnery, 1962, 362 p. \$7.50.

An examination of Communist political warfare with some proposals for a counterattack.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THEORETICAL ESSAYS. EDITED BY KLAUS KNORR AND SIDNEY VERBA. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 237 p. \$5.00.

An interesting symposium on developments in the theory of international relations, including games, models, bargaining theory and the like.

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FOREIGN POLICY. BY M. RUTHNASWAMY. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961, 384 p. Rs. 20.

A systematic study—the first to appear in India, apparently—on the principles and organization of foreign policy, the art of diplomacy and diplomatic techniques.

DIPLOMATIC PROTEST IN FOREIGN POLICY: ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES. BY JOSEPH C. MCKENNA. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962, 222 p. \$6.00.

A study concerned with the effectiveness of diplomatic protest as a device in international relations. The cases examined are a number of U.S. protests between 1900 and 1935, relating to such matters as neutral rights, protection of foreign investments and security of nationals abroad, and Communist activities.

NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY. BY GILLIAN WHITE. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1962, 283 p. \$13.75.

A statement of the relevant rules of international law in the post-1945 setting.

THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM. BY NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 83 p. \$2.75.

In these Godkin lectures delivered at Harvard in February 1962 Governor Rockefeller speaks on the values of the federal idea and its potential role, nationally and internationally.

DER ROTE HANDSCHUH. BY FRITZ MAX CAHÉN. Frankfurt/Main: Athenaeum Verlag, 1961, 300 p. DM. 18.

A discussion of contemporary ideologies, Soviet and Western, and the significance of their confrontation.

REVISIONISM: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF MARXIST IDEAS. EDITED BY LEOPOLD LABEDZ. New York: Praeger, 1962, 404 p. \$7.95.

Essays on prominent Marxist revisionists and heretics and on the reappearance of revisionist and neo-Marxist trends in recent years.

STALIN AND THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, 1941-1947. BY ALFRED J. RIEBER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 395 p. \$7.50.

This volume, in the series of Studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, deals with the interaction of Soviet policies and those of the French Communist Party in the period from the German invasion of Russia up to the withdrawal of the Communists from the French government in 1947.

FRANCE AND HER EASTERN ALLIES, 1919-1925. BY PIOTR S. WANDYCZ. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, 454 p. \$8.50.

A very solid history of Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak relations between the Versailles Conference and the Locarno treaties. The author, a historian at the University of Indiana, has made good use of the available sources in the three languages.

AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMACY AND JAPAN, 1945-1951. BY R. N. ROSECRANCE. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 288 p. \$8.50.

An original survey of Australian diplomacy toward Japan in the period between the end of the war and the eventual signing of the peace treaty.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1961. EDITED BY RICHARD P. STEBBINS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ELAINE P. ADAM. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1962, 555 p. \$6.95.

Now in its twenty-third year, this standard publication presents a selection from the principal documentary materials relating to American foreign policy. Provides numerous cross references to the parallel Council on Foreign Relations volume, "The United States in World Affairs."

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE. BY HERMAN KAHN. New York: Horizon Press, 1962, 254 p. \$4.50.

In this book Mr. Kahn develops the themes of his earlier and very important study "On Thermonuclear War." His central purpose is to set people to thinking rather than dithering about the formidable problems that modern technology and the state of international relations have dropped in our laps.

THE LIMITS OF DEFENSE. BY ARTHUR I. WASKOW. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 119 p. \$2.95.

After a critique of both the "counter-force" and the "balanced deterrent" theories of defense, the author puts forward his own proposal of "disarmament-plus"—staged and controlled disarmament combined with the creation of a world police force.

100 MILLION LIVES: MAXIMUM SURVIVAL IN A NUCLEAR WAR. BY RICHARD FRYKLUND. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 175 p. \$3.95.

An argument by a Washington journalist in favor of the strategy of limiting the targets for nuclear bombing to military installations and avoiding cities.

CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY POLITICS. EDITED BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, 272 p. \$7.50.

This third volume of the International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research comprises essays concerned with the role and control of violence in world politics and with the impact of the military in domestic political structures.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. EDITED BY JOHN J. JOHNSON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 427 p. \$8.50.

A group of specialists examines the role of the armed forces in the political and social transformations that are going on in the underdeveloped areas of the world: Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

DER PARTISAN. BY ROLF SCHROERS. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1961, 344 p. DM. 18.50.

An effort, at times rather murky, to get at the qualities and motivations underlying the phenomenon of partisan or guerrilla movements.

THE POLITICS OF WESTERN DEFENSE. BY F. W. MULLEY. New York: Praeger, 1962, 282 p. \$6.75.

The author, a Labor M.P., appraises the political and military aspects of the NATO alliance and suggests means of strengthening it, including the need for a European nuclear strike force.

AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. BY ROBERT GILPIN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 352 p. \$6.95.

A useful effort to appraise the role scientists have played in determining our nuclear weapons policy, a subject that involves the difficult question of how to distinguish between technical and political judgments.

LIVING WITH THE ATOM. BY RITCHIE CALDER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 275 p. \$5.95.

A discussion of the promises and problems of living in an age of nuclear energy, particularly those relating to health, radiation and disposal of radioactive waste.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE. BY JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 76 p. \$2.50.

In these lectures delivered in India in 1961, Ambassador Galbraith discusses, with wit and perception, some of the problems involved in achieving the momentum of economic development. He particularly stresses the social and political requisites for economic advance.

THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. BY BELA BALASSA. Homewood (Ill.): Irwin, 1961, 304 p. \$7.35.

This is one of the first books to make a systematic analysis of the character of economic integration, the problems it poses, and the criteria by which it should be judged. It draws together a large literature and makes good use of recent experience in Western Europe and elsewhere.

L'ÉCONOMIE DU XX^e SIÈCLE. BY FRANÇOIS PERROUX. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1961, 598 p. NF. 24.

This is the fullest and most systematic account we have had of Professor Perroux' "dominant economy," "poles of growth" and other central elements of his economic ideas.

TRADITIONAL CULTURES: AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. BY GEORGE M. FOSTER. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 292 p. \$6.50.

In this thoughtful study, a professor of anthropology at the University of California deals with "the cultural, social, and psychological side of technical assistance and technological development, particularly as it occurs in traditional rural communities which have been the targets of developmental programs."

BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD. EDITED BY ROBERT L. BAKER. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, 463 p. \$7.75.

Papers on a variety of international economic and business problems, prepared for the International Industrial Conference held in San Francisco in 1961.

THE RACE TO THE YEAR 2000. BY FRITZ BAADE. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 246 p. \$4.95.

An effort by a German economist to project the possible shape of the world in coming decades, with particular attention to competitive trends in the Communist bloc and the West.

IRAN UND WIR. BY FRIEDRICH KOCHWASSER. Herrenalb/Schwarzwald: Erdmann, 1961, 339 p. DM. 18.40.

A history of German-Iranian trade and economic relations from the late Middle Ages to the present; principal emphasis is upon developments since 1945.

The Second World War

NIGHT DROP: THE AMERICAN AIRBORNE INVASION OF NORMANDY. BY BRIGADIER GENERAL S. L. A. MARSHALL. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1962, 425 p. \$6.50.

A detailed and vivid account of the actions of the first U.S. airborne divisions in the Normandy invasion, based in good part on interviews with the survivors shortly after the event.

LE DÉBARQUEMENT DE PROVENCE (15 AOÛT 1944). BY JACQUES ROBICHON. Paris: Laffont, 1962, 372 p. NF. 18.

An account by a French journalist of the 1944 Allied landing in southern France.

PLOESTI: THE GREAT GROUND-AIR BATTLE OF 1 AUGUST 1943. BY JAMES DUGAN AND CARROLL STEWART. New York: Random House, 1962, 407 p. \$6.95.

An elaborate and authoritative account of the spectacular but costly U.S. air raid on the Ploesti refineries in Rumania.

OPERATIONSGEBIET ÖSTLICHE OSTSEE UND DER FINNISCH-BALTISCHE RAUM 1944. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961, 186 p. DM. 24.

Three studies on German-Finnish military collaboration in 1944.

OPERATION BERNHARD. BY ANTHONY PIRIE. New York: Morrow, 1962, 303 p. \$5.00.

A cloak-and-dagger account of a wartime German plan to counterfeit *en masse* British bank notes.

The United States

MEN AND DECISIONS. BY LEWIS L. STRAUSS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 468 p. \$6.95.

In these readable and significant memoirs Admiral Strauss reviews his exceptionally active, fruitful and at times controversy-ridden career. As is appropriate, about half the book is devoted to the years 1946-1958 when he was a member and then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and intimately involved in some of the nation's most fateful decisions.

SPEARHEADS OF DEMOCRACY: LABOR IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. BY GEORGE C. LODGE. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1962, 260 p. \$4.00.

The former Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs sets out in lively fashion his analysis and recommendations concerning a set of problems too often overlooked in American foreign policy. After describing the political and economic importance of labor leaders and organizations in underdeveloped countries, he assesses past policy and makes a series of concrete recommendations about what American labor, private business and the government should be doing.

THE LIBERAL PAPERS. EDITED BY JAMES ROOSEVELT. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962, 354 p. \$5.00; Garden City: Doubleday, \$1.25 (paper).

This book of critical essays on various facets of our foreign policy has been the object of a minor political tempest. According to the editor, it grew out of discussions in 1959-60 that "were initiated because of disillusionment with many of the seemingly mindless policies that we as a nation were following." Authors include David Riesman, James Warburg, Walter Millis, Arthur Waskow, H. Stuart Hughes and Quincy Wright.

AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES. EDITED BY ROBERT E. SPILLER AND ERIC LARRABEE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 216 p. \$4.75.

Ten specialists in various cultural and political fields were asked to address themselves to the "national self-image" in the twentieth century. Some of the pieces are quite good but too much navel-contemplation leads to squinting.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND YOU! BY ANDREW BERDING. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 264 p. \$4.50.

The former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs discusses on the basis of his extended experience in government service how our foreign policy is created and carried out, how the procedure might be improved and what the citizen can do.

CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: ITS FORMATION AND FINANCING. BY SIMON KUZNETS, ASSISTED BY ELIZABETH JENKS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 664 p. \$12.00.

This basic volume completes a 12-year study of capital formation and its financing undertaken by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

THE REVOLT OF THE CONSERVATIVES. BY GEORGE WOLFSKILL. Boston: Houghton, 1962, 303 p. \$5.00.

A lively and interesting story of the American Liberty League in the heyday of its battle against the New Deal between 1934 and 1936.

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING. BY JAMES A. ROBINSON. Homewood (Ill.): Dorsey Press, 1962, 262 p. \$5.50.

In this contribution to a relatively sparsely treated subject Professor Robinson examines the role of Congress in the formation of U.S. foreign policy, a role that he finds to be increasingly one of legitimizing or amending policies initiated by the executive.

THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. BY DAVID N. FARNSWORTH. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961, 189 p. \$4.00. (Paper, \$3.00.)

A monograph on the role of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in the years 1947-1956.

THE AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT AND OTHER REPORTS, OPINIONS, AND SPECULATIONS. BY RICHARD H. ROVERE. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, 308 p. \$4.95.

A mélange of lively essays on the American political and intellectual scene by a staff writer for *The New Yorker*. The title piece is an obscurantist tongue-in-cheek quest for the hidden masters of our society, reprinted from *Esquire*.

THE TIGER IN THE SENATE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF WAYNE MORSE. BY A. ROBERT SMITH. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 455 p. \$4.95.

A warts-and-all biography of the maverick, able, but appallingly pugnacious Senator from Oregon.

MR. CONSERVATIVE: BARRY GOLDWATER. BY JACK BELL. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 312 p. \$4.50.

An interim appraisal by a political writer for the Associated Press.

THE TIME OF POWER: A REAPPRAISAL OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES. BY RICHARD GOOLD-ADAMS. London: Weidenfeld, 1962, 320 p. 30/.

A British appraisal, neither sympathetic nor particularly penetrating, of the career of the late John Foster Dulles.

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1961. Washington: G.P.O., 1962, 908 p. \$6.00.

This volume in the series of Presidential papers covers the period January 20 to December 31, 1961. It contains President Kennedy's public messages, verbatim transcripts of news conferences and other materials released by the White House.

ANGLO-AMERICA. BY PAUL F. GRIFFIN AND OTHERS. San Francisco: Fearon, 1962, 552 p. \$7.75.

A substantial regional geography of the United States and Canada.

Western Europe

EUROPA: DOKUMENTE ZUR FRAGE DER EUROPÄISCHEN EINIGUNG. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1962, 3 v.

This comprehensive and valuable collection of documents relating to European unity extends from plans for federation during the inter-war period through the middle of 1961. It includes memoranda, treaties, conventions and constitutions.

SYSTÈMES FISCAUX ET MARCHÉ COMMUN. BY LOUIS REBOUD. Paris: Sirey, 1961, 374 p. NF. 24.

An analysis of the problems involved in relating the constitution of the Common Market to the diverse fiscal systems of the participants.

L'EUROPE DES EUROPÉENS. BY GEORGES ELGOZY. Paris: Flammarion, 1961, 332 p. NF. 8.50.

The author of "La France devant le Marché Commun" discusses the further actions that must be taken to achieve real European union.

COMMON MARKET LAW: TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES. BY ALAN CAMPBELL AND DENNIS THOMPSON. South Hackensack (N.J.): Rothman, 1962, 487 p. \$11.50.

Chiefly an extensive legal commentary on the Rome Treaty, its provisions, application and implications for municipal law.

LA POLITIQUE CÉRÉALIÈRE EN EUROPE AU SEUIL DE L'UNIFICATION. BY FRANCIS-CHARLES FABRE. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1960, 231 p. Gldrs. 15.90.

Detailed data on European grain economy and national policies that form a useful background for the problems of the Common Market.

LA IV^e RÉPUBLIQUE ET SA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE. BY ALFRED GROSSER. Paris: Colin, 1961, 438 p. NF. 22.

A lucid and scholarly examination of the problems confronting the Fourth Republic and its foreign policy. As Mr. Grosser points out, France was the only country in the postwar world forced to confront both the domestic Communist problem and the demands for colonial independence. The interplay of these two issues severely handicapped the governments that tried to deal with them.

THE TEST: DE GAULLE AND ALGERIA. BY C. L. SULZBERGER. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, 228 p. \$4.95.

Pieces on President de Gaulle and his handling of the Algerian crisis, compiled chiefly from Mr. Sulzberger's columns in *The New York Times*.

LE RÉFÉRENDUM DU 8 JANVIER 1961. UNDER THE DIRECTION OF FRANÇOIS GOGUEL. Paris: Colin, 1962, 237 p. NF. 24.

A careful analysis of campaigns, press attitudes and voting with regard to the referendum concerning self-determination in Algeria.

THE LIBERATION OF PARIS. BY WILLIS THORNTON. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, 231 p. \$5.95.

An account of life in Paris under the German occupation and of the liberation of the city in 1944.

THE ACTION FRANÇAISE: DIE-HARD REACTIONARIES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRANCE. BY EDWARD R. TANNENBAUM. New York: Wiley, 1962, 316 p. \$7.50.

An understanding but by no means partisan study of the French nationalist Right, from the Dreyfus Affair through the Vichy régime. Despite differences in individual temperament, the author found a common set of qualities: "authoritarian, anti-democratic, antisemitic, and certain that their thinking alone is right."

LA FRANCE DANS LA C.E.C.A. BY PHILIPPE SAINT MARC. Paris: Colin, 1961, 438 p. NF. 24.

A study of the French experience in the European Coal and Steel Community, with particular reference to the problems of multiple planning.

WAR AND PEACE AND GERMANY. BY FRED WARNER NEAL. New York: Norton, 1962, 166 p. \$3.95.

In this essay on the German and Berlin issues in postwar international relations Professor Neal is critical of U.S. policy as being inherently incapable of success and as committing U.S. prestige and security in defense of interests not our own. He urges the need to negotiate "meaningfully and realistically" with the Soviet Union.

BERLIN: HOSTAGE FOR THE WEST. BY JOHN MANDER. Baltimore: Penguin, 1962, 124 p. 95 cents (paper).

A brief discussion of the West's political and moral stake in West Berlin and of Khrushchev's possible intentions.

THE FRENCH IN GERMANY, 1945-1949. BY F. ROY WILLIS. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 308 p. \$6.00.

A good history of the French zone of occupation. One of the author's conclusions is that the occupation, rather than embittering relations, did in fact pave the way for the closer understanding that took place in the 1950s.

IDEOLOGIEN DES RECHTSRADIKALISMUS IM NACHKRIEGS-DEUTSCHLAND. BY HANS-HELMUTH KNÜTTER. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1961, 230 p. DM. 16.80.

A study of "right-radical" ideas in postwar Germany, with special reference to the themes and image of National Socialism.

GERMAN CATHOLICS AND HITLER'S WARS. BY GORDON C. ZAHN. New York: Sheed, 1962, 232 p. \$4.75.

A study of the reasons for the failure or inability of German Catholics effectively to resist Hitler's drive to war.

GRIFF NACH DER WELTMACHT. BY FRITZ FISCHER. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961, 896 p. DM. 34.80.

An ambitious and scholarly effort to explain the confused but expansionist war aims of Imperial Germany in the First World War.

GESCHICHTE ÖSTERREICHS. BY ERICH ZÖLLNER. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1961, 672 p. DM. 36.

This is a massive history, by a professor at the University of Vienna, of the Austrian lands from the earliest settlement to the present. Extensive bibliography.

DER WIEDERAUFBAU IN ÖSTERREICH: DIE FINANZIELLE KULISSE. BY FRANZ HEISSENBERGER. Frankfurt/Main: Knapp, 1961, 119 p. DM. 17.80.

A discussion of the financial problems confronting Austria in the reconstruction period after 1945.

TRENT'ANNI DI STORIA ITALIANA (1915-1945). PRESENTED BY FRANCO ANTONICELLI. Turin: Einaudi, 1961, 387 p. L. 2000.

In this interpretation of Italian history from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second, surveys of particular periods are interlarded with illustrative evidence by a wide variety of authors and participants in the events.

THE AWAKENING OF SOUTHERN ITALY. BY MARGARET CARLYLE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 147 p. \$3.40.

A discussion of the social and economic changes that are now stirring the long-stagnant life of oppression and poverty of Southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia.

IL DUCE: THE LIFE OF BENITO MUSSOLINI. BY CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT. Boston: Little, Brown, 1962, 367 p. \$6.00.

A life of Mussolini, stressing the years of his decline and fall, but not adding a great deal to our understanding of the late dictator.

FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL: AN AMERICAN INTERPRETATION. BY PAUL BLANSHARD. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962, 300 p. \$3.95.

Mr. Blanshard continues his running indictment of Catholicism as a political force, turning his attention this time to affairs in the Iberian peninsula. He is critical of the church, of both the régimes and of recent U.S. policy in the area.

A MEDIDA DA PRODUÇÃO INDUSTRIAL PORTUGUESA. BY JOÃO PIRES CHAVES AND RUI FERREIRA LEITE. Lisbon: Associação Industrial Portuguesa, 1962, 145 p.

A calculation, with a 28-page English summary, of Portuguese industrial production, for the period 1953-1960.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

CONVERSATIONS WITH STALIN. BY MILOVAN DJILAS. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, 211 p. \$3.95.

In this book (its publication was the occasion for his re-arrest), Mr. Djilas reports on his three visits to the Soviet Union and his conversations with Stalin in 1944, 1945 and 1948, years when he was a prominent Yugoslav Communist leader. While much of what he has to say is now known from other sources, it provides some exceptionally revealing insights into Communist views, purposes and disputes in those years.

THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS. BY ALEXANDER DALLIN. New York: Praeger, 1962, 244 p. \$5.75. (Paper, \$1.95.)

A close student of Soviet foreign policy, Professor Dallin here discusses the assumptions and expectations underlying Soviet policy in and toward the U.N. Considerable attention is paid to events since 1959.

THE KREMLIN SINCE STALIN. BY WOLFGANG LEONHARD. New York: Praeger, 1962, 403 p. \$7.75.

A somewhat abridged, but updated, translation (the original, "Kreml ohne Stalin," noted here July 1960) of a solid and informative account of developments in the Soviet Union and in international Communism, from the last year of Stalin's life to the end of 1960.

RUSSIA ENTERS THE 1960s. EDITED BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. Philadelphia: Lipincott, 1962, 278 p. \$6.50.

Chiefly a selection of materials on anti-Stalinism and economic growth from the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress.

A NEW RUSSIA? BY HARRISON E. SALISBURY. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 143 p. \$3.50.

Mr. Salisbury, Russian specialist for *The New York Times*, here reports on his mixed impressions of a visit to the Soviet Union in the autumn and winter of 1961-1962.

RUSSIA IN MY LIFE. BY THOMAS P. WHITNEY. New York: Reynal, 1962, 307 p. \$6.00.

An informal account of life and politics in Moscow in the last nine years of the Stalin era.

RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY WALTER KOLARZ. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 518 p. \$12.50.

An informative survey of the status and condition of the many churches and religious groups existing, with varying degrees of success or difficulty, within the Soviet Union.

THE TWO FACES OF TASS. BY THEODORE E. KRUGLAK. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, 263 p. \$5.00.

A study of the Soviet news agency—its background, and its news gathering and other functions.

SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1928–1952. BY NAUM JASNY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 467 p. \$10.00.

Mr. Jasny follows the course of Soviet industrialization from the end of N.E.P. to Stalin's death, and evaluates the achievements and the costs involved. An important contribution to the subject.

PRICES AND PRODUCTION OF MACHINERY IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1928–1958. BY RICHARD MOORSTEEN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 498 p. \$15.00.

A significant but quite specialized and technical study measuring the trends in prices and output of machinery in the U.S.S.R.

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD. BY LEON GOURE. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 363 p. \$6.95.

Based on careful use of Soviet and German sources, this is a first-rate account of the 900-day siege of Leningrad from August 1941 to January 1944. In addition to presenting a dramatic, and fearful, story, the author seeks to explain why the city was able to survive, a question that has obvious relevance to any appraisal of the toughness and viability of the Soviet political system.

THE SOVIET REVOLUTION, 1917–1939. BY RAPHAEL R. ABRAMOVITCH. New York: International Universities Press, 1962, 473 p. \$7.50.

The author, who was born in 1880 and is one of the very few survivors of the Menshevik leadership, here sets forth his interpretation of the 1917 Bolshevik seizure of power and the subsequent evolution of the Soviet régime. The volume is particularly valuable in its account of the years of revolution and civil war when Mr. Abramovitch was on the scene and, on several occasions, in the midst of critical events.

A HISTORY OF SOVIET AIR POWER. BY ROBERT A. KILMARX. New York: Praeger, 1962, 359 p. \$7.50.

A substantial survey of the development of Soviet air power since 1917. The last chapters deal with recent developments in missileery.

DER ROTE SOLDAT. BY ERICH F. PRUCK. Munich: Olzog, 1961, 331 p. DM. 19.80.

A study, based in part on Russian sources, of Soviet military organization, discipline, training and strategy.

INDEPENDENT EASTERN EUROPE: A HISTORY. BY C. A. MACARTNEY AND A. W. PALMER. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962, 499 p. \$12.00.

Two specialists—one on Hungary and one on the South Slavs—collaborate in this substantial survey of the history of states lying between Germans and Russians during the years of precarious independence between the two world wars.

EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE WORLD: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POST-STALIN ERA. EDITED BY STEPHEN D. KERTESZ. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962, 386 p. \$6.50.

This volume, a sequel to "The Fate of East Central Europe," which appeared in 1956, surveys the vicissitudes of the nations in this area in the most recent past.

THE BREAK-UP OF THE HABSBURG EMPIRE 1914–1918. BY Z. A. B. ZEMAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 274 p. \$4.80.

A substantial study of the various political and national factors that led to the disintegration of Austria-Hungary in the course of the First World War.

CENTRAL PLANNING IN POLAND. BY JOHN MICHAEL MONTIAS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 410 p. \$7.50.

A very solid and quite technical monograph dealing with the problems, theoretical and practical, of economic planning in Communist Poland. Emphasis is on industry and the role of the Planning Commission.

REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY. BY PAUL E. ZINNER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 380 p. \$6.00.

This study by Professor Zinner is based both on documentary records and on extensive interviewing of Hungarian refugees who escaped to the West. While the revolution itself provides the climax to the story, Professor Zinner ably traces its "labored genesis" back to the period of the Communist seizure of power in Hungary shortly after the war.

THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD. BY MARIA GALANTAI. London: Pall Mall Press, 1961, 224 p. 21/.

A woman's personal account of the siege of Budapest in 1944-1945.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEW COMMUNISM. BY GEORGE W. HOFFMAN AND FRED WARNER NEAL. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, 546 p. \$8.00.

This work, prepared under the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund, provides a wide-ranging survey and appraisal of Titoism in practice. After reviewing briefly the background of the Partisan movement and the break with Stalin, the authors devote their attention principally to the contemporary scene in Yugoslavia and the influence of Titoism abroad.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE LIVING COMMONWEALTH. EDITED BY KENNETH BRADLEY. London: Hutchinson, 1961, 543 p. 50/.

A substantial book of chapters on the Commonwealth and its members, dedicated to the proposition that "It is not enough simply to believe in the Commonwealth. It is also necessary to understand it."

THE RATIONALE OF THE STERLING AREA. BY A. R. CONAN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, 133 p. \$4.75.

A short essay introduces some texts from the proceedings of the Radcliffe Committee relevant to the discussion of key issues of the sterling area.

BRITAIN AND CHINA. BY EVAN LUARD. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 256 p. \$5.00.

This first volume in a new series—Britain in the World Today—sponsored by St. Antony's College, Oxford, deals centrally with British-Chinese relations since the victory of the Communists on the mainland.

THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. BY ROLAND YOUNG. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962, 259 p. \$6.50.

An able account of the organization and workings of the British Parliament by an American political scientist. An unabashed enthusiast for the institution, he echoes the comment, "It's a great place!"

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN. BY IAIN MACLEOD. New York: Atheneum, 1962, 319 p. \$5.75.

The Conservative Party Leader in the House of Commons here tries his hand at biography. Despite the additional perspective of time and access to Chamberlain's private papers, the book does not add greatly to the earlier study by Keith Feiling or to our general sense of Neville Chamberlain's role in the critical years preceding World War II.

THE PROFESSOR AND THE PRIME MINISTER. BY THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD. Boston: Houghton, 1962, 400 p. \$5.95.

An extraordinarily able and revealing biography of F. A. Lindemann, later Viscount Cherwell, that withdrawn and controversial figure who became Churchill's scientific adviser and *éminence grise* in the Second World War.

AUCUPARIUS: RECOLLECTIONS OF A RECRUITING OFFICER. BY MAJOR SIR RALPH FURSE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 330 p. \$5.60.

These memoirs are centrally concerned with the selection and recruitment of men for the British Colonial Service—a subject still of contemporary relevance.

ORDEAL BY FIRE: CANADA, 1910–1945. BY RALPH ALLEN. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 492 p. \$5.95.

A leading Canadian journalist's history of Canadian life in the critical years from 1910 to 1945 with a good deal of attention to the livelier, even eccentric, characters prominent in those years. The volume is the fifth in the Canadian History Series.

DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1917–1939. SELECTED AND EDITED BY WALTER A. RIDDELL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 806 p. \$13.50.

A substantial collection of official documents designed "to enable the reader to obtain a clear picture of Canadian foreign policy" in the inter-war period.

The Middle East

THE ARAB WORLD TODAY. BY MORROE BERGER. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 480 p. \$5.95.

In this scholarly study, limited to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, a professor of sociology undertakes to analyze the contemporary condition and temper of the Arab world—its ambivalent views toward the West and itself, its inability to achieve political stability, its difficulties in coming to terms with the present.

ARAB NATIONALISM. SELECTED AND EDITED BY SYLVIA G. HAIM. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, 255 p. \$6.00.

A selection of writings from the literature of Arab nationalism from the late nineteenth century to the present.

GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. BY H. B. SHARABI. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962, 296 p. \$6.50.

A general summary and guide, by countries.

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS. BY P. J. VATIKIOTIS. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961, 300 p. \$7.95.

While the author is somewhat laden with the impedimenta of methodology and hypotheses, he has a good first-hand knowledge of the Middle East and much of interest to say about the role of the army and the army officers in the contemporary Egyptian political scene.

South and Southeast Asia

FOREIGN AID AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. BY COLONEL AMOS A. JORDAN, JR. New York: Praeger, 1962, 272 p. \$6.50.

The author of this useful contribution, a professor of social sciences at West Point, examines the interrelation between military and economic assistance, a subject about which there has been an abundance of superficial judgments.

THE ARC OF CRISIS. BY CLAUDE A. BUSS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 479 p. \$5.95.

The author appraises the state of affairs in the arc of nations from Japan and Korea in the east to India and Pakistan in the west, pivoting about China, "the central fact of East Asia." He is critical of past U.S. policies in the area and offers some proposals for a "new start."

EAST ASIA IN DANGER. BY LORENZ STUCKI. New York: Walker, 1961, 207 p. \$5.00.

A Swiss editor's report on a visit to Southeast and East Asia around the periphery of Communist China.

INDIA'S CHINA POLICY. BY P. C. CHAKRAVARTI. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962, 180 p. \$4.95.

An Indian scholar criticizes his country's policy toward Communist China as based on wishful thinking and unrealistic appeasement. He favors a policy of common defense against China though not in the form of an open alliance with the West.

DIVIDE AND QUIT. BY PENDEREL MOON. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, 302 p. \$5.50.

An account of the violent events and massacres in the State of Bahawalpur that accompanied the partition of India in 1947. The author, a member of the Indian Civil Service, was stationed in the area at the time.

INDIA'S URBAN FUTURE. EDITED BY ROY TURNER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, 470 p. \$7.00.

A selection of conference studies dealing with urbanization, town-village relations, economic development and urban planning.

WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE: A CRITIQUE OF NEW INDIA'S PLANS AND ASPIRATIONS. BY S. G. BARVE. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962, 372 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$6.00.)

An Indian economist and former public servant here discusses—in a tract, not a treatise, as he says—the numerous economic and social problems confronting his country, and how they may be met.

TILAK AND GOKHALE: REVOLUTION AND REFORM IN THE MAKING OF MODERN INDIA. BY STANLEY A. WOLFERT. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, 370 p. \$7.50.

A comparative biography of two of Gandhi's predecessors in stimulating and guiding Indian nationalism: Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gopal Krishna Gokhale.

THE MAKING OF BURMA. BY DOROTHY WOODMAN. London: Cresset, 1962, 594 p. 63/.

A quite ambitious history of Burma as a background to the country's achievement of independence in 1948. The author has made especial efforts to unravel the very

complex problem of the demarcation of Burma's frontier with China, nearly 1,000 miles in length.

A HISTORY OF MALAYA. BY J. KENNEDY. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962, 311 p. \$6.75.

This concise history of Malaya since 1400 has quite a bit to say about twentieth-century developments, the Japanese occupation and the achievement of nationhood.

PROBLEMS OF FREEDOM: SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE INDEPENDENCE. EDITED BY WESLEY R. FISHEL. New York: Free Press of Glencoe; East Lansing: Michigan State University, Bureau of Social and Political Research, 1962, 233 p. \$6.95.

A group of knowledgeable contributors write on various developments and problems in Viet Nam since 1954: political, ethnic, economic and social.

LE VIET-MINH. BY BERNARD FALL. Paris: Colin, 1960, 376 p. NF. 19.

This is a revised and greatly expanded version of the author's earlier work, "The Viet-Minh Regime," published in English in 1956. A valuable survey of political, economic and social developments in North Viet Nam.

PEASANT MARKETING IN JAVA. BY ALICE G. DEWEY. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, 238 p. \$6.00.

This book, based on field studies in 1952-54, deals with the organization and functioning of the peasant market system in East Java.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

CHINA'S POLITICS IN PERSPECTIVE. BY HAROLD S. QUIGLEY. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, 266 p. \$4.50.

As the author observes, this book is not addressed to specialists but to general readers as an introduction to Chinese politics, on the mainland and on Taiwan. The concluding chapter briefly discusses American policy and non-recognition.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR ERA. BY ALICE LANGLEY HSIEH. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1962, 204 p. \$4.50. (Paper, \$2.25.)

A member of the research staff of the RAND Corporation discusses the development of Communist China's military and strategic thinking in recent years, up to January 1960, and the implications of China's eventual achievement of a nuclear capability.

POWER RELATIONS WITHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1930-1934. BY TSO-LIANG HSIAO. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962, 404 p. \$7.50.

Annotations and comments on documents relating to the Chinese Communist movement in the 1930s—part of the work for a monograph on the subject.

FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA. EDITED BY ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN. South Hackensack (N.J.): Rothman, 1962, 603 p. \$14.00.

A collection of basic laws promulgated since 1949—constitutions, organic laws, electoral, penal, marriage, property and labor laws.

A SHORT HISTORY OF TIBET. BY H. E. RICHARDSON. New York: Dutton, 1962, 308 p. \$5.95.

A British diplomat, with several long tours of duty in Tibet, has written a concise general history, with considerable emphasis on twentieth-century events, including the recent Tibetan uprising and the Indian-Chinese dispute.

THE YOSHIDA MEMOIRS: THE STORY OF JAPAN IN CRISIS. BY SHIGERU YOSHIDA. Boston: Houghton, 1962, 305 p. \$5.50.

In these very interesting and outspoken memoirs, well translated by his son, Shigeru Yoshida tells of his career as Japanese diplomat and statesman. Of central importance is his account of his terms as Prime Minister in the postwar years under the Occupation.

JAPANS RUSSLANDPOLITIK VON 1939 BIS 1941. BY HUBERTUS LUPKE. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1962, 189 p. DM. 24.65.

A study, based on Japanese Foreign Office materials, of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union from the fall of 1939 to the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict and the war in the Pacific.

JAPAN: WIRTSCHAFTSMACHT DES FERNEN OSTENS. BY KARL HAX. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961, 632 p. DM. 56.

A valuable and massive analysis of the background, resources and stages of Japan's remarkable industrial advance over the last century.

THE MODERN JAPANESE BANKING SYSTEM. BY HUBERT F. SCHIFFER. New York: University Publishers, 1962, 240 p. \$7.50.

A study, based on Japanese sources, of Japan's commercial banking system, its structure and operations.

Africa

THE POLITICS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM. BY GEORGE W. SHEPHERD, JR. New York: Praeger, 1962, 244 p. \$5.00. (Paper, \$1.95.)

A survey of the various patterns of African nationalism—traditionalist, Westernized, ultra-African and white racist. The author is a professor of international relations at the University of Denver.

AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES. BY THOMAS HODGKIN. Baltimore: Penguin, 1962, 217 p. 95 cents (paper).

A useful, brief account of African political parties, their origin, types, organization and objectives.

THE LONELY AFRICAN. BY COLIN M. TURNBULL. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962, 251 p. \$4.50.

The theme of these biographies of African tribesmen is that "the African has been taught to abandon his old ways, yet he is not accepted in the new world even when he has mastered its ways."

REVOLUTION IN AFRICA. BY K. MADHU PANIKKAR. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961, 202 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$6.50.)

A young Indian—not the well-known Ambassador with the same initials—combines research and observation to give his interpretation of recent political developments in Africa.

AFRICA SOUTH. BY HARM J. DE BLIJ. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962, 399 p. \$5.95.

The author, a geographer with some ten years' experience and travel in southern Africa, offers a general introduction to basic information on the people and conditions of this area.

LET MY PEOPLE GO. BY ALBERT LUTHULI. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, 255 p. \$5.50.

In this autobiography the former President of the African National Congress and recipient of the 1961 Nobel Peace Prize discusses his personal life and family background as well as his political career in the growing tensions of South Africa.

RACIAL THEMES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA. BY CYRIL A. ROGERS AND C. FRANTZ. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 427 p. \$6.75.

A study, by a psychologist and an anthropologist, of public opinion and attitudes of the European population in Southern Rhodesia as they concern racial matters.

TANGANYIKA: SAIL IN THE WILDERNESS. BY KATHLEEN M. STAHL. The Hague: Mouton, 1961, 160 p. Gldrs. 14.

An account of Tanganyika in the last few years of British rule.

ANGOLA: A SYMPOSIUM. VIEWS OF A REVOLT. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1962, 160 p. \$2.25 (paper).

A series of articles discussing Portuguese-Angolan relations from a variety of perspectives, some of them conflicting.

ANGOLA IN FERMENT. BY THOMAS OKUMA. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962, 137 p. \$3.50.

A former missionary to Angola discusses the growing nationalist movement in the Portuguese colony.

ETHIOPIA: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. BY GEORGE A. LIPSKY AND OTHERS. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962, 376 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$8.75.)

This useful introductory study, prepared under the auspices of the American University, is the ninth in the series, "Survey of World Cultures."

DIE GEOGRAPHISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER WIRTSCHAFT GHANAS. BY WALTHER MANSHARD. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1961, 308 p. DM. 40.

The author, who spent the years 1952-1960 in Ghana as a lecturer in geography, surveys the economic geography of the country with particular attention to agricultural developments.

LE CONGO, TERRE D'AVENIR, EST-IL MENACÉ? BY PATRICE LUMUMBA. Brussels: Office de Publicité, 1961, 217 p. Belgian Fr. 180.

Since 1957 the Belgian publishers have held this manuscript, which the author never found time to revise. Taking pains to explain that there really was nationalism among the Congolese, Lumumba seems to have looked toward more Congolese participation in steps leading toward autonomy, perhaps in some sort of Belgian-Congolese federation.

CHANGEMENTS SOCIAUX EN CÔTE D'IVOIRE. BY B. HOLAS. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1961, 117 p. NF. 8.

Close observation of changes in custom and ritual of a forest people of the Ivory Coast resulting at least in part from their being drawn into the coffee economy of the country.

Latin America and the West Indies

LATIN AMERICA: DIPLOMACY AND REALITY. BY ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1962, 144 p. \$2.95. (Paper, \$1.25.)

This book is concerned primarily with questions of policy the United States will face in its relations with Latin America in the near and in the more distant future. Written with directness and candor, it takes the measure of the Communist threat and also cuts rather sharply at some of the myths prevailing on both sides of the Rio Grande. Mr. Berle draws on his long experience, both official and private, but these are his considered views on policy rather than a personal memoir.

SIGNAL D'UNE TROISIÈME VOIE? BY GEORGES FRIEDMANN. Paris: Gallimard, 1961, 136 p. NF. 7.50.

A brief discussion of Latin American attitudes and problems, "entre Fidel et l'oncle Sam."

MEXICO: REVOLUTION TO EVOLUTION, 1940-1960. BY HOWARD F. CLINE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 375 p. \$6.75.

The author, Director of the Hispanic Foundation in the Library of Congress, but writing unofficially as a professional historian, has prepared a concise, meaty and authoritative survey of developments in Mexico during the last two decades.

CASTRO'S REVOLUTION: MYTHS AND REALITIES. BY THEODORE DRAPER. New York: Praeger, 1962, 211 p. \$4.50. (Paper, \$1.75.)

In these excellent essays—prepared originally as magazine articles—Mr. Draper discusses the meaning of the Castro revolution, the views of other interpreters, the abortive effort to overthrow the régime and the relation between Castro and Communism.

THE CUBAN INVASION: THE CHRONICLE OF A DISASTER. BY KARL E. MEYER AND TAD SZULC. New York: Praeger, 1962, 160 p. \$3.95.

Mr. Meyer of *The Washington Post* and Mr. Szulc of *The New York Times* collaborate in a report and post-mortem on the abortive and disastrous invasion of Cuba in April 1961. While not looking for villains in the piece, the authors feel that the principal institutional blame falls on the C.I.A.

CUBA BETRAYED. BY FULGENCIO BATISTA. New York: Vantage Press, 1962, 332 p. \$3.95.

In this book, written in exile, the former head of Cuba presents his side of the story—his achievements, the plots against him, the significance of Castro.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AGENT. BY HANS TANNER. London: Foulis, 1962, 161 p. 22/6.

A diary of derring-do on behalf of the anti-Castro movement in Miami.

BRITISH GUIANA. BY RAYMOND T. SMITH. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 218 p. \$4.00.

A concise survey of British Guiana's resources, history, economy, social structure, government and politics.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain*: British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations*: United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *International Court of Justice*, *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.*, *Food and Agric. Org.*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office*: 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community*, *European Economic Community*, *Euratom*: 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 87th Congress, 2d Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

AFRICA

THE ECONOMIC development of Uganda; report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Uganda. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 475 p. \$8.50.

OFFICIAL publications of British East Africa. Part II: Tanganyika, comp. by A. A. Walker. Washington, Library of Congress, 1962. 134 p. \$1.00.

UNITED Nations operations in the Congo. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 13, 1962. Washington, 1962. 28 p.

UNITED States Information Agency operations in Africa. Hearing, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Feb. 7, 1962. Washington, 1962. 22 p.

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL commodities: projections for 1970. Rome, FAO, 1962. v.p. (FAO Commodity Review, 1962, Special Supp.) \$2.00.

THE PROBLEMS of the Arid Zone; proceedings of the Paris symposium. Paris, UNESCO, 1962. 481 p. (Arid Zone Research, XVIII.)

ATOMIC ENERGY

AUTHORIZING appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission. Report, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to accompany H.R. 11974, Je. 21, 1962. Washington, 1962. 18 p. (H. Rept. 1871.)

AEC raw materials program. Hearings, Subcommittee on Raw Materials, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 15-16, 1962. Washington, 1962. 184 p.

FRANCE and the atom. N.Y., French Press and Information Service, 1962. 55 p.

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

EFTA'S foreign trade during the first year of operation, 1st July 1960-30th June 1961. [Washington], EFTA, n.d. 32 p.

PROCEEDINGS of the Meeting of Ministers, 27-30 November 1961. Geneva, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1962. 224 p.

EXPORT controls in the United Kingdom and the EEC. Report by T. J. Dodd and K. B. Keating to the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . , Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Apr. 4, 1962. Washington, 1962. 29 p. (Com. Print.)

IMPACT of Common Market proposals on competitive status of U.S. bread and feed grains in the EEC area. Washington, Foreign Agricultural Service, 1962. 33 p.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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